Detecting T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

What it does

When your agent uses it

• Hunting privilege-escalation activity
• Validating elevation-abuse detection coverage

Example prompts

• “/detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism”

Requirements

• Python 3

Workflow steps

6 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.

1. 1Monitor UAC Registry Modifications: Many UAC bypasses modify registry keys under HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command or…
2. 2Detect Auto-Elevating Process Abuse: Certain Windows binaries auto-elevate without UAC prompts (fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe…
3. 3Track Process Integrity Level Changes: Monitor for processes escalating from medium to high integrity level without corresponding UAC…
4. 4Hunt for Elevated Process Spawning: Detect when auto-elevating processes spawn unexpected children (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) -- indicating…
5. 5Monitor Linux Elevation Abuse: Track sudo misconfiguration exploitation, setuid binary abuse, and capability manipulation.
6. 6Correlate with Privilege Escalation Chain: Map elevation abuse to the broader attack chain, identifying what was done with escalated…

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 54a7988. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

• Tool permissions

  Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

  From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

• Runs code

  Ships 2 files in scripts/ (Python), which the agent can run.

  From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

• Network

  No URLs in SKILL.md.

  From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

• Credentials

  Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

  From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Detecting T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism loads about 1.5k tokens when it runs, and up to ~3.1k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 115 tokens; SKILL.md has 378 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it

~115

When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches

~1.5k

With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them

~3.1k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

• NoteRuns commands with sudoSKILL.md:62

  **Monitor Linux Elevation Abuse**: Track sudo misconfiguration exploitation, setuid binary abuse, and capability manipul

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); the scripts in this folder are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills at commit 54a7988, republished under its Apache-2.0 licence (© mukul975). 378 words, ~1,461 tokens.

name

detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism

description

Detect abuse of elevation control mechanisms (T1548), including Windows UAC bypass via auto-elevating binaries like fodhelper.exe and Linux sudo/setuid/setgid exploitation, by monitoring registry changes, integrity-level transitions, and parent-child process relationships via Sysmon and Windows Security events. Use when hunting privilege-escalation activity or validating elevation-abuse detection coverage.

domain

cybersecurity

subdomain

threat-hunting

tags

threat-hunting, uac-bypass, privilege-escalation, mitre-t1548, elevation-control, windows-security

version

1.0

author

mahipal

license

Apache-2.0

d3fend_techniques

Executable Denylisting, Execution Isolation, File Metadata Consistency Validation, Restore Access, Password Authentication

nist_csf

DE.CM-01, DE.AE-02, DE.AE-07, ID.RA-05

mitre_attack

T1548.002, T1548.001, T1548.003, T1548.004

index=sysmon (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13)
| where match(TargetObject, "(?i)HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\(ms-settings|mscfile|exefile|Folder)\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command")
| table _time Computer User EventCode TargetObject Details Image

index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(fodhelper|computerdefaults|eventvwr|sdclt|slui|cmstp)\.exe$")
| where NOT match(ParentImage, "(?i)(explorer|svchost|services)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RegistryKey has_any ("ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command", "mscfile\\shell\\open\\command")
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName

title: UAC Bypass via Registry Modification
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains:
            - '\ms-settings\shell\open\command'
            - '\mscfile\shell\open\command'
            - '\exefile\shell\open\command'
    condition: selection
level: high
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1548.002

Hunt ID: TH-UAC-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Bypass Method: [Registry hijack/DLL hijack/Token manipulation]
Auto-Elevate Binary: [fodhelper.exe/eventvwr.exe/etc.]
Registry Key Modified: [Full registry path]
Payload Executed: [Command or binary path]
User Context: [Account]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium]
ATT&CK Technique: [T1548.00x]

© mukul975, Apache-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 7 other files (scripts, references, assets) in skills/detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.

• SKILL.md
• LICENSE
• assets/template.md
• references/api-reference.md
• references/standards.md
• references/workflows.md
• scripts/agent.py
• scripts/process.py

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 54a7988