Official agent skill

C Review

by trailofbits in trailofbits/skills

Performs comprehensive C/C++ security review for memory corruption, integer overflows, race conditions, and platform-specific vulnerabilities.

OfficialCC-BY-SA-4.0Auto-check: notesSecurity

Install C Review

skills CLI
$ npx skills add trailofbits/skills --skill c-review -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install trailofbits/skills c-review --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/trailofbits/skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/plugins/c-review/skills/c-review .claude/skills/c-review && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
c-review
GitHub stars
7.4k
Used in
1 other repo
Token cost
~3.3k tokens
SKILL.md length
1,491 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
79
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
CC-BY-SA-4.0

At a glance

Performs comprehensive C/C++ security review for memory corruption, integer overflows, race conditions, and platform-specific vulnerabilities.

  • Works in 4 steps: Parameters → Resolve paths → Run the workflow → …
  • Auditing native C/C++ applications
  • SKILL.md covers Phase 0 — Parameters, Phase 1 — Resolve paths, Phase 2 — Run the workflow and Phase 3 — Return the report, plus 1 more section
  • Calls uv

What it does

C Review is an agent skill from trailofbits/skills, published by the product's own GitHub organization. Performs comprehensive C/C++ security review for memory corruption, integer overflows, race conditions, and platform-specific vulnerabilities. Use when auditing native C/C++ applications, reviewing daemons or services for memory safety, or hunting integer overflow / use-after-free / race conditions in userspace code.

Its SKILL.md is about 3.3k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts.

It sits in Security, covering Security review and Async programming. It works with C++. The repository describes itself as: Trail of Bits Claude Code skills for security research, vulnerability detection, and audit workflows. The licence is CC-BY-SA-4.0.

When your agent uses it

  • Auditing native C/C++ applications
  • Reviewing daemons
  • Services for memory safety
  • Hunting integer overflow / use-after-free / race conditions in userspace code

Example prompts

  • “Use the c-review skill to perform comprehensive C/C++ security review for memory corruption, integer overflows, race conditions, and…”
  • “/c-review”

Requirements

  • Pre-approved tools (allowed-tools): Workflow, AskUserQuestion, Bash, Read

Workflow steps

4 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Parameters
  2. Resolve paths
  3. Run the workflow
  4. Return the report

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 82fe822. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves these tools, so the agent can use them without asking each time:

    • Workflow
    • AskUserQuestion
    • Bash
    • Read

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • uv

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    No URLs in SKILL.md. Its commands use uv, which can reach the network depending on how they are called.

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

C Review loads about 3.3k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 82 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,491 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~82
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~3.3k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check: notes

The automated check noted patterns worth knowing about, such as sudo or a known installer.

  • NotePre-approves every shell command (allowed-tools: Bash)SKILL.md
    allowed-tools: Workflow, AskUserQuestion, Bash, Read

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from trailofbits/skills at commit 82fe822, republished under its CC-BY-SA-4.0 licence (© trailofbits). 1,491 words, ~3,261 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/c-review/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
c-review
description
Performs comprehensive C/C++ security review for memory corruption, integer overflows, race conditions, and platform-specific vulnerabilities. Use when auditing native C/C++ applications, reviewing daemons or services for memory safety, or hunting integer overflow / use-after-free / race conditions in userspace code.
allowed-tools
Workflow, AskUserQuestion, Bash, Read

C/C++ Security Review

Resolve four parameters, make one Workflow call, return the report. The workflow owns concurrency, retries and result collection.

Use for: native C/C++ userspace — memory safety, integer overflow, races, type confusion, Linux/macOS daemons, Windows services.

Not for: kernel drivers or modules; managed languages (Java, C#, Python, Go, Rust); embedded or bare-metal code with no libc.

Phase 0 — Parameters

Parse any free text on the invocation line (flamenco only, high severity only, use haiku) and pre-fill what it implies. Then make one AskUserQuestion call for whatever is still unresolved. Never silently default a required parameter.

ParameterValuesInferring it from the invocation
threat_modelREMOTE / LOCAL_UNPRIVILEGED / BOTH"remote", "network", "attacker" → REMOTE; "local", "unprivileged" → LOCAL_UNPRIVILEGED; otherwise ask
worker_modelhaiku / sonnet / opus / inheritAn explicit model name. Otherwise ask. inherit uses the session model
severity_filterall / medium / high"all", "every", "noisy" → all; "medium and above" → medium; "high only" → high; otherwise ask
scope_subpathrepo-relative directory, optional"X only", "just audit X/" → the matching subdirectory, fuzzy-matched against top-level dirs. Absent → .. Ambiguous → ask

Two scopes stay separate for the whole run:

  • finding_scope_root = scope_subpath (default .) — a finding must live inside it, and it is the tree the unit list is generated from.
  • context_roots = . — read freely to establish callers, build flags and reachability. Narrow it to finding_scope_root only if the user explicitly forbids wider reading, and say that reachability confidence drops when you do.

Phase 1 — Resolve paths

bash
root="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}"
if [ -z "$root" ] || [ ! -f "$root/workflows/c-review.js" ]; then
  # Fallback for a cache layout that does not set the variable. ~/.claude ONLY — never `.`:
  # `.` is the AUDITED repository, and a tree that vendors or mirrors this marketplace would
  # win the traversal and run its copy of the scripts, with a different question set and
  # nothing saying which copy ran. Let find's stderr through; a missing ~/.claude is a real
  # failure to report, not noise to hide.
  hit="$(find "$HOME/.claude" -path '*/c-review/workflows/c-review.js' -print -quit)"
  root="${hit%/workflows/c-review.js}"
fi
[ -n "$root" ] && [ -f "$root/workflows/c-review.js" ] && echo "PLUGIN ROOT: $root"

Stop if neither resolves, rather than running with an empty path — and say which path you resolved, so a copy other than the installed plugin is visible before eight agents run against it.

bash
# The workflow cannot call Date.now(), so the timestamp is made here.
output_dir="$(pwd)/.c-review-results/$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
mkdir -p "$output_dir"; echo "$output_dir"

# A Workflow script has no filesystem APIs, and `assemble_findings.py` resolves `--scope`
# against ITS OWN cwd. Resolve it once here and pass BOTH spellings, or the workflow strips
# `src/` from a finding's path while the assembler strips `/repo/src/`, and the two disagree
# about which findings are duplicates of each other.
scope_abs="$(cd "${scope_subpath:-.}" && pwd)" || echo "scope_subpath does not exist"
echo "$scope_abs"

uv must be on PATH: Detect runs the unit enumerator and Assemble runs assemble_findings.py. If uv is missing, say so and stop — the whole review is partitioned from that unit list.

Phase 2 — Run the workflow

Invoking this skill is the opt-in to multi-agent orchestration — call Workflow without asking again. A review of a real codebase also runs past any default workflow size guideline; that guideline is advisory and this is the case it exempts. Do not shrink the fan-out to fit it, and do not substitute hand-spawned Agent calls.

One Workflow call. scriptPath takes the absolute path resolved in Phase 1; args must be a real JSON object, not a JSON-encoded string.

Workflow({
  scriptPath: "<plugin_root>/workflows/c-review.js",
  args: {
    outputDir:        "<output_dir>",
    pluginRoot:       "<plugin_root>",
    threatModel:      "REMOTE",
    severityFilter:   "all",
    findingScopeRoot: "expat/lib",
    findingScopeRootAbs: "/abs/path/to/repo/expat/lib",
    contextRoots:     ".",
    workerModel:      "sonnet"
  }
})

findingScopeRootAbs is the scope_abs from Phase 1 and is not optional in practice: omitted, the workflow tells the assembler no absolute root is known and a finding filed as /repo/expat/lib/xmlparse.c stops merging with the same bug filed as xmlparse.c.

Six further arguments are optional. Omitted, each takes its default; passed with the wrong TYPE, the workflow throws with the field name rather than defaulting. Pass them only when the user asks or when running an evaluation:

ArgumentDefaultWhat it is for
maxUnitLines150Cap on a review unit; a larger function is split at syntactic seams. Raising it reintroduces the saturation the cap prevents
linesPerAgent1500Source lines per review agent. A no-op on a small tree — --agent-min (default 4) floors the derived count, so two very different values can produce identical assignments. Use reviewAgents to pin the fan-out
reviewAgentsderivedPins the review fan-out, subject to the same floor as the derived count: both are clamped to 4–14, and an explicit value above 14 raises the cap to itself. A value below 4 is raised to 4, and a trailing slice too small to be worth an agent is folded into its neighbour, so the final count can come out one lower than asked
invariantAuditfalseAdds the shared-state invariant audit to the sweep. A whole extra agent; turn it on for state-machine-heavy targets
exclude[]Array of globs or substrings the unit enumerator skips (each becomes a repeated --exclude). Use when enumeration aborts naming a path it cannot own — a symlink resolving outside the scope root, an unreadable directory — and the excluded paths land in the enumerator's totals as a visible coverage hole, not silence
benchmarkModefalseEval-only. Adds an external-source declaration to reviewer prompts and two schema fields. Changes no finding; leave it off for a real audit

The workflow validates its own arguments and throws with a named field if one is missing. It runs five phases:

PhaseAgentsWhat it does
Detect1Runs enumerate_units.py for the unit list; platform flags from actual API usage; shared-state structs; per bug class, whether any candidate site exists
Review4–14One agent per contiguous slice of the unit list. Each returns findings with severity and a ledger row per (unit × question)
Sweep0–2The class axis: one agent over every bug class with no entry anywhere that Detect did not rule out. None, and the phase is skipped. Plus the struct-field audit when invariantAudit: true
Dedup0–1Only for collisions the assembler cannot merge deterministically. Usually skipped
Assemble1Runs assemble_findings.py: ledger gate, deterministic merges, findings.json, REPORT.md, REPORT.sarif

Around 8–10 agents on a mid-size target.

Show full SKILL.md (677 more words)Show less

Phase 3 — Return the report

Read <output_dir>/REPORT.md and return it.

Say once, plainly, next to the findings: no false-positive review ran. Every severity is the reviewer's own (severity_source: "reviewer"), judgeRan is always false, and nothing rejected anything. Expect some of what you are shown to be wrong or out of scope — say so rather than presenting the list as adjudicated, and do not filter it yourself.

Then surface, prominently and separately from the findings, anything in the workflow result that means the run was partial:

FieldMeaning and what to do
artifactsWritten: falseREPORT.md and REPORT.sarif are missing; the part files under parts/ are intact. Re-assemble by hand (below) — never reconstruct from the tool result
artifactsWritten: nullThe assemble agent returned nothing, so whether the artifacts exist is unknown — the command may have completed and only its structured answer failed. List the output directory before doing anything else
gateAccepted: false with artifacts writtenThe failure that looks like success. Artifacts are complete; the coverage gate could not run or rejected the ledger, so the review is assembled and unverified. Do not re-run the assembler — read ledger-gate.json and report the gap. artifactError always carries the reason
coverage: nullCoverage is unmeasured, not complete. Never report such a run as fully covered; point at ledger-gate.json
coverageReport checksSatisfied / checksRequired, and checksCompleted only as "answered" — never "functions reviewed". checksSatisfied below checksCompleted means the gate threw rows out: a coverage-integrity failure. Name the violations
groupsFailed, agentFailures, notesThat ground was not covered. Do not let a clean report imply it was
unrecognisedPartsWhole agents' output in no artifact. null means unchecked, not none
silentClasses / ruledOutClasses / platformDroppedClasses"Swept and found nothing" / "nothing looked" / "out of scope by configuration". Report separately — only the middle one means a human should look

Hand re-assembly, when artifactsWritten is false:

uv run --no-project <plugin_root>/scripts/assemble_findings.py --run-dir <output_dir> \
  --threat-model <MODEL> --severity-filter <FILTER> --no-judge \
  --scope <finding_scope_root> --context-roots <context_roots> \
  --worker-model <worker_model> \
  --expect <part-stem>=<finding-count>   # one per part the workflow log names
  • --expect is not optional. Without it the allowlist admits every file under parts/, including one nobody dispatched, and the run exits 1 for that reason alone. If you cannot recover the counts from the workflow log, exit 1 is correct and the run is assembled-but-unverified.
  • Never drop --no-judge. Dropping it overwrites every reviewer severity with MEDIUM and records judge_ran: true for a run no judge ever saw.
  • Six flags cannot be reconstructed at all (--expect-complete, --benchmark-mode, --groups-attempted, --groups-failed, --agent-failure, --external-source), so the document will say agent_failures: [] on a run that may have lost a slice. Report that. Without a units.json the assembler also exits 1: no gate ran.

Finally list the artifacts: findings.json, REPORT.md, REPORT.sarif, units.json, ledger-gate.json, detect.json, and the parts/ and assignments/ directories.

Rationalizations to Reject

  • "The run mostly worked, so I'll just present the report." A failed agent is uncovered ground, not a rounding error. Report it next to the findings.
  • "Coverage is 80%, that's basically complete." The missing 20% is a list of exact (unit, question) pairs in ledger-gate.json. Name them.
  • "I'll write the findings myself instead of running the workflow." Hand-orchestrating costs far more for worse recall. Always call Workflow.
  • "The artifacts failed, so I'll reconstruct the report from the tool result." The part files are on disk and the assembler is deterministic. Re-run it.
  • "Zero findings, so there is nothing to report." A zero-finding run still produces both artifacts, and zero findings on real C code is itself worth saying out loud.
  • "The workflow returned findings, so I can skip reading REPORT.md." The tool result is capped and carries counts, not findings. The report is the artifact.
  • "No judge ran, so I should filter the findings myself." No — silently dropping findings reproduces a judge's cost with none of its rigour and leaves the artifact disagreeing with what you said. Report what the pipeline produced, labelled unadjudicated.
  • "No judge ran, so I'll present severities as authoritative." Also no. They are one reviewer's opinion.
  • "A class-per-agent fan-out would find more." Location is the partition on purpose; the class catalogue is a bounded completeness sweep on top. Do not add one.

Design rationale, the coverage gate's threat model and its known limitations are in AGENTS.md. Read it before changing a prompt or a gate rule.

© trailofbits, CC-BY-SA-4.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in plugins/c-review/skills/c-review of trailofbits/skills.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 82fe822

Used in 1 other repository

We found 1 copy of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 1 other GitHub owner. This page covers the copy in trailofbits/skills, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

Compare with similar skills

C Review next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

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C Review this skilltrailofbits/skills7.4k1 repos~3.3kAutomated safety check: NotesCC-BY-SA-4.0
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Wooyun Legacytanweai/wooyun-legacy1.8k—~1.9kAutomated safety check: PassCustom licence
Static Vulnerability DetectorArabelaTso/Skills-4-SE253—~2kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
YugabyteDB ASH Instrumentationyugabyte/yugabyte-db11k—~4.5kAutomated safety check: PassCustom licence
Deepsec Documentation Guidevercel-labs/deepsec8.1k—~956Automated safety check: PassApache-2.0

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Works with

Categories

Questions about C Review

What does C Review do?

Performs comprehensive C/C++ security review for memory corruption, integer overflows, race conditions, and platform-specific vulnerabilities. C Review is an agent skill from trailofbits/skills, published by the product's own GitHub organization. Performs comprehensive C/C++ security review for memory corruption, integer overflows, race conditions, and platform-specific vulnerabilities.

When should I use C Review?

C Review fits situations like: auditing native C/C++ applications; reviewing daemons; services for memory safety; hunting integer overflow / use-after-free / race conditions in userspace code.

How do I install C Review in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add trailofbits/skills --skill c-review -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (plugins/c-review/skills/c-review in trailofbits/skills) into .claude/skills/c-review in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install C Review in Codex?

Run `npx skills add trailofbits/skills --skill c-review -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (plugins/c-review/skills/c-review in trailofbits/skills) into .agents/skills/c-review in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use C Review in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add trailofbits/skills --skill c-review -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/c-review, .gemini/skills/c-review, .github/skills/c-review and .opencode/skills/c-review in your project.

What does C Review need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, C Review needs the command-line tools its instructions call (uv). Its frontmatter pre-approves these tools: Workflow, AskUserQuestion, Bash, Read.

Does C Review access the network?

SKILL.md contains no URLs. Its commands use uv, which can reach the network depending on how they are called. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is C Review safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found notes only (pre-approves every shell command (allowed-tools: bash)), nothing it rates as a warning. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does C Review use?

C Review is published under the CC-BY-SA-4.0 licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does C Review use?

About 3.3k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 13k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to C Review?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with C Review: Code Audit (3stoneBrother/code-audit, 893 stars), Wooyun Legacy (tanweai/wooyun-legacy, 1.8k stars), Static Vulnerability Detector (ArabelaTso/Skills-4-SE, 253 stars) and YugabyteDB ASH Instrumentation (yugabyte/yugabyte-db, 11k stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains C Review?

trailofbits (a GitHub organization, an official publisher) maintains it in trailofbits/skills, which has 7,420 GitHub stars. The repository holds 79 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 7, 2026.

Source: trailofbits/skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.