Security and Hardening
addyosmani/agent-skills
Applies a threat-model-first approach to web code that handles untrusted input, authentication, data storage, dependencies or personal data.
Hardens code against vulnerabilities. An agent skill from penpot/penpot.
$ npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a claude-codeProject install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.
$ gh skill install penpot/penpot security-and-hardening --agent claude-codeProject scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/penpot/penpot.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening .claude/skills/security-and-hardening && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.
Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/
Install the "security-and-hardening" agent skill from https://github.com/penpot/penpot/tree/develop/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening into .claude/skills/security-and-hardening/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "security-and-hardening", then confirm the skill loads.Claude Code copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$skill-installer install https://github.com/penpot/penpot/tree/develop/.agents/skills/security-and-hardeningType this inside Codex. $skill-installer <name> installs a curated skill from openai/skills. The installer writes to $CODEX_HOME/skills (default ~/.codex/skills). Restart Codex if the skill does not show up.
$ npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a codexProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.codex/skills/.
$ gh skill install penpot/penpot security-and-hardening --agent codexProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/penpot/penpot.git skills-src && mkdir -p .agents/skills && cp -r skills-src/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening .agents/skills/security-and-hardening && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.agents/skills/ instead of .agents/skills for a personal install.
Codex skills documentation · loads skills from .agents/skills/
Install the "security-and-hardening" agent skill from https://github.com/penpot/penpot/tree/develop/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening into .agents/skills/security-and-hardening/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "security-and-hardening", then confirm the skill loads.Codex copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a cursorProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.cursor/skills/.
$ gh skill install penpot/penpot security-and-hardening --agent cursorProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/penpot/penpot.git skills-src && mkdir -p .cursor/skills && cp -r skills-src/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening .cursor/skills/security-and-hardening && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.cursor/skills/ instead of .cursor/skills for a personal install.
Cursor skills documentation · loads skills from .cursor/skills/, .agents/skills/, .claude/skills/, .codex/skills/
Install the "security-and-hardening" agent skill from https://github.com/penpot/penpot/tree/develop/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening into .cursor/skills/security-and-hardening/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "security-and-hardening", then confirm the skill loads.Cursor copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ gemini skills install https://github.com/penpot/penpot.git --path .agents/skills/security-and-hardening--scope user (default) or --scope workspace; --path is the subfolder of the repo that holds the skill; --consent skips the security confirmation prompt.
$ npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a gemini-cliProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.gemini/skills/.
$ gh skill install penpot/penpot security-and-hardening --agent gemini-cliProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/penpot/penpot.git skills-src && mkdir -p .gemini/skills && cp -r skills-src/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening .gemini/skills/security-and-hardening && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.gemini/skills/ instead of .gemini/skills for a personal install, then run /skills reload.
Gemini CLI skills documentation · loads skills from .gemini/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "security-and-hardening" agent skill from https://github.com/penpot/penpot/tree/develop/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening into .gemini/skills/security-and-hardening/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "security-and-hardening", then confirm the skill loads.Gemini CLI copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ gh skill install penpot/penpot security-and-hardeningInstalls for Copilot at project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Preview a skill first with gh skill preview. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).
$ npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a github-copilotProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.copilot/skills/.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/penpot/penpot.git skills-src && mkdir -p .github/skills && cp -r skills-src/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening .github/skills/security-and-hardening && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.copilot/skills/ instead of .github/skills for a personal install. Commit .github/skills so cloud agent and code review can use it.
GitHub Copilot skills documentation · loads skills from .github/skills/, .claude/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "security-and-hardening" agent skill from https://github.com/penpot/penpot/tree/develop/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening into .github/skills/security-and-hardening/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "security-and-hardening", then confirm the skill loads.GitHub Copilot copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a opencodeOpenCode documents no install command of its own. Project install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.config/opencode/skills/.
$ gh skill install penpot/penpot security-and-hardening --agent opencodeProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/penpot/penpot.git skills-src && mkdir -p .opencode/skills && cp -r skills-src/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening .opencode/skills/security-and-hardening && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.config/opencode/skills/ instead of .opencode/skills for a personal install.
OpenCode skills documentation · loads skills from .opencode/skills/, .claude/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "security-and-hardening" agent skill from https://github.com/penpot/penpot/tree/develop/.agents/skills/security-and-hardening into .opencode/skills/security-and-hardening/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "security-and-hardening", then confirm the skill loads.OpenCode copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
security-and-hardeningHardens code against vulnerabilities. An agent skill from penpot/penpot.
Security And Hardening is an agent skill from penpot/penpot. Hardens code against vulnerabilities. Use when handling user input, authentication, data storage, or external integrations. Use when building any feature that accepts untrusted data, manages user sessions, or interacts with third-party services.
Its SKILL.md is about 4.7k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts.
It sits in Security, covering Secure coding, Web application vulnerabilities and Threat modeling. The repository describes itself as: Penpot: The open-source design platform for Product teams that need scalable collaboration. The licence is MPL-2.0.
3 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.
Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 10955f1. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.
Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.
From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.
Shell commands in SKILL.md call:
npmgitFrom the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.
Links to these hosts (documentation or services it may open):
genai.owasp.orgFrom URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.
Names these keys or tokens, usually read from environment variables:
API_KEYSTRIPE_API_KEYSESSION_SECRETFrom names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.
Security And Hardening loads about 4.7k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 67 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,364 words of instructions outside code blocks.
Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.
The automated check noted patterns worth knowing about, such as sudo or a known installer.
.env files:├── .env → NOT committed (contains real secrets)└── .env.local → NOT committed (local overrides).env.env.local.env.*.localAutomated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.
The full file from penpot/penpot at commit 10955f1, republished under its MPL-2.0 licence (© penpot). 1,364 words, ~4,650 tokens.
.claude/skills/security-and-hardening/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).Security-first development practices for web applications. Treat every external input as hostile, every secret as sacred, and every authorization check as mandatory. Security isn't a phase — it's a constraint on every line of code that touches user data, authentication, or external systems.
Controls bolted on without a threat model are guesses. Before hardening, spend five minutes thinking like an attacker:
| Threat | Ask | Typical mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Can someone impersonate a user/service? | Authentication, signature verification |
| Tampering | Can data be altered in transit or at rest? | Integrity checks, parameterized queries, HTTPS |
| Repudiation | Can an action be denied later? | Audit logging of security events |
| Information disclosure | Can data leak? | Encryption, field allowlists, generic errors |
| Denial of service | Can it be overwhelmed? | Rate limiting, input size caps, timeouts |
| Elevation of privilege | Can a user gain rights they shouldn't? | Authorization checks, least privilege |
If you can't name the trust boundaries for a feature, you're not ready to secure it. This is OWASP A04: Insecure Design — most breaches begin in design, not code.
npm audit (or equivalent) before every releaseeval() or innerHTML with user-provided dataThese are prevention patterns, not a ranking. For the 2021 ordering, see the quick-reference table in references/security-checklist.md.
// BAD: SQL injection via string concatenation
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;
// GOOD: Parameterized query
const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);
// GOOD: ORM with parameterized input
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });// Password hashing
import { hash, compare } from 'bcrypt';
const SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
const hashedPassword = await hash(plaintext, SALT_ROUNDS);
const isValid = await compare(plaintext, hashedPassword);
// Session management
app.use(session({
secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET, // From environment, not code
resave: false,
saveUninitialized: false,
cookie: {
httpOnly: true, // Not accessible via JavaScript
secure: true, // HTTPS only
sameSite: 'lax', // CSRF protection
maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours
},
}));// BAD: Rendering user input as HTML
element.innerHTML = userInput;
// GOOD: Use framework auto-escaping (React does this by default)
return <div>{userInput}</div>;
// If you MUST render HTML, sanitize first
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);// Always check authorization, not just authentication
app.patch('/api/tasks/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
const task = await taskService.findById(req.params.id);
// Check that the authenticated user owns this resource
if (task.ownerId !== req.user.id) {
return res.status(403).json({
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Not authorized to modify this task' }
});
}
// Proceed with update
const updated = await taskService.update(req.params.id, req.body);
return res.json(updated);
});// Security headers (use helmet for Express)
import helmet from 'helmet';
app.use(helmet());
// Content Security Policy
app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
directives: {
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"], // Tighten if possible
imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'https:'],
connectSrc: ["'self'"],
},
}));
// CORS — restrict to known origins
app.use(cors({
origin: process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS?.split(',') || 'http://localhost:3000',
credentials: true,
}));// Never return sensitive fields in API responses
function sanitizeUser(user: UserRecord): PublicUser {
const { passwordHash, resetToken, ...publicFields } = user;
return publicFields;
}
// Use environment variables for secrets
const API_KEY = process.env.STRIPE_API_KEY;
if (!API_KEY) throw new Error('STRIPE_API_KEY not configured');Any time the server fetches a URL the user influenced — webhooks, "import from URL", image proxies, link previews — an attacker can aim it at internal services (cloud metadata, localhost, private IPs).
// BAD: fetch whatever the user gives you
await fetch(req.body.webhookUrl);
// GOOD: allowlist scheme + host, reject if ANY resolved IP is private, forbid redirects
import { lookup } from 'node:dns/promises';
import ipaddr from 'ipaddr.js';
const ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set(['hooks.example.com']);
async function assertSafeUrl(raw: string): Promise<URL> {
const url = new URL(raw);
if (url.protocol !== 'https:') throw new Error('https only');
if (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(url.hostname)) throw new Error('host not allowed');
// Resolve ALL records; a single private/reserved address fails the check.
const addrs = await lookup(url.hostname, { all: true });
if (addrs.some((a) => ipaddr.parse(a.address).range() !== 'unicast')) {
throw new Error('private/reserved IP');
}
return url;
}
await fetch(await assertSafeUrl(req.body.webhookUrl), { redirect: 'error' });The range() !== 'unicast' check covers loopback, link-local 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata, the #1 SSRF target), private, and unique-local ranges across IPv4 and IPv6.
Caveat — this still has a TOCTOU gap. fetch resolves DNS again after the check, so an attacker using a short-TTL record can rebind to an internal IP between validation and connection. For high-risk surfaces, resolve once and connect to the pinned IP, or put a filtering agent in front (request-filtering-agent / ssrf-req-filter).
import { z } from 'zod';
const CreateTaskSchema = z.object({
title: z.string().min(1).max(200).trim(),
description: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
priority: z.enum(['low', 'medium', 'high']).default('medium'),
dueDate: z.string().datetime().optional(),
});
// Validate at the route handler
app.post('/api/tasks', async (req, res) => {
const result = CreateTaskSchema.safeParse(req.body);
if (!result.success) {
return res.status(422).json({
error: {
code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
message: 'Invalid input',
details: result.error.flatten(),
},
});
}
// result.data is now typed and validated
const task = await taskService.create(result.data);
return res.status(201).json(task);
});// Restrict file types and sizes
const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
const MAX_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5MB
function validateUpload(file: UploadedFile) {
if (!ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(file.mimetype)) {
throw new ValidationError('File type not allowed');
}
if (file.size > MAX_SIZE) {
throw new ValidationError('File too large (max 5MB)');
}
// Don't trust the file extension — check magic bytes if critical
}Not all audit findings require immediate action. Use this decision tree:
npm audit reports a vulnerability
├── Severity: critical or high
│ ├── Is the vulnerable code reachable in your app?
│ │ ├── YES --> Fix immediately (update, patch, or replace the dependency)
│ │ └── NO (dev-only dep, unused code path) --> Fix soon, but not a blocker
│ └── Is a fix available?
│ ├── YES --> Update to the patched version
│ └── NO --> Check for workarounds, consider replacing the dependency, or add to allowlist with a review date
├── Severity: moderate
│ ├── Reachable in production? --> Fix in the next release cycle
│ └── Dev-only? --> Fix when convenient, track in backlog
└── Severity: low
└── Track and fix during regular dependency updatesKey questions:
When you defer a fix, document the reason and set a review date.
npm audit catches known CVEs; it won't catch a malicious or typosquatted package. Also:
npm ci (not npm install) in CI — reproducible builds, no silent version drift.postinstall scripts in unfamiliar packages — they run arbitrary code at install time.cross-env vs crossenv, react-dom vs reactdom.import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
// General API rate limit
app.use('/api/', rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
max: 100, // 100 requests per window
standardHeaders: true,
legacyHeaders: false,
}));
// Stricter limit for auth endpoints
app.use('/api/auth/', rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
max: 10, // 10 attempts per 15 minutes
}));.env files:
├── .env.example → Committed (template with placeholder values)
├── .env → NOT committed (contains real secrets)
└── .env.local → NOT committed (local overrides)
.gitignore must include:
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
*.pem
*.keyAlways check before committing:
# Check for accidentally staged secrets
git diff --cached | grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token"If a secret is ever committed, rotate it. Deleting the line or rewriting history is not enough — assume it's compromised the moment it reaches a remote. Revoke and reissue the key first, then purge it from history.
If your app calls an LLM — chatbots, summarizers, agents, RAG — it inherits a new attack surface. Map it to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025):
eval, SQL, a shell, innerHTML, or a file path. Validate and encode it exactly as you would raw user input.// BAD: trusting model output as a command or as markup
const sql = await llm.generate(`Write SQL for: ${userQuestion}`);
await db.query(sql); // arbitrary query execution
container.innerHTML = await llm.reply(userMessage); // stored XSS, via the model
// GOOD: model output is data — parse defensively, then validate, then encode
let intent;
try {
intent = CommandSchema.parse(JSON.parse(await llm.replyJson(userMessage)));
} catch {
throw new ValidationError('unexpected model output'); // JSON.parse or schema failed
}
await runAllowlistedAction(intent.action, intent.params);
container.textContent = await llm.reply(userMessage);### Authentication
- [ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (salt rounds ≥ 12)
- [ ] Session tokens are httpOnly, secure, sameSite
- [ ] Login has rate limiting
- [ ] Password reset tokens expire
### Authorization
- [ ] Every endpoint checks user permissions
- [ ] Users can only access their own resources
- [ ] Admin actions require admin role verification
### Input
- [ ] All user input validated at the boundary
- [ ] SQL queries are parameterized
- [ ] HTML output is encoded/escaped
- [ ] Server-side URL fetches are allowlisted (no SSRF to internal services)
### Data
- [ ] No secrets in code or version control
- [ ] Sensitive fields excluded from API responses
- [ ] PII encrypted at rest (if applicable)
### Infrastructure
- [ ] Security headers configured (CSP, HSTS, etc.)
- [ ] CORS restricted to known origins
- [ ] Dependencies audited for vulnerabilities
- [ ] Error messages don't expose internals
### Supply Chain
- [ ] Lockfile committed; CI installs with `npm ci`
- [ ] New dependencies reviewed (maintenance, downloads, postinstall scripts)
### AI / LLM (if used)
- [ ] Model output treated as untrusted (no eval/SQL/innerHTML/shell)
- [ ] Secrets and other users' data kept out of prompts
- [ ] Tool/agent permissions scoped; destructive actions require confirmation| Rationalization | Reality |
|---|---|
| "This is an internal tool, security doesn't matter" | Internal tools get compromised. Attackers target the weakest link. |
| "We'll add security later" | Security retrofitting is 10x harder than building it in. Add it now. |
| "No one would try to exploit this" | Automated scanners will find it. Security by obscurity is not security. |
| "The framework handles security" | Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees. You still need to use them correctly. |
| "It's just a prototype" | Prototypes become production. Security habits from day one. |
| "Threat modeling is overkill here" | Five minutes of "how would I attack this?" prevents the design flaws no control can patch later. |
| "It's just LLM output, it's only text" | That "text" can be a SQL statement, a script tag, or a shell command. Treat it like any untrusted input. |
*) originsevalAfter implementing security-relevant code:
npm audit shows no critical or high vulnerabilities© penpot, MPL-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file
Just SKILL.md in .agents/skills/security-and-hardening of penpot/penpot.
Open the folder on GitHubat commit 10955f1
We found 10 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 6 other GitHub owners. This page covers the copy in penpot/penpot, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.
Security And Hardening next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.
| Skill | Stars | Used in | Tokens | Auto-check | Licence | Repo updated |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security And Hardening this skillpenpot/penpot | 61k | 6 repos | ~4.7k | Automated safety check: Notes | MPL-2.0 | |
| Security and Hardeningaddyosmani/agent-skills | 104k | 1 repos | ~4.4k | Automated safety check: Notes | MIT | |
| Security And Hardeningdzhalaevd/Donatello | 135 | — | ~5.1k | Automated safety check: Notes | Apache-2.0 | |
| Security Audit Scannerruvnet/ruflo | 74k | 2 repos | ~823 | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| 124 Java Secure Codingjabrena/plinth | 447 | — | ~885 | Automated safety check: Pass | Apache-2.0 | |
| Security Scanericrisco/rsc-harness | 180 | — | ~2.8k | Automated safety check: Notes | MIT |
addyosmani/agent-skills
Applies a threat-model-first approach to web code that handles untrusted input, authentication, data storage, dependencies or personal data.
dzhalaevd/Donatello
Review or harden security-sensitive behavior involving authentication, authorization, secrets, sessions, untrusted input, sensitive data, or trust boundaries.
ruvnet/ruflo
Runs claude-flow CLI security scans for input validation, path traversal, SQL injection, XSS, hardcoded secrets and known CVEs, and writes an audit report.
jabrena/plinth
A skill your agent uses when you need to apply Java secure coding best practices — including validating untrusted inputs, defending against injection attacks with parameterized queries, minimizing…
ericrisco/rsc-harness
A skill your agent uses when automated scanners drive a security sweep of a repo or app — SAST, dependency/lockfile CVEs, secrets in the tree or git history, IaC misconfig — and the raw output has…
rsmdt/the-startup
Vulnerability review, threat modeling, OWASP patterns, and secure coding assessment.
penpot/penpot
PR flow — open a new PR for the current task branch (validates base branch, commits, issue and push state) or update an existing PR's title or description to match Penpot conventions.
penpot/penpot
A cat clone with syntax highlighting, line numbers, and Git integration - a modern replacement for cat.
penpot/penpot
Run local CI-style checks with ./scripts/ci (lint, tests, format) per monorepo module.
penpot/penpot
Write or rewrite text in ASD-STE100 Simplified Technical English.
penpot/penpot
Code review criteria — the five review axes, core principles, severity format, and verdict for reviewing code changes.
penpot/penpot
Stage, review, and commit files following Penpot commit conventions.
Categories
Hardens code against vulnerabilities. An agent skill from penpot/penpot. Security And Hardening is an agent skill from penpot/penpot. Hardens code against vulnerabilities.
Security And Hardening fits situations like: handling user input; external integrations; building any feature that accepts untrusted data; manages user sessions.
Run `npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (.agents/skills/security-and-hardening in penpot/penpot) into .claude/skills/security-and-hardening in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.
Run `npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (.agents/skills/security-and-hardening in penpot/penpot) into .agents/skills/security-and-hardening in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.
Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add penpot/penpot --skill security-and-hardening -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/security-and-hardening, .gemini/skills/security-and-hardening, .github/skills/security-and-hardening and .opencode/skills/security-and-hardening in your project.
Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Security And Hardening needs the command-line tools its instructions call (npm and git) and credentials named API_KEY, STRIPE_API_KEY and SESSION_SECRET. Our summary lists: Node.js; A credential in SESSION_SECRET; A credential in API_KEY.
SKILL.md names 1 domain. As links in the text: genai.owasp.org. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.
Our automated static check of SKILL.md found notes only (mentions a .env file), nothing it rates as a warning. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.
Security And Hardening is published under the MPL-2.0 licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.
About 4.7k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 19k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.
Skills that share tags, products or a category with Security And Hardening: Security and Hardening (addyosmani/agent-skills, 104k stars), Security And Hardening (dzhalaevd/Donatello, 135 stars), Security Audit Scanner (ruvnet/ruflo, 74k stars) and 124 Java Secure Coding (jabrena/plinth, 447 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.
penpot (a GitHub organization) maintains it in penpot/penpot, which has 60,869 GitHub stars. The repository holds 24 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 9, 2026.
Source: penpot/penpot on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.