Agent Owasp Compliance

What it does

When your agent uses it

• Audit - Comparing agent framework security features against the standard - Any request like is my agent OWASP compliant?
• Check ASI compliance
• Agentic security audit

Example prompts

• “is my agent OWASP compliant?”
• “check ASI compliance”
• “agentic security audit”
• “/agent-owasp-compliance”

Requirements

• Python 3

Workflow steps

10 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.

1. 1Does user input pass through validation before reaching any tool? (ASI-01)
2. 2Is there an explicit list of what tools the agent can call? (ASI-02)
3. 3Can the agent do anything, or are its capabilities bounded? (ASI-03)
4. 4Can the agent promote its own privileges? (ASI-04)
5. 5Do agents verify each other's identity before accepting tasks? (ASI-05)
6. 6Is every tool call logged with enough detail to replay it? (ASI-06)
7. 7Does each agent have a unique cryptographic identity? (ASI-07)
8. 8Is policy enforcement deterministic (not LLM-based)? (ASI-08)
9. 9Are plugins/tools integrity-verified before use? (ASI-09)
10. 10Is there a circuit breaker or kill switch? (ASI-10)

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 727ff2e. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

• Tool permissions

  Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

  From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

• Runs code

  No scripts in the folder and no shell commands in SKILL.md (its code samples are python and markdown).

  From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

• Network

  Links to these hosts (documentation or services it may open):

  • owasp.org
  • github.com

  From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

• Credentials

  Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

  From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Agent Owasp Compliance loads about 3k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 142 tokens; SKILL.md has 888 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it

~142

When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches

~3k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from github/awesome-copilot at commit 727ff2e, republished under its MIT licence (© github). 888 words, ~2,970 tokens.

name

agent-owasp-compliance

description

Check any AI agent codebase against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 risks. Use this skill when: - Evaluating an agent system's security posture before production deployment - Running a compliance check against OWASP ASI 2026 standards - Mapping existing security controls to the 10 agentic risks - Generating a compliance report for security review or audit - Comparing agent framework security features against the standard - Any request like "is my agent OWASP compliant?", "check ASI compliance", or "agentic security audit"

Codebase → Scan for each ASI control:
  ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection
  ASI-02: Tool Use Governance
  ASI-03: Agency Boundaries
  ASI-04: Escalation Controls
  ASI-05: Trust Boundary Enforcement
  ASI-06: Logging & Audit
  ASI-07: Identity Management
  ASI-08: Policy Integrity
  ASI-09: Supply Chain Verification
  ASI-10: Behavioral Monitoring
→ Generate Compliance Report (X/10 covered)

import re
from pathlib import Path

def check_asi_01(project_path: str) -> dict:
    """ASI-01: Is user input validated before reaching tool execution?"""
    positive_patterns = [
        "input_validation", "validate_input", "sanitize",
        "classify_intent", "prompt_injection", "threat_detect",
        "PolicyEvaluator", "PolicyEngine", "check_content",
    ]
    negative_patterns = [
        r"eval\(", r"exec\(", r"subprocess\.run\(.*shell=True",
        r"os\.system\(",
    ]

    # Scan Python files for signals
    root = Path(project_path)
    positive_matches = []
    negative_matches = []

    for py_file in root.rglob("*.py"):
        content = py_file.read_text(errors="ignore")
        for pattern in positive_patterns:
            if pattern in content:
                positive_matches.append(f"{py_file.name}: {pattern}")
        for pattern in negative_patterns:
            if re.search(pattern, content):
                negative_matches.append(f"{py_file.name}: {pattern}")

    positive_found = len(positive_matches) > 0
    negative_found = len(negative_matches) > 0

    return {
        "risk": "ASI-01",
        "name": "Prompt Injection",
        "status": "pass" if positive_found and not negative_found else "fail",
        "controls_found": positive_matches,
        "vulnerabilities": negative_matches,
        "recommendation": "Add input validation before tool execution, not just output filtering"
    }

# GOOD: Validate before tool execution
result = policy_engine.evaluate(user_input)
if result.action == "deny":
    return "Request blocked by policy"
tool_result = await execute_tool(validated_input)

# BAD: User input goes directly to tool
tool_result = await execute_tool(user_input)  # No validation

ALLOWED_TOOLS = {"search", "read_file", "create_ticket"}

def execute_tool(name: str, args: dict):
    if name not in ALLOWED_TOOLS:
        raise PermissionError(f"Tool '{name}' not in allowlist")
    # validate args...
    return tools[name](**validated_args)

def accept_task(sender_id: str, task: dict):
    trust = trust_registry.get_trust(sender_id)
    if not trust.meets_threshold(0.7):
        raise PermissionError(f"Agent {sender_id} trust too low: {trust.current()}")
    if not verify_signature(task, sender_id):
        raise SecurityError("Task signature verification failed")
    return process_task(task)

# OWASP ASI Compliance Report
Generated: 2026-04-01
Project: my-agent-system

## Summary: 7/10 Controls Covered

| Risk | Status | Finding |
|------|--------|---------|
| ASI-01 Prompt Injection | PASS | PolicyEngine validates input before tool calls |
| ASI-02 Insecure Tool Use | PASS | Tool allowlist enforced in governance.py |
| ASI-03 Excessive Agency | PASS | Execution rings limit capabilities |
| ASI-04 Unauthorized Escalation | PASS | Ring promotion requires attestation |
| ASI-05 Trust Boundary | FAIL | No identity verification between agents |
| ASI-06 Insufficient Logging | PASS | AuditChain with SHA-256 chain hashes |
| ASI-07 Insecure Identity | FAIL | Agents use string names, no crypto identity |
| ASI-08 Policy Bypass | PASS | Deterministic PolicyEvaluator, no LLM in path |
| ASI-09 Supply Chain | FAIL | No integrity manifests or plugin signing |
| ASI-10 Behavioral Anomaly | PASS | Circuit breakers and trust decay active |

## Critical Gaps
- ASI-05: Add agent identity verification using DIDs or signed tokens
- ASI-07: Replace string agent names with cryptographic identity
- ASI-09: Generate INTEGRITY.json manifests for all plugins

## Recommendation
Install agent-governance-toolkit for reference implementations of all 10 controls:
pip install agent-governance-toolkit

© github, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in skills/agent-owasp-compliance of github/awesome-copilot.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 727ff2e

Used in 1 other repository

We found 1 copy of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 1 other GitHub owner. This page covers the copy in github/awesome-copilot, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

• boshi-xixixi/TraeSkill.trae/Skills/.agents/skills/agent-owasp-compliance