Agent skill

Stride Analysis Patterns

by sangrokjung in sangrokjung/claude-forge

Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats.

MITAuto-check passedSecurity

Install Stride Analysis Patterns

skills CLI
$ npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install sangrokjung/claude-forge stride-analysis-patterns --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forge.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/stride-analysis-patterns .claude/skills/stride-analysis-patterns && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
stride-analysis-patterns
GitHub stars
849
Used in
8 other repos
Token cost
~5.3k tokens
SKILL.md length
241 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
24
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats.

  • Works in 2 steps: STRIDE Categories → Threat Analysis Matrix
  • Analyzing system security
  • SKILL.md covers When to Use This Skill, Core Concepts, Templates and Best Practices, plus 1 more section
  • Instructions only: no scripts, shell commands, URLs or credentials in SKILL.md

What it does

Stride Analysis Patterns is an agent skill from sangrokjung/claude-forge. Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.

Its SKILL.md is about 5.3k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts.

It sits in Security, covering Threat modeling. The repository describes itself as: oh-my-zsh for Claude Code — 16 agents, 35 commands, 32 skills, 21 safety hooks in one install. v4.0 adds an adversarial review loop: a second agent that never sees the first… The licence is MIT.

When your agent uses it

  • Analyzing system security
  • Conducting threat modeling sessions
  • Creating security documentation

Example prompts

  • “/stride-analysis-patterns”

Requirements

  • Python 3

Workflow steps

2 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. STRIDE Categories
  2. Threat Analysis Matrix

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 34d881d. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    No scripts in the folder and no shell commands in SKILL.md (its code samples are python and markdown).

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Links to these hosts (documentation or services it may open):

    • docs.microsoft.com
    • owasp.org
    • wiley.com

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Stride Analysis Patterns loads about 5.3k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 49 tokens; SKILL.md has 241 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~49
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~5.3k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from sangrokjung/claude-forge at commit 34d881d, republished under its MIT licence (© sangrokjung). 241 words, ~5,264 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/stride-analysis-patterns/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
stride-analysis-patterns
description
Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Use when analyzing system security, conducting threat modeling sessions, or creating security documentation.

STRIDE Analysis Patterns

Systematic threat identification using the STRIDE methodology.

When to Use This Skill

  • Starting new threat modeling sessions
  • Analyzing existing system architecture
  • Reviewing security design decisions
  • Creating threat documentation
  • Training teams on threat identification
  • Compliance and audit preparation

Core Concepts

1. STRIDE Categories
S - Spoofing       → Authentication threats
T - Tampering      → Integrity threats
R - Repudiation    → Non-repudiation threats
I - Information    → Confidentiality threats
    Disclosure
D - Denial of      → Availability threats
    Service
E - Elevation of   → Authorization threats
    Privilege
2. Threat Analysis Matrix
CategoryQuestionControl Family
SpoofingCan attacker pretend to be someone else?Authentication
TamperingCan attacker modify data in transit/rest?Integrity
RepudiationCan attacker deny actions?Logging/Audit
Info DisclosureCan attacker access unauthorized data?Encryption
DoSCan attacker disrupt availability?Rate limiting
ElevationCan attacker gain higher privileges?Authorization

Templates

Template 1: STRIDE Threat Model Document
markdown
# Threat Model: [System Name]

## 1. System Overview

### 1.1 Description

[Brief description of the system and its purpose]

### 1.2 Data Flow Diagram

[User] --> [Web App] --> [API Gateway] --> [Backend Services] | v [Database]


### 1.3 Trust Boundaries
- **External Boundary**: Internet to DMZ
- **Internal Boundary**: DMZ to Internal Network
- **Data Boundary**: Application to Database

## 2. Assets

| Asset | Sensitivity | Description |
|-------|-------------|-------------|
| User Credentials | High | Authentication tokens, passwords |
| Personal Data | High | PII, financial information |
| Session Data | Medium | Active user sessions |
| Application Logs | Medium | System activity records |
| Configuration | High | System settings, secrets |

## 3. STRIDE Analysis

### 3.1 Spoofing Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| S1 | Session hijacking | User sessions | High | Medium |
| S2 | Token forgery | JWT tokens | High | Low |
| S3 | Credential stuffing | Login endpoint | High | High |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Implement MFA
- [ ] Use secure session management
- [ ] Implement account lockout policies

### 3.2 Tampering Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| T1 | SQL injection | Database queries | Critical | Medium |
| T2 | Parameter manipulation | API requests | High | High |
| T3 | File upload abuse | File storage | High | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Input validation on all endpoints
- [ ] Parameterized queries
- [ ] File type validation

### 3.3 Repudiation Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| R1 | Transaction denial | Financial ops | High | Medium |
| R2 | Access log tampering | Audit logs | Medium | Low |
| R3 | Action attribution | User actions | Medium | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Comprehensive audit logging
- [ ] Log integrity protection
- [ ] Digital signatures for critical actions

### 3.4 Information Disclosure Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| I1 | Data breach | User PII | Critical | Medium |
| I2 | Error message leakage | System info | Low | High |
| I3 | Insecure transmission | Network traffic | High | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Encryption at rest and in transit
- [ ] Sanitize error messages
- [ ] Implement TLS 1.3

### 3.5 Denial of Service Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| D1 | Resource exhaustion | API servers | High | High |
| D2 | Database overload | Database | Critical | Medium |
| D3 | Bandwidth saturation | Network | High | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Rate limiting
- [ ] Auto-scaling
- [ ] DDoS protection

### 3.6 Elevation of Privilege Threats

| ID | Threat | Target | Impact | Likelihood |
|----|--------|--------|--------|------------|
| E1 | IDOR vulnerabilities | User resources | High | High |
| E2 | Role manipulation | Admin access | Critical | Low |
| E3 | JWT claim tampering | Authorization | High | Medium |

**Mitigations:**
- [ ] Proper authorization checks
- [ ] Principle of least privilege
- [ ] Server-side role validation

## 4. Risk Assessment

### 4.1 Risk Matrix
          IMPACT
     Low  Med  High Crit
Low   1    2    3    4

L Med 2 4 6 8 I High 3 6 9 12 K Crit 4 8 12 16


### 4.2 Prioritized Risks

| Rank | Threat | Risk Score | Priority |
|------|--------|------------|----------|
| 1 | SQL Injection (T1) | 12 | Critical |
| 2 | IDOR (E1) | 9 | High |
| 3 | Credential Stuffing (S3) | 9 | High |
| 4 | Data Breach (I1) | 8 | High |

## 5. Recommendations

### Immediate Actions
1. Implement input validation framework
2. Add rate limiting to authentication endpoints
3. Enable comprehensive audit logging

### Short-term (30 days)
1. Deploy WAF with OWASP ruleset
2. Implement MFA for sensitive operations
3. Encrypt all PII at rest

### Long-term (90 days)
1. Security awareness training
2. Penetration testing
3. Bug bounty program
Template 2: STRIDE Analysis Code
python
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from enum import Enum
from typing import List, Dict, Optional
import json

class StrideCategory(Enum):
    SPOOFING = "S"
    TAMPERING = "T"
    REPUDIATION = "R"
    INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE = "I"
    DENIAL_OF_SERVICE = "D"
    ELEVATION_OF_PRIVILEGE = "E"


class Impact(Enum):
    LOW = 1
    MEDIUM = 2
    HIGH = 3
    CRITICAL = 4


class Likelihood(Enum):
    LOW = 1
    MEDIUM = 2
    HIGH = 3
    CRITICAL = 4


@dataclass
class Threat:
    id: str
    category: StrideCategory
    title: str
    description: str
    target: str
    impact: Impact
    likelihood: Likelihood
    mitigations: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
    status: str = "open"

    @property
    def risk_score(self) -> int:
        return self.impact.value * self.likelihood.value

    @property
    def risk_level(self) -> str:
        score = self.risk_score
        if score >= 12:
            return "Critical"
        elif score >= 6:
            return "High"
        elif score >= 3:
            return "Medium"
        return "Low"


@dataclass
class Asset:
    name: str
    sensitivity: str
    description: str
    data_classification: str


@dataclass
class TrustBoundary:
    name: str
    description: str
    from_zone: str
    to_zone: str


@dataclass
class ThreatModel:
    name: str
    version: str
    description: str
    assets: List[Asset] = field(default_factory=list)
    boundaries: List[TrustBoundary] = field(default_factory=list)
    threats: List[Threat] = field(default_factory=list)

    def add_threat(self, threat: Threat) -> None:
        self.threats.append(threat)

    def get_threats_by_category(self, category: StrideCategory) -> List[Threat]:
        return [t for t in self.threats if t.category == category]

    def get_critical_threats(self) -> List[Threat]:
        return [t for t in self.threats if t.risk_level in ("Critical", "High")]

    def generate_report(self) -> Dict:
        """Generate threat model report."""
        return {
            "summary": {
                "name": self.name,
                "version": self.version,
                "total_threats": len(self.threats),
                "critical_threats": len([t for t in self.threats if t.risk_level == "Critical"]),
                "high_threats": len([t for t in self.threats if t.risk_level == "High"]),
            },
            "by_category": {
                cat.name: len(self.get_threats_by_category(cat))
                for cat in StrideCategory
            },
            "top_risks": [
                {
                    "id": t.id,
                    "title": t.title,
                    "risk_score": t.risk_score,
                    "risk_level": t.risk_level
                }
                for t in sorted(self.threats, key=lambda x: x.risk_score, reverse=True)[:10]
            ]
        }


class StrideAnalyzer:
    """Automated STRIDE analysis helper."""

    STRIDE_QUESTIONS = {
        StrideCategory.SPOOFING: [
            "Can an attacker impersonate a legitimate user?",
            "Are authentication tokens properly validated?",
            "Can session identifiers be predicted or stolen?",
            "Is multi-factor authentication available?",
        ],
        StrideCategory.TAMPERING: [
            "Can data be modified in transit?",
            "Can data be modified at rest?",
            "Are input validation controls sufficient?",
            "Can an attacker manipulate application logic?",
        ],
        StrideCategory.REPUDIATION: [
            "Are all security-relevant actions logged?",
            "Can logs be tampered with?",
            "Is there sufficient attribution for actions?",
            "Are timestamps reliable and synchronized?",
        ],
        StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE: [
            "Is sensitive data encrypted at rest?",
            "Is sensitive data encrypted in transit?",
            "Can error messages reveal sensitive information?",
            "Are access controls properly enforced?",
        ],
        StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE: [
            "Are rate limits implemented?",
            "Can resources be exhausted by malicious input?",
            "Is there protection against amplification attacks?",
            "Are there single points of failure?",
        ],
        StrideCategory.ELEVATION_OF_PRIVILEGE: [
            "Are authorization checks performed consistently?",
            "Can users access other users' resources?",
            "Can privilege escalation occur through parameter manipulation?",
            "Is the principle of least privilege followed?",
        ],
    }

    def generate_questionnaire(self, component: str) -> List[Dict]:
        """Generate STRIDE questionnaire for a component."""
        questionnaire = []
        for category, questions in self.STRIDE_QUESTIONS.items():
            for q in questions:
                questionnaire.append({
                    "component": component,
                    "category": category.name,
                    "question": q,
                    "answer": None,
                    "notes": ""
                })
        return questionnaire

    def suggest_mitigations(self, category: StrideCategory) -> List[str]:
        """Suggest common mitigations for a STRIDE category."""
        mitigations = {
            StrideCategory.SPOOFING: [
                "Implement multi-factor authentication",
                "Use secure session management",
                "Implement account lockout policies",
                "Use cryptographically secure tokens",
                "Validate authentication at every request",
            ],
            StrideCategory.TAMPERING: [
                "Implement input validation",
                "Use parameterized queries",
                "Apply integrity checks (HMAC, signatures)",
                "Implement Content Security Policy",
                "Use immutable infrastructure",
            ],
            StrideCategory.REPUDIATION: [
                "Enable comprehensive audit logging",
                "Protect log integrity",
                "Implement digital signatures",
                "Use centralized, tamper-evident logging",
                "Maintain accurate timestamps",
            ],
            StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE: [
                "Encrypt data at rest and in transit",
                "Implement proper access controls",
                "Sanitize error messages",
                "Use secure defaults",
                "Implement data classification",
            ],
            StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE: [
                "Implement rate limiting",
                "Use auto-scaling",
                "Deploy DDoS protection",
                "Implement circuit breakers",
                "Set resource quotas",
            ],
            StrideCategory.ELEVATION_OF_PRIVILEGE: [
                "Implement proper authorization",
                "Follow principle of least privilege",
                "Validate permissions server-side",
                "Use role-based access control",
                "Implement security boundaries",
            ],
        }
        return mitigations.get(category, [])
Template 3: Data Flow Diagram Analysis
python
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import List, Set, Tuple
from enum import Enum

class ElementType(Enum):
    EXTERNAL_ENTITY = "external"
    PROCESS = "process"
    DATA_STORE = "datastore"
    DATA_FLOW = "dataflow"


@dataclass
class DFDElement:
    id: str
    name: str
    type: ElementType
    trust_level: int  # 0 = untrusted, higher = more trusted
    description: str = ""


@dataclass
class DataFlow:
    id: str
    name: str
    source: str
    destination: str
    data_type: str
    protocol: str
    encrypted: bool = False


class DFDAnalyzer:
    """Analyze Data Flow Diagrams for STRIDE threats."""

    def __init__(self):
        self.elements: Dict[str, DFDElement] = {}
        self.flows: List[DataFlow] = []

    def add_element(self, element: DFDElement) -> None:
        self.elements[element.id] = element

    def add_flow(self, flow: DataFlow) -> None:
        self.flows.append(flow)

    def find_trust_boundary_crossings(self) -> List[Tuple[DataFlow, int]]:
        """Find data flows that cross trust boundaries."""
        crossings = []
        for flow in self.flows:
            source = self.elements.get(flow.source)
            dest = self.elements.get(flow.destination)
            if source and dest and source.trust_level != dest.trust_level:
                trust_diff = abs(source.trust_level - dest.trust_level)
                crossings.append((flow, trust_diff))
        return sorted(crossings, key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True)

    def identify_threats_per_element(self) -> Dict[str, List[StrideCategory]]:
        """Map applicable STRIDE categories to element types."""
        threat_mapping = {
            ElementType.EXTERNAL_ENTITY: [
                StrideCategory.SPOOFING,
                StrideCategory.REPUDIATION,
            ],
            ElementType.PROCESS: [
                StrideCategory.SPOOFING,
                StrideCategory.TAMPERING,
                StrideCategory.REPUDIATION,
                StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE,
                StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,
                StrideCategory.ELEVATION_OF_PRIVILEGE,
            ],
            ElementType.DATA_STORE: [
                StrideCategory.TAMPERING,
                StrideCategory.REPUDIATION,
                StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE,
                StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,
            ],
            ElementType.DATA_FLOW: [
                StrideCategory.TAMPERING,
                StrideCategory.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE,
                StrideCategory.DENIAL_OF_SERVICE,
            ],
        }

        result = {}
        for elem_id, elem in self.elements.items():
            result[elem_id] = threat_mapping.get(elem.type, [])
        return result

    def analyze_unencrypted_flows(self) -> List[DataFlow]:
        """Find unencrypted data flows crossing trust boundaries."""
        risky_flows = []
        for flow in self.flows:
            if not flow.encrypted:
                source = self.elements.get(flow.source)
                dest = self.elements.get(flow.destination)
                if source and dest and source.trust_level != dest.trust_level:
                    risky_flows.append(flow)
        return risky_flows

    def generate_threat_enumeration(self) -> List[Dict]:
        """Generate comprehensive threat enumeration."""
        threats = []
        element_threats = self.identify_threats_per_element()

        for elem_id, categories in element_threats.items():
            elem = self.elements[elem_id]
            for category in categories:
                threats.append({
                    "element_id": elem_id,
                    "element_name": elem.name,
                    "element_type": elem.type.value,
                    "stride_category": category.name,
                    "description": f"{category.name} threat against {elem.name}",
                    "trust_level": elem.trust_level
                })

        return threats
Template 4: STRIDE per Interaction
python
from typing import List, Dict, Optional
from dataclasses import dataclass

@dataclass
class Interaction:
    """Represents an interaction between two components."""
    id: str
    source: str
    target: str
    action: str
    data: str
    protocol: str


class StridePerInteraction:
    """Apply STRIDE to each interaction in the system."""

    INTERACTION_THREATS = {
        # Source type -> Target type -> Applicable threats
        ("external", "process"): {
            "S": "External entity spoofing identity to process",
            "T": "Tampering with data sent to process",
            "R": "External entity denying sending data",
            "I": "Data exposure during transmission",
            "D": "Flooding process with requests",
            "E": "Exploiting process to gain privileges",
        },
        ("process", "datastore"): {
            "T": "Process tampering with stored data",
            "R": "Process denying data modifications",
            "I": "Unauthorized data access by process",
            "D": "Process exhausting storage resources",
        },
        ("process", "process"): {
            "S": "Process spoofing another process",
            "T": "Tampering with inter-process data",
            "I": "Data leakage between processes",
            "D": "One process overwhelming another",
            "E": "Process gaining elevated access",
        },
    }

    def analyze_interaction(
        self,
        interaction: Interaction,
        source_type: str,
        target_type: str
    ) -> List[Dict]:
        """Analyze a single interaction for STRIDE threats."""
        threats = []
        key = (source_type, target_type)

        applicable_threats = self.INTERACTION_THREATS.get(key, {})

        for stride_code, description in applicable_threats.items():
            threats.append({
                "interaction_id": interaction.id,
                "source": interaction.source,
                "target": interaction.target,
                "stride_category": stride_code,
                "threat_description": description,
                "context": f"{interaction.action} - {interaction.data}",
            })

        return threats

    def generate_threat_matrix(
        self,
        interactions: List[Interaction],
        element_types: Dict[str, str]
    ) -> List[Dict]:
        """Generate complete threat matrix for all interactions."""
        all_threats = []

        for interaction in interactions:
            source_type = element_types.get(interaction.source, "unknown")
            target_type = element_types.get(interaction.target, "unknown")

            threats = self.analyze_interaction(
                interaction, source_type, target_type
            )
            all_threats.extend(threats)

        return all_threats

Best Practices

Do's
  • Involve stakeholders - Security, dev, and ops perspectives
  • Be systematic - Cover all STRIDE categories
  • Prioritize realistically - Focus on high-impact threats
  • Update regularly - Threat models are living documents
  • Use visual aids - DFDs help communication
Don'ts
  • Don't skip categories - Each reveals different threats
  • Don't assume security - Question every component
  • Don't work in isolation - Collaborative modeling is better
  • Don't ignore low-probability - High-impact threats matter
  • Don't stop at identification - Follow through with mitigations

Resources

© sangrokjung, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in skills/stride-analysis-patterns of sangrokjung/claude-forge.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 34d881d

Used in 8 other repositories

We found 18 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 8 other GitHub owners. This page covers the copy in sangrokjung/claude-forge, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

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  • Continuous Learning V2

    sangrokjung/claude-forge

    Instinct-based learning system that observes sessions via hooks, creates atomic instincts with confidence scoring, and evolves them into skills/commands/agents.

    849 GitHub starsUsed in 6 repos~1.8k tokens
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  • Harness Diet

    sangrokjung/claude-forge

    Measure and shrink the always-loaded context of a Claude Code harness (CLAUDE.md + rules without paths frontmatter) back under budget — migrate narrative to reference files, convert rules to…

    849 GitHub stars~1.9k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
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Categories

Questions about Stride Analysis Patterns

What does Stride Analysis Patterns do?

Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats. Stride Analysis Patterns is an agent skill from sangrokjung/claude-forge. Apply STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats.

When should I use Stride Analysis Patterns?

Stride Analysis Patterns fits situations like: analyzing system security; conducting threat modeling sessions; creating security documentation.

How do I install Stride Analysis Patterns in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/stride-analysis-patterns in sangrokjung/claude-forge) into .claude/skills/stride-analysis-patterns in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Stride Analysis Patterns in Codex?

Run `npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/stride-analysis-patterns in sangrokjung/claude-forge) into .agents/skills/stride-analysis-patterns in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Stride Analysis Patterns in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add sangrokjung/claude-forge --skill stride-analysis-patterns -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/stride-analysis-patterns, .gemini/skills/stride-analysis-patterns, .github/skills/stride-analysis-patterns and .opencode/skills/stride-analysis-patterns in your project.

What does Stride Analysis Patterns need to run?

SKILL.md names no scripts, command-line tools or credentials: Stride Analysis Patterns is instructions for the agent only. Our summary lists: Python 3.

Does Stride Analysis Patterns access the network?

SKILL.md names 3 domains. As links in the text: docs.microsoft.com, owasp.org and wiley.com. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Stride Analysis Patterns safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does Stride Analysis Patterns use?

Stride Analysis Patterns is published under the MIT licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Stride Analysis Patterns use?

About 5.3k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 21k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to Stride Analysis Patterns?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Stride Analysis Patterns: Fla Ascend Performance (fla-org/flash-linear-attention, 5.8k stars), Forensify (alexgreensh/repo-forensics, 187 stars), Create Rule (cartography-cncf/cartography, 4.1k stars) and Commit Security Scan (codexstar69/bug-hunter, 519 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Stride Analysis Patterns?

sangrokjung (a GitHub user) maintains it in sangrokjung/claude-forge, which has 849 GitHub stars. The repository holds 24 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on September 3, 2026.

Source: sangrokjung/claude-forge on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.