Agent skill

Report Writing

by sickn33 in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi

MITAuto-check passedSecurity

Install Report Writing

skills CLI
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill report-writing -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills report-writing --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/report-writing .claude/skills/report-writing && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
report-writing
GitHub stars
47k
Used in
1 other repo
Token cost
~3.2k tokens
SKILL.md length
425 words
Files
2 (incl. references)
Skills in repo
1,497
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi

  • Works in 5 steps: Exposes PII / health / financial data of… → Allows account takeover or privilege… → Requires ZERO user interaction from… → …
  • Tasks that involve Report writing
  • SKILL.md covers THE MOST IMPORTANT RULE, TITLE FORMULA, HACKERONE REPORT TEMPLATE and Impact, plus 6 more sections
  • Needs ATTACKER_TOKEN

What it does

Report Writing is an agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi

Its SKILL.md is about 3.2k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. The skill folder holds 2 other files, including reference files (for example `references/details.md`). Compatibility notes: Process guidance; no tooling required. Docs-only; upstream templates not bundled.

It sits in Security, covering Report writing and Bug bounty. The repository describes itself as: AAS Core is the local, agent-first control plane for complete catalog discovery, agent-owned selection, stack validation, and planning, backed by 2,400+ agentic skills. Includes… The licence is MIT.

When your agent uses it

  • Tasks that involve Report writing
  • Tasks that involve Bug bounty

Example prompts

  • “/report-writing”

Requirements

  • Python 3
  • A credential in ATTACKER_TOKEN
  • Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Process guidance; no tooling required. Docs-only; upstream templates not bundled.

Workflow steps

5 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.

  1. Exposes PII / health / financial data of other users? → +1 severity
  2. Allows account takeover or privilege escalation? → +2 severity
  3. Requires ZERO user interaction from victim? → +1 severity
  4. Affects ALL users (not specific condition)? → +1 severity
  5. Remotely exploitable with no internal network access? → baseline for High+

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit b84d35a. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    No scripts in the folder and no shell commands in SKILL.md (its code samples are markdown and python).

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Links to these hosts (documentation or services it may open):

    • github.com

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names these keys or tokens, usually read from environment variables:

    • ATTACKER_TOKEN

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

  • Compatibility

    Process guidance; no tooling required. Docs-only; upstream templates not bundled.

    From compatibility in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

Context cost

Report Writing loads about 3.2k tokens when it runs, and up to ~5.6k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 19 tokens; SKILL.md has 425 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~19
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~3.2k
With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them
~5.6k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills at commit b84d35a, republished under its MIT licence (© sickn33). 425 words, ~3,180 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/report-writing/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder). This skill also uses 1 other file; get the full folder from GitHub.
name
report-writing
description
Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi
compatibility
Process guidance; no tooling required. Docs-only; upstream templates not bundled.
category
security
risk
safe
source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_repo
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_type
community
date_added
2026-09-20
license
MIT
license_source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
sources
community, operator_experience

REPORT WRITING

Impact-first. Human tone. No theoretical language. Triagers are people.


THE MOST IMPORTANT RULE

Never use "could potentially" or "could be used to" or "may allow". Either it does the thing or it doesn't. If you haven't proved it, don't claim it.

BAD:  "This vulnerability could potentially allow an attacker to access user data."
GOOD: "An attacker can access any user's order history by changing the user_id
       parameter to the target user's ID. I confirmed this using two test accounts:
       attacker@test.com (ID 123) successfully retrieved victim@test.com (ID 456)
       orders, including their shipping address and payment method last 4 digits."

TITLE FORMULA

[Bug Class] in [Exact Endpoint/Feature] allows [attacker role] to [impact] [victim scope]

Good titles (specific, impact-first):

IDOR in /api/v2/invoices/{id} allows authenticated user to read any customer's invoice data
Missing auth on POST /api/admin/users allows unauthenticated attacker to create admin accounts
Stored XSS in profile bio field executes in admin panel — allows privilege escalation
SSRF via image import URL parameter reaches AWS EC2 metadata service
Race condition in coupon redemption allows same code to be used unlimited times

Bad titles (vague, useless to triager):

IDOR vulnerability found
Broken access control
XSS in user input
Security issue in API
Unauthorized access to user data

HACKERONE REPORT TEMPLATE

markdown
## Summary

[One paragraph: what the bug is, where it is, what an attacker can do. Be specific.
Include: endpoint, method, parameter, data exposed, required access level.]

Example: "The `/api/users/{user_id}/orders` endpoint does not verify that the
authenticated user owns the requested user_id. An attacker can enumerate any
user's order history, including PII (email, address, phone) and purchase history,
by incrementing the user_id parameter. No privileges beyond a standard free
account are required."

## Vulnerability Details

**Vulnerability Type:** IDOR / Broken Object Level Authorization
**CVSS 3.1 Score:** 6.5 (Medium) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
**Affected Endpoint:** GET /api/users/{user_id}/orders

## Steps to Reproduce

**Environment:**
- Attacker account: attacker@test.com, user_id = 123
- Victim account: victim@test.com, user_id = 456
- Target: https://target.com

**Steps:**

1. Log in as attacker@test.com, obtain Bearer token

2. Send the following request:

GET /api/users/456/orders HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN_HERE


3. Observe response:

```json
{
  "orders": [
    {"id": 789, "items": [...], "email": "victim@test.com", "address": "123 Main St..."}
  ]
}

The response contains victim's full order history and PII despite being requested by a different user.

Impact

An authenticated attacker can enumerate all user orders by iterating user_id values. This exposes: full name, email, shipping address, purchase history, and payment method (last 4). With ~100K users, this represents a mass PII breach affecting all registered users. Exploitation requires only a free account and takes minutes with a simple loop.

Add server-side ownership verification:

python
if order.user_id != current_user.id:
    raise Forbidden()

Supporting Materials

[Screenshot showing attacker's session returning victim's order data] [Video walkthrough if available]


---

## BUGCROWD REPORT TEMPLATE

```markdown
# [IDOR] User order history accessible without authorization via /api/users/{id}/orders

**VRT Category:** Broken Access Control > IDOR > P2

## Description

[Same impact-first paragraph as HackerOne summary]

## Steps to Reproduce

[Same structured steps — exact HTTP requests, exact responses]

## Proof of Concept

[Screenshot/video showing the actual impact]

## Expected vs Actual Behavior

**Expected:** 403 Forbidden when user_id does not match authenticated user
**Actual:** 200 OK with victim's full order data

## Severity Justification

P2 (High) — Direct read access to other users' PII. Affects all user accounts.
No user interaction required. Exploitable by any authenticated user.
Automated enumeration could exfil all [N] user records in minutes.

## Remediation

Add ownership verification: `if order.user_id != current_user.id: raise 403`

INTIGRITI REPORT TEMPLATE

markdown
# [Bug Class]: [Exact Impact] in [Endpoint/Feature]

## Description

[Impact-first paragraph. Start with what an attacker can do, not with how you found it.
Include: endpoint, method, parameter, data exposed, required privileges.]

## Steps to Reproduce

**Environment:**
- Attacker: email=attacker@test.com (standard account, no special role)
- Victim: email=victim@test.com
- Tested: [date]

**Reproduction steps:**

1. [Login as attacker / visit URL / send request]

2. Send the following HTTP request:

\```http
METHOD /endpoint HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN
Content-Type: application/json

{"param": "victim_id_here"}
\```

3. Observe response contains victim's private data:

\```json
{"email": "victim@test.com", "address": "123 Main St", ...}
\```

## Impact

[Specific, quantified impact. What data, how many users, what can attacker do.]

CVSS 3.1 Score: X.X ([Severity]) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

## Remediation

[1-3 sentence concrete fix. Include code if helpful.]

## Attachments

[Screenshot or Loom video showing the impact — Intigriti triagers prefer video for complex bugs]

Intigriti-specific notes:

  • Title format: [Bug Class]: [One-line impact] (no formula required, but keep it specific)
  • Severity is set by you: Critical/High/Medium/Low/Exceptional
  • CVSS 3.1 is standard (CVSS 4.0 also accepted on newer programs)
  • PoC video is valued much more than screenshot alone — record with Loom
  • Safe harbor: Intigriti enforces it, be comfortable going slightly aggressive with testing

IMMUNEFI REPORT TEMPLATE

markdown
# [Bug Class] — [Protocol Name] — [Severity]

## Summary

[One paragraph with: root cause, affected function, economic impact, attack cost.
Include numbers where possible: "attacker can drain $X in Y transactions."]

## Vulnerability Details

**Contract:** `VulnerableContract.sol`
**Function:** `claimRedemption()`
**Bug Class:** Accounting State Desynchronization
**Severity:** Critical

### Root Cause

[Exact code snippet showing the vulnerable code with comments]

## Proof of Concept

```solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
// Foundry PoC — run: forge test --match-test test_exploit -vvvv

contract ExploitTest is Test {
    // ... full working exploit
}

Impact

[Quantified: "Attacker can drain X% of TVL = $Y at current rates. Requires $Z gas. Attack is repeatable."]

Show full SKILL.md (190 more words)Show less

[Specific code change with before/after]


---

## CVSS 3.1 QUICK SCORING

### Formula

CVSS = f(AV, AC, PR, UI, S, C, I, A)


### Metric Quick Picks

| Metric | Value | Weight | When |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Attack Vector (AV)** | Network | +0.85 | Via internet |
| | Local | +0.55 | Local access needed |
| **Attack Complexity (AC)** | Low | +0.77 | Repeatable |
| | High | +0.44 | Race/timing needed |
| **Privileges Required (PR)** | None | +0.85 | No login |
| | Low | +0.62 | Regular user account |
| | High | +0.27 | Admin account |
| **User Interaction (UI)** | None | +0.85 | No victim action |
| | Required | +0.62 | Victim must click |
| **Scope (S)** | Changed | higher | Affects browser/OS/other |
| | Unchanged | lower | Stays in app |
| **Confidentiality (C)** | High | +0.56 | All data exposed |
| | Low | +0.22 | Limited data |
| **Integrity (I)** | High | +0.56 | Can modify any data |
| **Availability (A)** | High | +0.56 | Crashes service |

### Typical Scores by Bug Class

| Bug | Typical CVSS | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| IDOR (read PII) | 6.5 | Medium |
| IDOR (write/delete) | 7.5 | High |
| Auth bypass → admin | 9.8 | Critical |
| Stored XSS (any user) | 5.4–8.8 | Med–High |
| SQLi (data exfil) | 8.6 | High |
| SSRF (cloud metadata) | 9.1 | Critical |
| Race condition (double spend) | 7.5 | High |
| GraphQL auth bypass | 8.7 | High |
| JWT none algorithm | 9.1 | Critical |

---

## SEVERITY DECISION GUIDE

### Critical (P1)
- Full account takeover of any user without interaction
- Remote code execution
- SQLi with ability to dump/modify entire DB
- Auth bypass to admin panel
- SSRF to cloud metadata → IAM credentials exfil

### High (P2)
- Mass PII exposure (email, phone, SSN, payment data)
- Privilege escalation from user to admin
- SSRF reaching internal services (data returned)
- Stored XSS executing for all users of sensitive feature
- Payment bypass / financial loss without limit

### Medium (P3)
- IDOR on specific user's non-critical data
- XSS on low-sensitivity page requiring victim interaction
- CSRF on important but non-critical action
- Rate limit bypass on OTP (with effort demonstrated)

### Low (P4)
- Information disclosure (non-sensitive, no PII)
- Clickjacking on sensitive action WITH working PoC
- CORS on limited data

---

## SEVERITY SELF-ASSESSMENT

Each YES raises severity:
  1. Exposes PII / health / financial data of other users? → +1 severity
  2. Allows account takeover or privilege escalation? → +2 severity
  3. Requires ZERO user interaction from victim? → +1 severity
  4. Affects ALL users (not specific condition)? → +1 severity
  5. Remotely exploitable with no internal network access? → baseline for High+

---

## DOWNGRADE COUNTERS

| Program Says | Counter With |
|---|---|
| "Requires authentication" | "Attacker needs only a free account — no special role or permission" |
| "Limited impact" | "Affects [N] users / exposes [PII type] / $[amount] at risk" |
| "Already known" | "Show me the report number — I searched hacktivity and found none" |
| "By design" | "Show me the documentation stating this is intended behavior" |
| "Low CVSS" | "CVSS doesn't capture business impact — attacker can extract [X] in [Y] minutes" |
| "Not exploitable" | "Here is the exact response showing victim's data returned to attacker session" |

---

## THE 60-SECOND PRE-SUBMIT CHECKLIST

[ ] Title follows formula: [Class] in [endpoint] allows [actor] to [impact] [ ] First sentence states exact impact in plain English [ ] Steps to Reproduce has exact HTTP request (copy-paste ready) [ ] Response showing the bug is included (screenshot or JSON body) [ ] Two test accounts used — not just one account testing itself [ ] CVSS score calculated and included [ ] Recommended fix is 1-2 sentences (not a lecture) [ ] No typos in endpoint paths or parameter names [ ] Report is < 600 words — triagers skim long reports [ ] Severity claimed matches impact described — don't overclaim [ ] Never used "could potentially" or "may allow" [ ] PoC is reproducible by triager from a fresh state


---


## Contents

- [CVSS 4.0 QUICK REFERENCE (newer programs)](references/details.md)
- [HUMAN TONE GUIDELINES](references/details.md)
- [STEPS TO REPRODUCE FORMAT (triager-optimized)](references/details.md)
- [Related Skills & Chains](references/details.md)
- [Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)](references/details.md)

## When to Use

- You need this skill's process guidance (reporting format, evidence handling, detection notes, or scope triage) during an authorized engagement.
- No active probing is involved in this step.

## Limitations

- Process guidance only; it does not authorize probing or exploitation — those steps need their own authorized skill and confirmation gate.
- Docs-only import: upstream templates, commands, and research assets are not bundled.

### Example

```markdown
Apply this skill's checklist to the current engagement notes and report gaps.

Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.

© sickn33, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 1 other file (references) in skills/report-writing of sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

  • SKILL.md
  • references/details.md

Open the folder on GitHubat commit b84d35a

Used in 1 other repository

We found 5 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 1 other GitHub owner. This page covers the copy in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

Compare with similar skills

Report Writing next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Report Writing compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Report Writing this skillsickn33/agentic-awesome-skills47k1 repos~3.2kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Report Writingelementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter4.8k—~5.2kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Web3 Triage and Report Examplestradecatlabs/vibe-coding-cn17k2 repos~7.7kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Bug Bounty Report Writingawarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter5.3k2 repos~3.9kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Write Reportbugbountywithmarco/bugbounty-disclosed-reports120—~585Automated safety check: PassNone
Offensive ReportingSnailSploit/Claude-Red7.4k—~3.7kAutomated safety check: PassMIT

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Questions about Report Writing

What does Report Writing do?

Bug bounty report writing for H1/Bugcrowd/Intigriti/Immunefi. Report Writing is an agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

When should I use Report Writing?

Report Writing fits situations like: tasks that involve Report writing; tasks that involve Bug bounty.

How do I install Report Writing in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill report-writing -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/report-writing in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .claude/skills/report-writing in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Report Writing in Codex?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill report-writing -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/report-writing in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .agents/skills/report-writing in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Report Writing in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill report-writing -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/report-writing, .gemini/skills/report-writing, .github/skills/report-writing and .opencode/skills/report-writing in your project.

What does Report Writing need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Report Writing needs credentials named ATTACKER_TOKEN. Our summary lists: Python 3; A credential in ATTACKER_TOKEN. Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Process guidance; no tooling required. Docs-only; upstream templates not bundled..

Does Report Writing access the network?

SKILL.md names 1 domain. As links in the text: github.com. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Report Writing safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does Report Writing use?

Report Writing is published under the MIT licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Report Writing use?

About 3.2k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 13k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full. Its references folder adds about 2.4k tokens, read only when the agent opens those files.

What are the alternatives to Report Writing?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Report Writing: Report Writing (elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter, 4.8k stars), Web3 Triage and Report Examples (tradecatlabs/vibe-coding-cn, 17k stars), Bug Bounty Report Writing (awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter, 5.3k stars) and Write Report (bugbountywithmarco/bugbounty-disclosed-reports, 120 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Report Writing?

sickn33 (a GitHub user) maintains it in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which has 47,405 GitHub stars. The repository holds 1,497 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 9, 2026.

Source: sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.