Agent skill

Kubernetes Network Security Audit

by kubeshark in kubeshark/kubeshark

Hunts for compromised workloads and malicious traffic in a Kubernetes cluster by sweeping network data through Kubeshark MCP, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK.

Apache-2.0Auto-check: notesSecurity

Install Kubernetes Network Security Audit

skills CLI
$ npx skills add kubeshark/kubeshark --skill security-audit -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install kubeshark/kubeshark security-audit --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/security-audit .claude/skills/security-audit && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
security-audit
GitHub stars
12k
Token cost
~7.3k tokens
SKILL.md length
3,233 words
Files
4 (incl. references)
Skills in repo
4
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
Apache-2.0

At a glance

Hunts for compromised workloads and malicious traffic in a Kubernetes cluster by sweeping network data through Kubeshark MCP, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK.

  • Works in 6 steps: Check What's Available → Query Live Traffic → Create Snapshots (Sequential — One at a… → …
  • Checking a Kubernetes cluster for signs of compromise
  • SKILL.md covers Prerequisites, Audit Methodology, SECTION A: Real-Time Analysis and SECTION B: Snapshot Deep Dive, plus 4 more sections
  • Calls npx, pandoc and kubectl

What it does

Network traffic is treated as ground truth, and the audit is a proactive sweep rather than an incident investigation. The agent first confirms Kubeshark is deployed and that tools such as `list_api_calls`, `list_l4_flows`, `list_workloads` and `get_api_call` are available. All queries use KFL filters, so the companion KFL skill is loaded first, with a fallback to port-based or name-based filters if a filter errors, since an error means bad syntax rather than missing data.

The audit runs in two sections: a real-time pass over live dissected traffic, then a snapshot deep dive on immutable evidence with protocol-level inspection. Threat classes include command-and-control, cryptomining, lateral movement, credential theft, DNS exfiltration and tunneling, port scanning, IMDS access and reverse shells. Reference files hold the KFL security filters, a threat catalog and a report template.

When your agent uses it

  • Checking a Kubernetes cluster for signs of compromise
  • Looking for DNS tunneling, cryptomining or reverse shell traffic
  • Assessing network security posture and producing a findings report
  • Hunting for lateral movement or unauthorized access between workloads

Example prompts

  • “Audit my production cluster for indicators of compromise using the Kubeshark data.”
  • “Check whether any workload is talking to a crypto mining pool or leaking data over DNS.”
  • “Do a threat hunt for lateral movement between namespaces and write up the findings.”

Requirements

  • Kubeshark deployed in the cluster, with its MCP tools available
  • The KFL skill from the same repository

Workflow steps

6 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Check What's Available
  2. Query Live Traffic
  3. Create Snapshots (Sequential — One at a Time)
  4. Present Intermediate Results
  5. Intermediate Report (after Section A)
  6. Final PDF Report (after Section B)

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 224b045. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • npx
    • pandoc
    • kubectl

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    No URLs in SKILL.md. Its commands use npx and kubectl, which can reach the network depending on how they are called.

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Kubernetes Network Security Audit loads about 7.3k tokens when it runs, and up to ~11k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 240 tokens; SKILL.md has 3,233 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~240
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~7.3k
With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them
~11k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check: notes

The automated check noted patterns worth knowing about, such as sudo or a known installer.

  • NoteMentions a .env fileSKILL.md:452
    api_calls` with KFL: `http && (path == "/.env" || path == "/actuator/info" || path == "/server-info" || path == "/versio

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from kubeshark/kubeshark at commit 224b045, republished under its Apache-2.0 licence (© kubeshark). 3,233 words, ~7,305 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/security-audit/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder). This skill also uses 3 other files; get the full folder from GitHub.
name
security-audit
description
Kubernetes network security audit skill powered by Kubeshark MCP. Use this skill whenever the user wants to audit a cluster for security threats, detect compromised workloads, find malicious traffic patterns, hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs), check for data exfiltration, identify C2 (command and control) communication, detect cryptomining, find lateral movement, discover credential theft attempts, assess network security posture, or perform threat hunting in Kubernetes. Also trigger when the user mentions security audit, threat detection, compromise assessment, vulnerability scan, "is my cluster compromised", "find malicious traffic", "check for threats", DNS exfiltration, DNS tunneling, port scanning, IMDS access, reverse shell, crypto miner, MITRE ATT&CK, IOC detection, anomaly detection, suspicious traffic, rogue workloads, unauthorized access, or any request to evaluate cluster security through network traffic analysis.

Kubernetes Network Security Audit with Kubeshark MCP

You are a Kubernetes network security specialist. Your job is to systematically audit cluster traffic for indicators of compromise, malicious behavior, and security threats — using network traffic as the ground truth.

Network traffic cannot lie. Logs can be tampered with, metrics can be spoofed, but packets on the wire reveal what workloads actually do — what they connect to, what protocols they speak, what data they send. Your audit leverages this by examining DNS queries, HTTP requests, L4 flows, and protocol-level payloads across every dimension of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Prerequisites

Before starting any audit, verify the environment is ready.

Tool: check_kubeshark_status

Confirm Kubeshark is deployed and tools are available. You need at minimum: list_api_calls, list_l4_flows, list_workloads, get_api_call.

KFL requirement: This skill uses KFL filters for all queries. Before constructing any filter, load the KFL skill (skills/kfl/). KFL is statically typed — incorrect field names will fail silently. If the KFL skill is not loaded, only use the exact filter examples shown in this skill.

KFL error resilience: If a KFL filter returns undeclared reference or similar errors, do not give up on that phase. Fall back to:

  1. Port-based filtering: dst.port == 5432 instead of protocol flags
  2. Name-based filtering: dst.name.contains("db") or src.name.contains("pod-name")
  3. Browsing entries with get_api_call on IDs from list_l4_flows A KFL error means the filter syntax is wrong, not that the data doesn't exist.

Audit Methodology

A security audit is NOT an incident investigation. You are not responding to a known event — you are proactively searching for threats that may be hiding in normal traffic. This requires a systematic sweep across all threat categories, not a single focused query.

The audit has two sections that run in sequence:

SECTION A: Real-Time Analysis       → Instant, uses live dissected traffic
SECTION B: Snapshot Deep Dive       → Immutable evidence, protocol-level inspection
Why Two Sections?

Kubeshark has two modes of data access:

  1. Real-time dissection — traffic is dissected as it flows through the cluster. Provides instant access to L7 data (DNS, HTTP, etc.) that is already captured and indexed. However, real-time dissection is resource- intensive and may not be enabled, or may have gaps in coverage.

  2. Snapshots — immutable captures of raw traffic within a time window. Must be created explicitly, then dissected separately. Guarantees complete coverage of all packets in the window, but takes time to create and index.

Section A uses whatever is already available — fast, immediate, but possibly incomplete. Section B creates snapshots for thorough, evidence-grade analysis.

Severity Classification

Classify every finding using this framework:

SeverityCriteriaExamples
CRITICALActive data exfiltration, credential theft in progress, confirmed C2DNS tunneling, IMDS credential harvest, mining pool connections
HIGHReconnaissance with cluster-wide scope, confirmed unauthorized accessK8s API secret enumeration, port scanning, cluster-admin abuse
MEDIUMSuspicious patterns requiring investigation, limited-scope reconCross-namespace probes, outdated User-Agents, unusual external connections
LOWAnomalies that may be benign, single-instance eventsUnknown workloads, new external destinations, noisy but not malicious
Timezone

Kubeshark returns timestamps in UTC. Always convert to local time before presenting to the user. Detect the local timezone at the start (e.g., date +%Z). Present local time as primary, with UTC in parentheses: 15:03:22 IST (12:03:22 UTC).

Conversion: Kubeshark timestamps are Unix milliseconds. To convert: ms / 1000 → Unix seconds → datetime → format with timezone offset. Example: 1778534735974 → 2026-05-11 14:05:35 PDT (21:05:35 UTC).


SECTION A: Real-Time Analysis

Goal: Fast initial sweep using live data that's already available. No waiting for snapshot creation or dissection.

Step 1: Check What's Available

Tool: check_kubeshark_status

Confirm Kubeshark is running and which tools are available.

Step 2: Query Live Traffic

Tool: get_l7_data_boundaries

Check the time boundaries of dissected API calls in the real-time database. This tells you how far back L7 data is available — use it to understand the scope of your real-time queries before running them.

Then query the real-time dissected traffic across key dimensions. Use list_api_calls and list_l4_flows without a snapshot_id to hit the live data.

Run these queries simultaneously:

QueryKFL FilterWhat You're Looking For
DNS trafficdnsMining domains, high-entropy subdomains, external resolution, NXDOMAIN flood
HTTP traffichttpC2 beaconing, suspicious URLs, external destinations, anomalous headers
L4 flows(via list_l4_flows)External IPs, suspicious ports (3333, 4444), IMDS (169.254.169.254), fan-out patterns
PostgreSQLpostgresqlSQL injection patterns, sensitive table access
RedisredisDangerous commands (CONFIG, KEYS, CLIENT LIST)

Filter by namespace if the user specified one (e.g., dns && src.pod.namespace == "k8s-mule").

Important: Real-time dissection may have incomplete data — traffic that arrived before dissection was enabled, or during gaps in coverage, won't appear. Treat Section A findings as a fast first pass, not the final word.

Step 3: Create Snapshots (Sequential — One at a Time)

While analyzing real-time data, begin creating snapshots for Section B.

Tool: get_data_boundaries

Check how far back raw capture data exists. Raw capture is the FIFO buffer that feeds snapshot creation — this tells you the time window available for snapshots (which is different from the L7 boundaries in Step 2).

CRITICAL: Create snapshots ONE AT A TIME, sequentially. Kubeshark only supports one concurrent snapshot download. Parallel creation will cause failures and data loss. The pattern is:

  1. Create snapshot → wait for completion → start dissection → move to next
  2. Snapshot creation is fast (seconds). Dissection is slow (minutes).
  3. You do NOT need to wait for dissection before creating the next snapshot. Create the next snapshot while the previous one dissects.

Use get_data_boundaries to calculate how many snapshots are needed:

total_range_ms = newest_timestamp - oldest_timestamp
window_ms      = 240000                          # 4 minutes
num_snapshots  = ceil(total_range_ms / window_ms)

Then create snapshots in 4-minute increments, starting from the most recent:

Step 1: create_snapshot (now - 4min → now)
        → poll get_snapshot until status == "completed"
        → start_snapshot_dissection
Step 2: create_snapshot (now - 8min → now - 4min)
        → poll get_snapshot until status == "completed"
        → start_snapshot_dissection
Step 3: create_snapshot (now - 12min → now - 8min)
        → poll get_snapshot until status == "completed"
        → start_snapshot_dissection

Polling pattern: After create_snapshot, call get_snapshot with the returned snapshot ID to check status. Repeat until status == "completed". After start_snapshot_dissection, call get_snapshot_dissection_status and check until progress == 100.

4-minute windows balance snapshot size (fast to create and dissect) against coverage (captures threats with sleep cycles up to ~3 minutes). Most attack patterns in the wild repeat within 30-120 seconds.

Do not skip this step. A single short snapshot will miss threats with longer sleep cycles. The 4-minute windows ensure full coverage.

Note: Small snapshots (under ~15 minutes of traffic) often dissect in seconds rather than minutes. If dissection completes quickly, you can collapse the phased approach (immediate data first, L7 after) into a single pass through all phases.

Step 4: Present Intermediate Results

Present Section A findings to the user as intermediate results — clearly labeled as preliminary:

## Intermediate Results (Real-Time Analysis)

⚠️ These findings are based on live dissected traffic, which may have
gaps in coverage. Snapshot analysis is in progress and will provide
the complete, evidence-grade audit.

[findings table and details]

Snapshots are being created and dissected. Full report to follow.

This gives the user immediate value while snapshots process. But be explicit: the audit is not complete until Section B finishes.


SECTION B: Snapshot Deep Dive

Goal: Systematic, thorough analysis against immutable snapshot data. This is the evidence-grade section — complete coverage, reproducible results.

The audit is NOT done until this section completes. Snapshots must be created, dissected, and analyzed at L7 before the final report is generated. Section A may miss traffic that wasn't being dissected in real-time — Section B captures everything in the raw PCAP buffer, including traffic that real-time dissection dropped or never saw. Do not skip this section or treat Section A results as the final word.

What a Snapshot Gives You

A completed snapshot provides three independent data sources — do not wait for dissection to use the first two:

SourceAvailableToolWhat It Provides
Workloads & IPsImmediatelylist_workloads with snapshot_idPod names, namespaces, IPs at capture time
PCAP ExportImmediatelyexport_snapshot_pcapRaw packets filtered by BPF expression
L7 DissectionAfter indexinglist_api_calls, get_api_call, get_api_statsDNS queries, HTTP requests, SQL statements, Redis commands, gRPC methods
Audit Flow Per Snapshot

For each 4-minute snapshot, run the full 7-phase sweep. Start with immediate data while dissection completes:

Snapshot ready
  ├── Start dissection (background)
  ├── Phase 1: list_workloads (immediate) — workload inventory + IPs
  │            export_snapshot_pcap (immediate) — raw packet evidence
  │
  ├── [dissection completes]
  │
  ├── Phase 2: list_api_calls — DNS threat analysis
  ├── Phase 3: list_api_calls — external HTTP communication
  ├── Phase 4: list_api_calls — lateral movement, K8s API access
  ├── Phase 5: list_api_calls — protocol abuse (PG, Redis, gRPC)
  ├── Phase 6: list_api_calls — credential access (IMDS, cloud APIs)
  └── Phase 7: correlate all findings

Process snapshots in reverse chronological order (most recent first). If the first snapshot reveals enough threats, you may not need to analyze all of them.

PCAP for Deep Inspection

PCAP export happens in Phase 1b (immediately after snapshot creation). In later phases, if a new finding needs deeper packet-level analysis beyond what list_api_calls provides, export additional PCAPs using the workload IPs collected in Phase 1a:

export_snapshot_pcap(snapshot_id, bpf_filter="host <workload_ip>")
Merging Findings Across Snapshots

Threats that appear in multiple snapshots are confirmed persistent. One-time events in a single snapshot may be transient. Note which findings repeat across snapshots — persistence is a strong signal of real compromise vs. a single anomalous event.


Phase 1: Workload Inventory & PCAP Evidence

Goal: Identify all active workloads, collect their IPs, and export raw PCAP evidence — all before dissection completes. Data source: Immediate (no dissection needed).

1a: Workload Inventory

Tool: list_workloads with snapshot_id

Query with the target namespace (or all namespaces). The response includes pod names, namespaces, and IP addresses at capture time — these IPs are critical for building BPF filters in later phases and for correlating L4 flows to workload identities.

For each workload, note:

  • Pod name and namespace
  • IP address (save these — you'll need them for PCAP export and L4 analysis)
  • Whether it's expected (matches known deployments)

What to flag:

  • Workloads not matching any known Deployment/DaemonSet/StatefulSet
  • Pods with names that mimic system components (e.g., kube-proxy-debug)
  • Unexpected number of replicas or pods in the namespace
1b: PCAP Export (Immediate — No Dissection Needed)

Tool: export_snapshot_pcap with snapshot_id

PCAP export is available immediately after snapshot creation — it reads raw packets, not dissected data. Use it now to preserve evidence and get raw packet-level visibility before L7 dissection completes.

Export PCAP for every CRITICAL finding from Section A's real-time analysis. Use the workload IPs from 1a to build BPF filters:

export_snapshot_pcap(snapshot_id, bpf_filter="host <workload_ip>")

This is especially useful for:

  • Verifying encrypted C2 (TLS ClientHello SNI inspection)
  • Confirming Stratum mining protocol content
  • Extracting DNS tunnel payloads at packet level
  • Preserving forensic evidence before cluster changes

If Section A identified no CRITICAL findings yet, export a broad PCAP for the most suspicious workloads based on L4 flow analysis (Phase 3).


Phase 2: DNS Threat Analysis

Goal: DNS is the single most reliable indicator of compromise. Every attack that communicates externally needs DNS resolution. Sweep DNS traffic for all known threat patterns.

2a: External DNS (Non-Cluster Queries)

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: dns

Examine all DNS queries. Flag anything that is NOT *.cluster.local or *.svc.cluster.local — these are external resolutions that reveal what workloads are reaching out to.

What to flag:

PatternThreatKFL Filter
Mining pool domains (minexmr, nanopool, mining-pool)Cryptojackingdns && dns_questions.exists(q, q.contains("minexmr"))
High-entropy subdomains (base64-like, >30 chars)DNS tunneling / exfiltrationdns — then inspect subdomain length and entropy
DGA patterns (random .com/.net with NXDOMAIN)C2 beaconingdns && dns_response && size(dns_answers) == 0
DoH resolver domains (cloudflare-dns.com, dns.google)DNS bypass / C2 channeldns && dns_questions.exists(q, q.contains("cloudflare-dns"))
Cloud API domains (sts.amazonaws.com, s3.amazonaws.com)Stolen credential usagedns && dns_questions.exists(q, q.contains("amazonaws.com"))
C2/attacker domains (attacker, c2, darknet, exfil)Command & Controldns && dns_questions.exists(q, q.contains("c2"))
2b: DNS Query Volume and Types

High query volume from a single pod is suspicious. Also check for unusual record types:

  • TXT queries to external domains → data exfiltration
  • NULL queries → DNS tunneling (iodine, dnscat2)
  • AXFR queries → zone transfer attempts (reconnaissance)
  • SRV queries to many namespaces → service enumeration
2c: NXDOMAIN Ratio

A high NXDOMAIN ratio (>20% of queries) from a single source suggests DGA beaconing — the malware tries many generated domains, most of which don't exist.

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: dns && dns_response && size(dns_answers) == 0

Compare the count of failed queries to total queries per source pod.


Phase 3: External Communication

Goal: Identify all traffic leaving the cluster. Any pod connecting to external IPs or domains needs justification. Data source: L7 dissection (after indexing).

Note: L4 flow analysis for external communication is covered in Section A (Step 2) using list_l4_flows against real-time data. In Section B, use list_api_calls against dissected snapshot data for deeper L7 inspection of external traffic.

3a: HTTP External Requests

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: http && !dst.pod.namespace.startsWith("kube")

Inspect outbound HTTP requests for:

  • Beaconing patterns: Regular-interval requests to the same external URL
  • Suspicious User-Agents: Mozilla/4.0, curl/, empty, or malware-like
  • Suspicious paths: /check?s=, /beacon, /heartbeat, /proxy?coin=
  • Base64 in headers: Oversized Cookie or custom X-* headers with encoded data
  • gRPC to external: Content-Type: application/grpc to non-cluster destinations
  • WebSocket upgrades: Upgrade: websocket to external hosts (potential mining)

Show full SKILL.md (1,301 more words)Show less

Phase 4: Lateral Movement

Goal: Identify pods communicating with services they shouldn't — crossing namespace boundaries, probing infrastructure, or scanning the network. Data source: L7 dissection (after indexing) for cross-namespace HTTP and API server analysis.

Note: Port scanning detection via list_l4_flows is covered in Section A (Step 2) against real-time data.

4a: Cross-Namespace Traffic

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: src.pod.namespace != dst.pod.namespace

Most pods should only talk within their namespace (and to kube-system services). Cross-namespace traffic to unexpected destinations is a lateral movement indicator.

4b: Kubernetes API Server Access

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: http && dst.port == 443 && path.startsWith("/api")

Check what pods are querying the K8s API server and what they're requesting:

API PathThreatSeverity
/api/v1/secretsSecret enumerationCRITICAL
/api/v1/podsWorkload discoveryHIGH
/apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.ioRBAC reconnaissanceHIGH
/api/v1/configmapsConfig enumerationMEDIUM
/api/v1/namespacesNamespace discoveryMEDIUM

A pod hitting multiple of these paths is performing systematic enumeration, not legitimate API access. Legitimate workloads typically access 1-2 specific resources, not sweep across resource types.

4c: Service Fingerprinting

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: http && (path == "/.env" || path == "/actuator/info" || path == "/server-info" || path == "/version")

These paths are used for service fingerprinting — mapping what software is running on internal endpoints. A pod probing multiple services with these paths is performing reconnaissance.

4d: Service Account Permission Audit via Traffic

Cross-reference Phase 4b findings (K8s API traffic) with the source pod's actual service account to determine if permissions are excessive.

For each pod making API server calls:

  1. Identify the service account: From the workload inventory or via kubectl get pod <name> -n <ns> -o jsonpath='{.spec.serviceAccountName}'
  2. Check what it accessed: The API paths from Phase 4b reveal what the pod actually queried (secrets, pods, RBAC, configmaps)
  3. Compare against expected access: A frontend pod should never hit /api/v1/secrets. A batch-processor has no reason to query /apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1/clusterrolebindings.

What to flag:

PatternThreatSeverity
Pod queries secrets but its SA only needs pod readOver-privileged SA or stolen tokenHIGH
Pod hits cluster-wide endpoints (--all-namespaces style queries)Cluster-admin bindingCRITICAL
Pod's SA is default but makes authenticated API callsToken mounted unnecessarilyMEDIUM
Multiple pods share the same over-privileged SALateral blast radiusHIGH

This converts a network finding (API traffic volume) into an actionable RBAC recommendation — telling the user exactly which ClusterRoleBinding to revoke.

4e: Cross-Namespace Threat Correlation

When port scanning or lateral movement targets IPs outside the audited namespace (e.g., IPs in the pod CIDR 10.244.x.x that don't belong to any workload in the target namespace), resolve them to identify the cross-namespace blast radius:

  1. Use list_workloads (all namespaces) to map destination IPs to pods
  2. Identify which namespaces are being probed
  3. Flag the scope: "port scan from k8s-mule/network-diagnostics is targeting pods in default, monitoring, and kube-system"

This turns a single-namespace finding into a cluster-wide risk assessment.


Phase 5: Protocol Abuse

Goal: Inspect L7 payload content for attack patterns within supported protocols. This is the phase most often skipped — and where subtle threats hide.

5a: PostgreSQL Wire Protocol

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: postgresql

The postgresql_query variable contains the full SQL text. Use it to detect:

KFL FilterThreatSeverity
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("UNION SELECT")SQL injectionHIGH
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("pg_shadow")Password hash theftCRITICAL
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("information_schema")Schema enumerationMEDIUM
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("TRUNCATE")Data destructionCRITICAL
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("DROP TABLE")Data destructionCRITICAL
postgresql && !postgresql_successFailed queries (may indicate probing)MEDIUM

Use get_api_call to inspect the full SQL content. Also check postgresql_user — queries from unexpected users are suspicious.

5b: Redis Protocol

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: redis

Use redis_type (command verb) and redis_command (full command line) to detect:

KFL FilterThreatSeverity
redis && redis_type == "CONFIG"Server config dump/writeHIGH
redis && redis_type == "KEYS"Full key enumerationHIGH
redis && redis_type == "CLIENT"Connection enumerationMEDIUM
redis && redis_type == "DEBUG"Debug accessMEDIUM
redis && redis_command.contains("CONFIG SET dir")Arbitrary file write (RCE)CRITICAL
redis && redis_type == "FLUSHALL"Data destructionCRITICAL
5c: gRPC Endpoints

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: grpc

Use grpc_method to inspect method names:

KFL FilterThreatSeverity
grpc && grpc_method.contains("Reflection")API surface enumerationMEDIUM
grpc && dst.name.contains("attacker")Data exfiltrationHIGH
grpc && grpc_status != 0Failed gRPC calls (may indicate probing)LOW
5d: HTTP Request Anomalies

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: http

Check for:

  • WebSocket upgrades to external hosts: Upgrade: websocket header — potential mining proxy or persistent C2 channel
  • DNS-over-HTTPS requests: accept: application/dns-json header — DNS bypass
  • AWS Signature headers: Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 — stolen cloud creds
  • IMDS-specific headers: X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds — token request

Phase 6: Credential Access

Goal: Detect active credential theft — IMDS access, service account abuse, cloud API exploitation.

6a: Instance Metadata Service (IMDS)

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: dst.ip == "169.254.169.254"

Any pod connecting to this IP is attempting to steal the node's cloud credentials. Check the HTTP paths:

PathWhat's Being Stolen
/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/IAM role name
/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>Actual AWS credentials
/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/documentInstance identity (account ID, region)
/latest/user-dataInstance bootstrap scripts (may contain secrets)
/latest/api/token (PUT)IMDSv2 session token
6b: Service Account Token Exfiltration

Look for HTTP requests where the body or headers contain JWT tokens (strings starting with eyJ). These may be service account tokens being sent to external endpoints.


Phase 7: Attack Chain Correlation

Goal: Connect individual findings into a coherent attack narrative.

After completing phases 1-6, synthesize findings into an attack chain. Real attacks follow a progression:

1. INITIAL ACCESS     → How did the attacker get in?
2. RECONNAISSANCE     → Port scanning, DNS enumeration, API discovery
3. CREDENTIAL ACCESS  → IMDS theft, secret enumeration, token exfil
4. LATERAL MOVEMENT   → Cross-namespace probing, SSRF, service scanning
5. EXFILTRATION       → DNS tunneling, HTTP exfil, gRPC streaming
6. PERSISTENCE        → C2 beaconing, cryptomining (monetization)

Map each finding to a stage. If you see findings across multiple stages from the same namespace or related workloads, you've found a coordinated attack.

Output Format

Present the audit results as:

  1. Workload inventory — table of all observed workloads with threat level
  2. Detailed findings — one section per finding, ordered by severity
  3. Attack chain summary — if findings correlate, map the kill chain
  4. Immediate actions — prioritized remediation steps

Audit Report — Two-Stage Delivery

The audit produces two outputs — an intermediate report during Section A, and a final PDF report after Section B completes.

Stage 1: Intermediate Report (after Section A)

Present findings from real-time analysis directly in the conversation. Clearly label as preliminary. This gives the user immediate value while snapshots are being created and dissected.

Stage 2: Final PDF Report (after Section B)

This is the primary deliverable. It is generated only after all snapshots have been dissected and analyzed at L7. Do not generate the final report based on Section A alone — that would miss protocol-level threats (SQL injection, Redis abuse, gRPC exfil) that only appear after dissection.

  1. Write the report as markdown: security-audit-<namespace>-<date>.md Follow the template in references/report-template.md — it defines the full structure: executive summary, threat table, detailed findings with evidence, attack chain analysis, detection coverage, and remediation.

  2. Convert to PDF (in preference order):

    bash
    npx md-to-pdf security-audit-<namespace>-<date>.md    # Best quality
    pandoc security-audit-<namespace>-<date>.md -o security-audit-<namespace>-<date>.pdf

    If neither tool is available, leave the markdown as the deliverable.

  3. The final report must include findings from both sections — Section A (real-time) and Section B (snapshot dissection). Findings confirmed by both sections are marked with higher confidence. Findings only in Section B (missed by real-time) should be noted — this reveals gaps in real-time dissection coverage.

Key Report Requirements
  • Quote raw evidence — actual DNS queries, HTTP URLs, SQL statements, Redis commands. The reader must be able to verify without re-running.
  • Timestamp every finding — snapshot ID + local time (UTC in parentheses).
  • Specific recommendations — not "fix RBAC" but "revoke ClusterRoleBinding mule-recon-cluster-admin".
  • Include MITRE ATT&CK IDs for each finding.
  • Evidence preservation — list snapshot IDs, recommend cloud storage upload.

What Network Auditing Cannot Detect

Be transparent about blind spots. Network traffic analysis cannot detect:

  • Configuration vulnerabilities: Privileged containers, missing resource limits, permissive RBAC, hostPath mounts — these are YAML-level issues with no traffic signature
  • Secrets in environment variables: Hardcoded credentials don't generate network traffic until used
  • Image vulnerabilities: CVEs in container images are not visible on the wire
  • Idle threats: A malicious pod that hasn't started communicating yet

Recommend kubectl-based configuration auditing for these gaps. Network auditing is the complement, not the replacement, for config-level security scanning.

Threat Intelligence Reference

For detailed descriptions of all 22 network-observable threat scenarios with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and detection guidance, see references/threat-catalog.md.

© kubeshark, Apache-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 3 other files (references) in skills/security-audit of kubeshark/kubeshark.

  • SKILL.md
  • references/kfl-security-filters.md
  • references/report-template.md
  • references/threat-catalog.md

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 224b045

Compare with similar skills

Kubernetes Network Security Audit next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Kubernetes Network Security Audit compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Kubernetes Network Security Audit this skillkubeshark/kubeshark12k—~7.3kAutomated safety check: NotesApache-2.0
Ecs Operation Reviewaws/tools-for-devops-agent100—~4.8kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Detecting Arp Poisoning In Network Trafficmukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills34k—~3.8kAutomated safety check: NotesApache-2.0
Cyberowlaikarimhabush/cyberowl263—~2.5kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Container Security Hardeningsickn33/agentic-awesome-skills47k1 repos~1kAutomated safety check: NotesMIT
Azure Compliancemicrosoft/GitHub-Copilot-for-Azure2552 repos~997Automated safety check: PassMIT

Similar skills

  • Ecs Operation Review

    aws/tools-for-devops-agent

    Official

    Performs a comprehensive Amazon ECS operations review across the 6 review pillars (Resiliency & HA, Observability, Security, Operations, Performance, Additional Analysis) using read-only AWS APIs…

    100 GitHub stars~4.8k tokensUpdated today
    SecurityAuto-check passed
  • Detecting Arp Poisoning In Network Traffic

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Detect Layer 2 ARP poisoning/spoofing by deploying ARPWatch, Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI), Wireshark packet analysis, and custom Python monitoring scripts that flag gratuitous ARP floods, IP-to-MAC…

    34k GitHub stars~3.8k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    SecurityAuto-check: notes
  • Cyberowlai

    karimhabush/cyberowl

    Check if recent cybersecurity alerts from 10 international CERTs affect your current project.

    263 GitHub stars~2.5k tokensUpdated today
    SecurityAuto-check passed
  • Container Security Hardening

    sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

    Harden Docker/container images and runtime deployments with secure base images, non-root users, CVE scanning, SBOM/signing, seccomp/AppArmor, and Kubernetes pod security controls.

    47k GitHub starsUsed in 1 repo~1k tokens
    SecurityAuto-check: notes
  • Azure Compliance

    microsoft/GitHub-Copilot-for-Azure

    Official

    Run Azure compliance and security audits with azqr plus Key Vault expiration checks.

    255 GitHub starsUsed in 2 repos~997 tokens
    SecurityAuto-check passed
  • Implementing File Integrity Monitoring With Aide

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Configures AIDE (Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) for file integrity monitoring on Linux, covering baseline database creation, scheduled integrity checks via cron, change detection, and…

    34k GitHub stars~642 tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    SecurityAuto-check: notes

More from kubeshark/kubeshark

  • Kubeshark Installer

    kubeshark/kubeshark

    Installs and configures Kubeshark on a Kubernetes cluster, choosing between the quick CLI path and a Helm install with custom values.

    12k GitHub stars~3.6k tokensUpdated yesterday
    Auto-check: notes
  • Syntax reference for KFL2, the CEL-based display filter language used to search Kubernetes network traffic captured by Kubeshark, loaded before any filter is written.

    12k GitHub stars~3.6k tokensUpdated yesterday
    Auto-check passed
  • Investigates past Kubernetes incidents from Kubeshark traffic snapshots: takes captures, dissects API calls, extracts PCAPs and compares traffic over time.

    12k GitHub stars~5.3k tokensUpdated yesterday
    Auto-check passed

Questions about Kubernetes Network Security Audit

What does Kubernetes Network Security Audit do?

Hunts for compromised workloads and malicious traffic in a Kubernetes cluster by sweeping network data through Kubeshark MCP, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. Network traffic is treated as ground truth, and the audit is a proactive sweep rather than an incident investigation. The agent first confirms Kubeshark is deployed and that tools such as `list_api_calls`, `list_l4_flows`, `list_workloads` and `get_api_call` are available.

When should I use Kubernetes Network Security Audit?

Kubernetes Network Security Audit fits situations like: checking a Kubernetes cluster for signs of compromise; looking for DNS tunneling, cryptomining or reverse shell traffic; assessing network security posture and producing a findings report; hunting for lateral movement or unauthorized access between workloads.

How do I install Kubernetes Network Security Audit in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add kubeshark/kubeshark --skill security-audit -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/security-audit in kubeshark/kubeshark) into .claude/skills/security-audit in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Kubernetes Network Security Audit in Codex?

Run `npx skills add kubeshark/kubeshark --skill security-audit -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/security-audit in kubeshark/kubeshark) into .agents/skills/security-audit in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Kubernetes Network Security Audit in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add kubeshark/kubeshark --skill security-audit -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/security-audit, .gemini/skills/security-audit, .github/skills/security-audit and .opencode/skills/security-audit in your project.

What does Kubernetes Network Security Audit need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Kubernetes Network Security Audit needs the command-line tools its instructions call (npx, pandoc and kubectl). Our summary lists: Kubeshark deployed in the cluster, with its MCP tools available; The KFL skill from the same repository.

Does Kubernetes Network Security Audit access the network?

SKILL.md contains no URLs. Its commands use npx, which can reach the network depending on how they are called. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Kubernetes Network Security Audit safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found notes only (mentions a .env file), nothing it rates as a warning. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does Kubernetes Network Security Audit use?

Kubernetes Network Security Audit is published under the Apache-2.0 licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Kubernetes Network Security Audit use?

About 7.3k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 29k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full. Its references folder adds about 4k tokens, read only when the agent opens those files.

What are the alternatives to Kubernetes Network Security Audit?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Kubernetes Network Security Audit: Ecs Operation Review (aws/tools-for-devops-agent, 100 stars), Detecting Arp Poisoning In Network Traffic (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, 34k stars), Cyberowlai (karimhabush/cyberowl, 263 stars) and Container Security Hardening (sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, 47k stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Kubernetes Network Security Audit?

kubeshark (a GitHub organization) maintains it in kubeshark/kubeshark, which has 12,096 GitHub stars. The repository holds 4 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 7, 2026.

Source: kubeshark/kubeshark on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.