Fla Ascend Performance
fla-org/flash-linear-attention
Guidelines for Ascend NPU kernel / Triton-Ascend backend performance work in the FLA repo.
Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats.
$ npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a claude-codeProject install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.
$ gh skill install sangrokjung/claude-forge stride-analysis-patterns --agent claude-codeProject scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/stride-analysis-patterns .claude/skills/stride-analysis-patterns && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.
Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/
Install the "stride-analysis-patterns" agent skill from https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge/tree/main/skills/stride-analysis-patterns into .claude/skills/stride-analysis-patterns/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "stride-analysis-patterns", then confirm the skill loads.Claude Code copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$skill-installer install https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge/tree/main/skills/stride-analysis-patternsType this inside Codex. $skill-installer <name> installs a curated skill from openai/skills. The installer writes to $CODEX_HOME/skills (default ~/.codex/skills). Restart Codex if the skill does not show up.
$ npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a codexProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.codex/skills/.
$ gh skill install sangrokjung/claude-forge stride-analysis-patterns --agent codexProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge.git skills-src && mkdir -p .agents/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/stride-analysis-patterns .agents/skills/stride-analysis-patterns && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.agents/skills/ instead of .agents/skills for a personal install.
Codex skills documentation · loads skills from .agents/skills/
Install the "stride-analysis-patterns" agent skill from https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge/tree/main/skills/stride-analysis-patterns into .agents/skills/stride-analysis-patterns/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "stride-analysis-patterns", then confirm the skill loads.Codex copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a cursorProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.cursor/skills/.
$ gh skill install sangrokjung/claude-forge stride-analysis-patterns --agent cursorProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge.git skills-src && mkdir -p .cursor/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/stride-analysis-patterns .cursor/skills/stride-analysis-patterns && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.cursor/skills/ instead of .cursor/skills for a personal install.
Cursor skills documentation · loads skills from .cursor/skills/, .agents/skills/, .claude/skills/, .codex/skills/
Install the "stride-analysis-patterns" agent skill from https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge/tree/main/skills/stride-analysis-patterns into .cursor/skills/stride-analysis-patterns/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "stride-analysis-patterns", then confirm the skill loads.Cursor copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ gemini skills install https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge.git --path skills/stride-analysis-patterns--scope user (default) or --scope workspace; --path is the subfolder of the repo that holds the skill; --consent skips the security confirmation prompt.
$ npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a gemini-cliProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.gemini/skills/.
$ gh skill install sangrokjung/claude-forge stride-analysis-patterns --agent gemini-cliProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge.git skills-src && mkdir -p .gemini/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/stride-analysis-patterns .gemini/skills/stride-analysis-patterns && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.gemini/skills/ instead of .gemini/skills for a personal install, then run /skills reload.
Gemini CLI skills documentation · loads skills from .gemini/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "stride-analysis-patterns" agent skill from https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge/tree/main/skills/stride-analysis-patterns into .gemini/skills/stride-analysis-patterns/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "stride-analysis-patterns", then confirm the skill loads.Gemini CLI copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ gh skill install sangrokjung/claude-forge stride-analysis-patternsInstalls for Copilot at project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Preview a skill first with gh skill preview. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).
$ npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a github-copilotProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.copilot/skills/.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge.git skills-src && mkdir -p .github/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/stride-analysis-patterns .github/skills/stride-analysis-patterns && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.copilot/skills/ instead of .github/skills for a personal install. Commit .github/skills so cloud agent and code review can use it.
GitHub Copilot skills documentation · loads skills from .github/skills/, .claude/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "stride-analysis-patterns" agent skill from https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge/tree/main/skills/stride-analysis-patterns into .github/skills/stride-analysis-patterns/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "stride-analysis-patterns", then confirm the skill loads.GitHub Copilot copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a opencodeOpenCode documents no install command of its own. Project install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.config/opencode/skills/.
$ gh skill install sangrokjung/claude-forge stride-analysis-patterns --agent opencodeProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge.git skills-src && mkdir -p .opencode/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/stride-analysis-patterns .opencode/skills/stride-analysis-patterns && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.config/opencode/skills/ instead of .opencode/skills for a personal install.
OpenCode skills documentation · loads skills from .opencode/skills/, .claude/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "stride-analysis-patterns" agent skill from https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge/tree/main/skills/stride-analysis-patterns into .opencode/skills/stride-analysis-patterns/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "stride-analysis-patterns", then confirm the skill loads.OpenCode copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
stride-analysis-patternsApply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats.
Stride Analysis Patterns is an agent skill from sangrokjung/claude-forge. Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.
Its SKILL.md is about 5.3k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts.
It sits in Security, covering Threat modeling. The repository describes itself as: oh-my-zsh for Claude Code — 16 agents, 35 commands, 32 skills, 21 safety hooks in one install. v4.0 adds an adversarial review loop: a second agent that never sees the first… The licence is MIT.
2 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.
Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 34d881d. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.
Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.
From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.
No scripts in the folder and no shell commands in SKILL.md (its code samples are python and markdown).
From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.
Links to these hosts (documentation or services it may open):
docs.microsoft.comowasp.orgwiley.comFrom URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.
Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.
From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.
Stride Analysis Patterns loads about 5.3k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 49 tokens; SKILL.md has 241 words of instructions outside code blocks.
Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.
The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.
Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.
The full file from sangrokjung/claude-forge at commit 34d881d, republished under its MIT licence (© sangrokjung). 241 words, ~5,264 tokens.
.claude/skills/stride-analysis-patterns/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.
S - Spoofing → Authentication threats
T - Tampering → Integrity threats
R - Repudiation → Non-repudiation threats
I - Information → Confidentiality threats
Disclosure
D - Denial of → Availability threats
Service
E - Elevation of → Authorization threats
Privilege| Category | Question | Control Family |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Can attacker pretend to be someone else? | Authentication |
| Tampering | Can attacker modify data in transit/rest? | Integrity |
| Repudiation | Can attacker deny actions? | Logging/Audit |
| Info Disclosure | Can attacker access unauthorized data? | Encryption |
| DoS | Can attacker disrupt availability? | Rate limiting |
| Elevation | Can attacker gain higher privileges? | Authorization |
# Threat Model: [System Name]
## 1. System Overview
### 1.1 Description
[Brief description of the system and its purpose]
### 1.2 Data Flow Diagram[User] --> [Web App] --> [API Gateway] --> [Backend Services] | v [Database]
### 1.3 Trust Boundaries
- **External Boundary**: Internet to DMZ
- **Internal Boundary**: DMZ to Internal Network
- **Data Boundary**: Application to Database
## 2. Assets
| Asset | Sensitivity | Description |
|-------|-------------|-------------|
| User Credentials | High | Authentication tokens, passwords |
| Personal Data | High | PII, financial information |
| Session Data | Medium | Active user sessions |
| Application Logs | Medium | System activity records |
| Configuration | High | System settings, secrets |
## 3. STRIDE Analysis
### 3.1 Spoofing Threats
| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| S1 | Session hijacking | User sessions | High | Medium |
| S2 | Token forgery | JWT tokens | High | Low |
| S3 | Credential stuffing | Login endpoint | High | High |
**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Implement MFA
- [ ] Use secure session management
- [ ] Implement account lockout policies
### 3.2 Tampering Threats
| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| T1 | SQL injection | Database queries | Critical | Medium |
| T2 | Parameter manipulation | API requests | High | High |
| T3 | File upload abuse | File storage | High | Medium |
**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Input validation on all endpoints
- [ ] Parameterized queries
- [ ] File type validation
### 3.3 Repudiation Threats
| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| R1 | Transaction denial | Financial ops | High | Medium |
| R2 | Access log tampering | Audit logs | Medium | Low |
| R3 | Action attribution | User actions | Medium | Medium |
**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Comprehensive audit logging
- [ ] Log integrity protection
- [ ] Digital signatures for critical actions
### 3.4 Information Disclosure Threats
| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| I1 | Data breach | User PII | Critical | Medium |
| I2 | Error message leakage | System info | Low | High |
| I3 | Insecure transmission | Network traffic | High | Medium |
**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Encryption at rest and in transit
- [ ] Sanitize error messages
- [ ] Implement TLS 1.3
### 3.5 Denial of Service Threats
| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| D1 | Resource exhaustion | API servers | High | High |
| D2 | Database overload | Database | Critical | Medium |
| D3 | Bandwidth saturation | Network | High | Medium |
**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Rate limiting
- [ ] Auto-scaling
- [ ] DDoS protection
### 3.6 Elevation of Privilege Threats
| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| E1 | IDOR vulnerabilities | User resources | High | High |
| E2 | Role manipulation | Admin access | Critical | Low |
| E3 | JWT claim tampering | Authorization | High | Medium |
**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Proper authorization checks
- [ ] Principle of least privilege
- [ ] Server-side role validation
## 4. Risk Assessment
### 4.1 Risk Matrix
IMPACT
Low Med High Crit
Low 1 2 3 4L Med 2 4 6 8 I High 3 6 9 12 K Crit 4 8 12 16
### 4.2 Prioritized Risks
| Rank | Threat | Risk Score | Priority |
|------|--------|------------|----------|
| 1 | SQL Injection (T1) | 12 | Critical |
| 2 | IDOR (E1) | 9 | High |
| 3 | Credential Stuffing (S3) | 9 | High |
| 4 | Data Breach (I1) | 8 | High |
## 5. Recommendations
### Immediate Actions
1. Implement input validation framework
2. Add rate limiting to authentication endpoints
3. Enable comprehensive audit logging
### Short-term (30 days)
1. Deploy WAF with OWASP ruleset
2. Implement MFA for sensitive operations
3. Encrypt all PII at rest
### Long-term (90 days)
1. Security awareness training
2. Penetration testing
3. Bug bounty programfrom dataclasses import dataclass, field
from enum import Enum
from typing import List, Dict, Optional
import json
class StrideCategory(Enum):
SPOOFING = "S"
TAMPERING = "T"
REPUDIATION = "R"
INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE = "I"
DENIAL_OF_SERVICE = "D"
ELEVATION_OF_PRIVILEGE = "E"
class Impact(Enum):
LOW = 1
MEDIUM = 2
HIGH = 3
CRITICAL = 4
class Likelihood(Enum):
LOW = 1
MEDIUM = 2
HIGH = 3
CRITICAL = 4
@dataclass
class Threat:
id: str
category: StrideCategory
title: str
description: str
target: str
impact: Impact
likelihood: Likelihood
mitigations: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
status: str = "open"
@property
def risk_score(self) -> int:
return self.impact.value * self.likelihood.value
@property
def risk_level(self) -> str:
score = self.risk_score
if score >= 12:
return "Critical"
elif score >= 6:
return "High"
elif score >= 3:
return "Medium"
return "Low"
@dataclass
class Asset:
name: str
sensitivity: str
description: str
data_classification: str
@dataclass
class TrustBoundary:
name: str
description: str
from_zone: str
to_zone: str
@dataclass
class ThreatModel:
name: str
version: str
description: str
assets: List[Asset] = field(default_factory=list)
boundaries: List[TrustBoundary] = field(default_factory=list)
threats: List[Threat] = field(default_factory=list)
def add_threat(self, threat: Threat) -> None:
self.threats.append(threat)
def get_threats_by_category(self, category: StrideCategory) -> List[Threat]:
return [t for t in self.threats if t.category == category]
def get_critical_threats(self) -> List[Threat]:
return [t for t in self.threats if t.risk_level in ("Critical", "High")]
def generate_report(self) -> Dict:
"""Generate threat model report."""
return {
"summary": {
"name": self.name,
"version": self.version,
"total_threats": len(self.threats),
"critical_threats": len([t for t in self.threats if t.risk_level == "Critical"]),
"high_threats": len([t for t in self.threats if t.risk_level == "High"]),
},
"by_category": {
cat.name: len(self.get_threats_by_category(cat))
for cat in StrideCategory
},
"top_risks": [
{
"id": t.id,
"title": t.title,
"risk_score": t.risk_score,
"risk_level": t.risk_level
}
for t in sorted(self.threats, key=lambda x: x.risk_score, reverse=True)[:10]
]
}
class StrideAnalyzer:
"""Automated STRIDE analysis helper."""
STRIDE_QUESTIONS = {
StrideCategory.SPOOFING: [
"Can an attacker impersonate a legitimate user?",
"Are authentication tokens properly validated?",
"Can session identifiers be predicted or stolen?",
"Is multi-factor authentication available?",
],
StrideCategory.TAMPERING: [
"Can data be modified in transit?",
"Can data be modified at rest?",
"Are input validation controls sufficient?",
"Can an attacker manipulate application logic?",
],
StrideCategory.REPUDIATION: [
"Are all security-relevant actions logged?",
"Can logs be tampered with?",
"Is there sufficient attribution for actions?",
"Are timestamps reliable and synchronized?",
],
StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE: [
"Is sensitive data encrypted at rest?",
"Is sensitive data encrypted in transit?",
"Can error messages reveal sensitive information?",
"Are access controls properly enforced?",
],
StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE: [
"Are rate limits implemented?",
"Can resources be exhausted by malicious input?",
"Is there protection against amplification attacks?",
"Are there single points of failure?",
],
StrideCategory.ELEVATION_OF_PRIVILEGE: [
"Are authorization checks performed consistently?",
"Can users access other users' resources?",
"Can privilege escalation occur through parameter manipulation?",
"Is the principle of least privilege followed?",
],
}
def generate_questionnaire(self, component: str) -> List[Dict]:
"""Generate STRIDE questionnaire for a component."""
questionnaire = []
for category, questions in self.STRIDE_QUESTIONS.items():
for q in questions:
questionnaire.append({
"component": component,
"category": category.name,
"question": q,
"answer": None,
"notes": ""
})
return questionnaire
def suggest_mitigations(self, category: StrideCategory) -> List[str]:
"""Suggest common mitigations for a STRIDE category."""
mitigations = {
StrideCategory.SPOOFING: [
"Implement multi-factor authentication",
"Use secure session management",
"Implement account lockout policies",
"Use cryptographically secure tokens",
"Validate authentication at every request",
],
StrideCategory.TAMPERING: [
"Implement input validation",
"Use parameterized queries",
"Apply integrity checks (HMAC, signatures)",
"Implement Content Security Policy",
"Use immutable infrastructure",
],
StrideCategory.REPUDIATION: [
"Enable comprehensive audit logging",
"Protect log integrity",
"Implement digital signatures",
"Use centralized, tamper-evident logging",
"Maintain accurate timestamps",
],
StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE: [
"Encrypt data at rest and in transit",
"Implement proper access controls",
"Sanitize error messages",
"Use secure defaults",
"Implement data classification",
],
StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE: [
"Implement rate limiting",
"Use auto-scaling",
"Deploy DDoS protection",
"Implement circuit breakers",
"Set resource quotas",
],
StrideCategory.ELEVATION_OF_PRIVILEGE: [
"Implement proper authorization",
"Follow principle of least privilege",
"Validate permissions server-side",
"Use role-based access control",
"Implement security boundaries",
],
}
return mitigations.get(category, [])from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import List, Set, Tuple
from enum import Enum
class ElementType(Enum):
EXTERNAL_ENTITY = "external"
PROCESS = "process"
DATA_STORE = "datastore"
DATA_FLOW = "dataflow"
@dataclass
class DFDElement:
id: str
name: str
type: ElementType
trust_level: int # 0 = untrusted, higher = more trusted
description: str = ""
@dataclass
class DataFlow:
id: str
name: str
source: str
destination: str
data_type: str
protocol: str
encrypted: bool = False
class DFDAnalyzer:
"""Analyze Data Flow Diagrams for STRIDE threats."""
def __init__(self):
self.elements: Dict[str, DFDElement] = {}
self.flows: List[DataFlow] = []
def add_element(self, element: DFDElement) -> None:
self.elements[element.id] = element
def add_flow(self, flow: DataFlow) -> None:
self.flows.append(flow)
def find_trust_boundary_crossings(self) -> List[Tuple[DataFlow, int]]:
"""Find data flows that cross trust boundaries."""
crossings = []
for flow in self.flows:
source = self.elements.get(flow.source)
dest = self.elements.get(flow.destination)
if source and dest and source.trust_level != dest.trust_level:
trust_diff = abs(source.trust_level - dest.trust_level)
crossings.append((flow, trust_diff))
return sorted(crossings, key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True)
def identify_threats_per_element(self) -> Dict[str, List[StrideCategory]]:
"""Map applicable STRIDE categories to element types."""
threat_mapping = {
ElementType.EXTERNAL_ENTITY: [
StrideCategory.SPOOFING,
StrideCategory.REPUDIATION,
],
ElementType.PROCESS: [
StrideCategory.SPOOFING,
StrideCategory.TAMPERING,
StrideCategory.REPUDIATION,
StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE,
StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,
StrideCategory.ELEVATION_OF_PRIVILEGE,
],
ElementType.DATA_STORE: [
StrideCategory.TAMPERING,
StrideCategory.REPUDIATION,
StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE,
StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,
],
ElementType.DATA_FLOW: [
StrideCategory.TAMPERING,
StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE,
StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,
],
}
result = {}
for elem_id, elem in self.elements.items():
result[elem_id] = threat_mapping.get(elem.type, [])
return result
def analyze_unencrypted_flows(self) -> List[DataFlow]:
"""Find unencrypted data flows crossing trust boundaries."""
risky_flows = []
for flow in self.flows:
if not flow.encrypted:
source = self.elements.get(flow.source)
dest = self.elements.get(flow.destination)
if source and dest and source.trust_level != dest.trust_level:
risky_flows.append(flow)
return risky_flows
def generate_threat_enumeration(self) -> List[Dict]:
"""Generate comprehensive threat enumeration."""
threats = []
element_threats = self.identify_threats_per_element()
for elem_id, categories in element_threats.items():
elem = self.elements[elem_id]
for category in categories:
threats.append({
"element_id": elem_id,
"element_name": elem.name,
"element_type": elem.type.value,
"stride_category": category.name,
"description": f"{category.name} threat against {elem.name}",
"trust_level": elem.trust_level
})
return threatsfrom typing import List, Dict, Optional
from dataclasses import dataclass
@dataclass
class Interaction:
"""Represents an interaction between two components."""
id: str
source: str
target: str
action: str
data: str
protocol: str
class StridePerInteraction:
"""Apply STRIDE to each interaction in the system."""
INTERACTION_THREATS = {
# Source type -> Target type -> Applicable threats
("external", "process"): {
"S": "External entity spoofing identity to process",
"T": "Tampering with data sent to process",
"R": "External entity denying sending data",
"I": "Data exposure during transmission",
"D": "Flooding process with requests",
"E": "Exploiting process to gain privileges",
},
("process", "datastore"): {
"T": "Process tampering with stored data",
"R": "Process denying data modifications",
"I": "Unauthorized data access by process",
"D": "Process exhausting storage resources",
},
("process", "process"): {
"S": "Process spoofing another process",
"T": "Tampering with inter-process data",
"I": "Data leakage between processes",
"D": "One process overwhelming another",
"E": "Process gaining elevated access",
},
}
def analyze_interaction(
self,
interaction: Interaction,
source_type: str,
target_type: str
) -> List[Dict]:
"""Analyze a single interaction for STRIDE threats."""
threats = []
key = (source_type, target_type)
applicable_threats = self.INTERACTION_THREATS.get(key, {})
for stride_code, description in applicable_threats.items():
threats.append({
"interaction_id": interaction.id,
"source": interaction.source,
"target": interaction.target,
"stride_category": stride_code,
"threat_description": description,
"context": f"{interaction.action} - {interaction.data}",
})
return threats
def generate_threat_matrix(
self,
interactions: List[Interaction],
element_types: Dict[str, str]
) -> List[Dict]:
"""Generate complete threat matrix for all interactions."""
all_threats = []
for interaction in interactions:
source_type = element_types.get(interaction.source, "unknown")
target_type = element_types.get(interaction.target, "unknown")
threats = self.analyze_interaction(
interaction, source_type, target_type
)
all_threats.extend(threats)
return all_threats© sangrokjung, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file
Just SKILL.md in skills/stride-analysis-patterns of sangrokjung/claude-forge.
Open the folder on GitHubat commit 34d881d
We found 18 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 8 other GitHub owners. This page covers the copy in sangrokjung/claude-forge, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.
Stride Analysis Patterns next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.
| Skill | Stars | Used in | Tokens | Auto-check | Licence | Repo updated |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stride Analysis Patterns this skillsangrokjung/claude-forge | 849 | 8 repos | ~5.3k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| Fla Ascend Performancefla-org/flash-linear-attention | 5.8k | — | ~5.6k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| Forensifyalexgreensh/repo-forensics | 187 | — | ~2.5k | Automated safety check: Notes | Custom licence | |
| Create Rulecartography-cncf/cartography | 4.1k | — | ~3k | Automated safety check: Pass | Apache-2.0 | |
| Commit Security Scancodexstar69/bug-hunter | 519 | — | ~629 | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| Auditing Code For Vulnerabilitiestrilwu/secskills | 156 | — | ~3.2k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT |
fla-org/flash-linear-attention
Guidelines for Ascend NPU kernel / Triton-Ascend backend performance work in the FLA repo.
alexgreensh/repo-forensics
Cross-agent self-inspection of your AI-agent stack. An agent skill from alexgreensh/repo-forensics.
cartography-cncf/cartography
Author a Cartography security rule (one or more Cypher Facts plus a Pydantic Finding output model) under cartography/rules/data/rules/.
codexstar69/bug-hunter
Scan code changes for security vulnerabilities using Bug Hunter-native artifacts and STRIDE context.
trilwu/secskills
Audit source code for exploitable vulnerabilities using threat-model-driven review, taint tracing, invariant checking, and variant analysis.
nordstjernen-web/northstar-browser
Audit browser-engine changes that process untrusted content or cross native-memory, origin, network, storage, extension, decoder, sandbox, or operating-system boundaries.
sangrokjung/claude-forge
Master systematic debugging techniques, profiling tools, and root cause analysis to efficiently track down bugs across any codebase or technology stack.
sangrokjung/claude-forge
Manage major dependency version upgrades with compatibility analysis, staged rollout, and comprehensive testing.
sangrokjung/claude-forge
Analyze session work and automatically convert reusable patterns into Claude Code skills.
sangrokjung/claude-forge
A skill your agent uses when starting Claude Code projects, writing CLAUDE.md/spec.md, dispatching subagents, or requesting Agent Teams parallel development.
sangrokjung/claude-forge
Instinct-based learning system that observes sessions via hooks, creates atomic instincts with confidence scoring, and evolves them into skills/commands/agents.
sangrokjung/claude-forge
Measure and shrink the always-loaded context of a Claude Code harness (CLAUDE.md + rules without paths frontmatter) back under budget — migrate narrative to reference files, convert rules to…
Categories
Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Stride Analysis Patterns is an agent skill from sangrokjung/claude-forge. Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats.
Stride Analysis Patterns fits situations like: analyzing system security; conducting threat modeling sessions; creating security documentation.
Run `npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/stride-analysis-patterns in sangrokjung/claude-forge) into .claude/skills/stride-analysis-patterns in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.
Run `npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/stride-analysis-patterns in sangrokjung/claude-forge) into .agents/skills/stride-analysis-patterns in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.
Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/stride-analysis-patterns, .gemini/skills/stride-analysis-patterns, .github/skills/stride-analysis-patterns and .opencode/skills/stride-analysis-patterns in your project.
SKILL.md names no scripts, command-line tools or credentials: Stride Analysis Patterns is instructions for the agent only. Our summary lists: Python 3.
SKILL.md names 3 domains. As links in the text: docs.microsoft.com, owasp.org and wiley.com. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.
Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.
Stride Analysis Patterns is published under the MIT licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.
About 5.3k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 21k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.
Skills that share tags, products or a category with Stride Analysis Patterns: Fla Ascend Performance (fla-org/flash-linear-attention, 5.8k stars), Forensify (alexgreensh/repo-forensics, 187 stars), Create Rule (cartography-cncf/cartography, 4.1k stars) and Commit Security Scan (codexstar69/bug-hunter, 519 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.
sangrokjung (a GitHub user) maintains it in sangrokjung/claude-forge, which has 849 GitHub stars. The repository holds 24 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on September 3, 2026.
Source: sangrokjung/claude-forge on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.