Agent skill

Hunt Business Logic

by sickn33 in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

MITAuto-check passed

Install Hunt Business Logic

skills CLI
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-business-logic -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-business-logic --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-business-logic .claude/skills/hunt-business-logic && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
hunt-business-logic
GitHub stars
47k
Used in
1 other repo
Token cost
~4.9k tokens
SKILL.md length
2,118 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
1,497
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

  • Works in 7 steps: Map all authentication boundaries.… → Identify every verification flow.… → Test rate-limiting controls on every… → …
  • SKILL.md covers Crown Jewel Targets, Attack Surface Signals, Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology and Payload & Detection Patterns, plus 8 more sections
  • Calls curl

What it does

Hunt Business Logic is an agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities.

Its SKILL.md is about 4.9k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts. Compatibility notes: Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not…

The repository describes itself as: AAS Core is the local, agent-first control plane for complete catalog discovery, agent-owned selection, stack validation, and planning, backed by 2,400+ agentic skills. Includes… The licence is MIT.

Example prompts

  • “/hunt-business-logic”

Requirements

  • Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.

Workflow steps

7 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.

  1. Map all authentication boundaries. Spider the target. Identify pages/endpoints that serve authenticated content (employee portals, premium…
  2. Identify every verification flow. Enumerate: email verification, phone/SMS verification, payment verification, CAPTCHA, age gates. For…
  3. Test rate-limiting controls on every form. For every POST endpoint (subscribe, login, OTP, search), send 50+ rapid requests. Vary: remove…
  4. Intercept and tamper with payment flows. Use Burp Suite to intercept every request between your browser, the application, and the payment…
  5. Test phone/callback number verification. Whenever a platform accepts a callback number, test: can you set it to a number you don't own?…
  6. Check for unprotected employee/internal surfaces. Search Shodan, GitHub, JS bundles, and Wayback Machine for internal subdomain/path…
  7. Validate business impact. For each finding, determine: does this result in financial loss, unauthorized access, or data exposure? Document…

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit b84d35a. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • curl

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Links to these hosts (documentation or services it may open):

    • hackerone.com
    • github.com

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

  • Compatibility

    Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.

    From compatibility in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

Context cost

Hunt Business Logic loads about 4.9k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 17 tokens; SKILL.md has 2,118 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~17
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~4.9k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills at commit b84d35a, republished under its MIT licence (© sickn33). 2,118 words, ~4,882 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/hunt-business-logic/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
hunt-business-logic
description
Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities.
compatibility
Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.
category
security
risk
offensive
source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_repo
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_type
community
date_added
2026-09-20
license
MIT
license_source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
sources
hackerone_public, github
report_count
25

⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

  1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
  2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
  3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
  4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

Crown Jewel Targets

Business logic vulnerabilities pay highest in platforms where financial transactions, identity verification, and access controls intersect with real-world consequences. The richest targets are:

  • E-commerce & payment platforms (Valve/Steam, Shopify) — payment flow manipulation, free goods, price tampering
  • Marketplace & gig economy apps (Airbnb, Uber) — identity/verification bypass enabling fraud or unsafe interactions
  • SaaS with tiered access (Mozilla Monitor) — bypassing verification to unlock monitoring features without entitlement
  • High-traffic consumer apps (Snapchat, Yelp) — rate-limit bypass enabling spam, enumeration, or abuse at scale

Asset types that pay: checkout flows, subscription endpoints, callback/verification systems, webhook handlers, employee/internal portals exposed to the internet, and any endpoint that trusts client-supplied data to make authorization decisions.


Attack Surface Signals

URL patterns to watch:

  • /checkout, /order, /subscribe, /payment, /verify, /confirm, /callback
  • /internal, /employee, /summit, /staff, /admin — internal pages accidentally public
  • /api/v*/payment, /api/v*/notify, /webhook — payment provider callbacks
  • Endpoints accepting X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, CF-Connecting-IP headers

Response/header signals:

  • Set-Cookie with unvalidated session state tied to cart or order data
  • Payment provider names in responses: Smart2Pay, Stripe, PayPal, Braintree
  • Redirect chains through third-party payment pages (in-flight data opportunity)
  • 200 OK on subscription/verification endpoints with no CAPTCHA or token

JS patterns:

  • Hardcoded internal URLs in frontend bundles (/employee/, /staff/, /internal/)
  • Client-side price calculation before server submission
  • Verification logic that only checks on the frontend (if (verified) { ... })
  • fetch('/api/subscribe', { method: 'POST', body: ... }) with no anti-CSRF token or rate-limit token

Tech stack signals:

  • Shopify storefronts with draft/unpublished channel pages
  • Apps using IP-based rate limiting without session/account binding
  • Payment webhooks with no HMAC signature validation
  • SMS/phone callback flows that don't verify ownership before enabling features

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

  1. Map all authentication boundaries. Spider the target. Identify pages/endpoints that serve authenticated content (employee portals, premium features, order pages) and test each unauthenticated. Look for internal pages indexed in JS bundles or linked from robots.txt/sitemap.xml.

  2. Identify every verification flow. Enumerate: email verification, phone/SMS verification, payment verification, CAPTCHA, age gates. For each, test: what happens if you skip the verification step entirely? What happens if you replay a valid token on a different account?

  3. Test rate-limiting controls on every form. For every POST endpoint (subscribe, login, OTP, search), send 50+ rapid requests. Vary: remove cookies, rotate X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP headers, change User-Agent. Check if the server uses IP from headers rather than connection IP.

  4. Intercept and tamper with payment flows. Use Burp Suite to intercept every request between your browser, the application, and the payment provider. Identify where price, currency, order ID, or status fields are set. Attempt to modify amounts to $0.01 or currency to a low-value currency. Look for POST-back/webhook endpoints that accept payment confirmation — test if they validate HMAC/signature.

  5. Test phone/callback number verification. Whenever a platform accepts a callback number, test: can you set it to a number you don't own? Does the platform call/text that number and grant trust based solely on submission? Try setting it to a victim's number.

  6. Check for unprotected employee/internal surfaces. Search Shodan, GitHub, JS bundles, and Wayback Machine for internal subdomain/path references. Test access without authentication. Check if these surfaces allow order placement, data access, or privilege escalation.

  7. Validate business impact. For each finding, determine: does this result in financial loss, unauthorized access, or data exposure? Document the end-to-end chain.


Payload & Detection Patterns

Rate limit bypass via header rotation:

bash
# Rotate X-Forwarded-For to bypass IP rate limiting
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
  curl -s -X POST https://target.com/api/subscribe \
    -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$i" \
    -H "X-Real-IP: 10.0.0.$i" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"email":"victim+'"$i"'@example.com"}' \
    -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n"
done

Payment tampering — modify in-flight price:

http
POST /payment/initiate HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com

amount=0.01&currency=USD&order_id=12345&product_id=99
bash
# Look for unvalidated webhook endpoints
curl -X POST https://target.com/payment/callback \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"status":"success","amount":"0.01","order_id":"12345","transaction_id":"fake-txn"}'

Unauthenticated internal page discovery:

bash
# Check robots.txt and sitemap for internal paths
curl -s https://target.com/robots.txt | grep -iE "(disallow|allow)" 
curl -s https://target.com/sitemap.xml | grep -iE "(employee|internal|staff|summit|admin)"

# Grep JS bundles for internal paths
curl -s https://target.com/assets/app.js | grep -oE '"/[a-zA-Z0-9/_-]{3,50}"' | sort -u

Email verification bypass:

bash
# Skip the verification step: hit the post-verification API endpoint directly
# with an unverified session. If it succeeds, the gate is UI-only.
curl -s -X POST https://monitor.target.com/api/monitoring/enable \
  -H "Cookie: session=<your_unverified_session>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"victim@example.com"}'

# Replay verification token on different account
curl -X POST https://target.com/verify \
  -d 'token=VALID_TOKEN_FROM_ACCOUNT_A&email=account_b@example.com'

Grep patterns for client-side logic issues:

bash
# Find price calculations in JS
grep -iE "(price|amount|total|cost)\s*[=*+]" app.js

# Find internal URLs in JS bundles
grep -oE '"/(employee|internal|staff|admin|summit)[^"]*"' *.js

# Find unvalidated IP header usage in server code
grep -iE "x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|cf-connecting-ip" src/ -r

Common Root Causes

  1. Server trusts client-supplied data for financial decisions. Developers offload price calculation to the frontend or pass amount fields through forms/URLs without re-validating on the server against a canonical source (the product database).

  2. Verification is enforced only in the UI, not the API. Frontend hides features behind a verification gate, but the backend API endpoints are fully functional without a verified status — any authenticated request succeeds.

  3. IP-based rate limiting reads from spoofable headers. Developers implement rate limits using request.headers['X-Forwarded-For'] instead of the actual connection IP, allowing trivial bypass by header manipulation.

  4. Payment webhooks lack signature validation. Developers implement "success" webhooks without verifying the HMAC signature provided by the payment provider, allowing anyone to POST a fake success notification.

  5. Internal/employee pages aren't access-controlled. Internal tools are deployed to production domains without authentication middleware, either because developers assume obscurity (unlisted URL) or forgot to apply auth to a new route.

  6. Phone/callback verification is advisory, not enforced. Systems accept a phone number and grant trust to whoever submitted it, without confirming the submitter owns or controls that number.

  7. Draft/channel-specific storefronts inherit full order functionality. Platforms like Shopify allow creating storefronts for specific channels (employee events) that are unlisted but still fully functional for order placement if the URL is known.


Bypass Techniques

DefenseBypass
IP-based rate limitingRotate X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, True-Client-IP, CF-Connecting-IP headers per request
CAPTCHA on subscription formsUse header-based bypass first; if CAPTCHA is only on the web form, call the underlying API endpoint directly
Email verification gateAccess the post-verification API endpoint directly; replay valid tokens; check if verified=true is a client-set cookie/param
Payment amount server validationModify currency to a lower-value currency; test with $0.00 or negative amounts; manipulate order IDs to reference different products
Webhook HMAC validationTest with no/empty signature header (is validation enforced at all — a modified payload only "passes" if it isn't); replay an UNMODIFIED captured webhook to test missing idempotency/anti-replay
Auth on internal pagesTry unauthenticated; try with a low-privilege account; try path traversal variants (/employee/../employee/)
Phone verification (OTP sent)Submit someone else's number without OTP validation; check if the system grants trust on submission vs. OTP confirmation

Gate 0 Validation

Before writing any report, answer all three:

  1. What can the attacker DO right now? Be specific: "An unauthenticated user can place an order for physical goods at $0 cost" or "An attacker can bypass email verification and monitor any email address without owning it" or "An attacker can send unlimited subscription emails to any address." Vague impact = reject.

  2. What does the victim LOSE? Identify a concrete, attributable loss: financial loss (free goods, fraudulent payments), privacy loss (phone number spoofed, unauthorized monitoring), service abuse (spam campaigns via rate-limit bypass), or security degradation (unverified identity trusted for sensitive actions). If the loss is purely theoretical, re-evaluate severity.

  3. Can it be reproduced in 10 minutes from scratch? Create a fresh account (or use no account). Follow your documented steps. Achieve the impact. If you can't reliably reproduce it end-to-end in under 10 minutes with the steps you've written, your methodology is incomplete — refine before submitting.


Show full SKILL.md (914 more words)Show less

Real Impact Examples

Scenario 1 — Free Physical Goods via Exposed Internal Storefront (Shopify-style) An employee summit page was deployed to a public Shopify storefront as a private channel for distributing free books to staff. The URL was discoverable via JS bundle analysis or link sharing. An anonymous user who navigated to the URL could browse and complete a checkout with no authentication required, receiving physical merchandise shipped at the company's expense. Impact: direct financial loss per order, potential for bulk ordering if not caught quickly.

Scenario 2 — Payment Manipulation via In-Flight Tampering (Valve/Steam-style) A payment flow passed order amount and currency through client-controlled parameters before redirecting to a third-party payment provider (Smart2Pay). By intercepting the redirect with Burp Suite and modifying the amount field, an attacker could complete a real payment for $0.01 while the application's webhook — lacking HMAC validation — accepted the provider's confirmation and credited the full item/service to the account. Impact: critical financial loss; attacker receives full value goods/services for near-zero cost, infinitely repeatable.

Scenario 3 — Email Verification Bypass for Unauthorized Monitoring (Mozilla-style) A breach-monitoring service required email verification before enabling monitoring alerts for an address. The verification check was enforced in the UI flow but the underlying API accepted monitoring setup requests for any address using a valid session — skipping the verification step entirely. An attacker could set up monitoring for email addresses they don't own, receiving breach notification data (potentially including credential exposure status) for victim accounts. Impact: privacy violation; attacker gains intelligence on whether a target's email was in a breach without the target's knowledge or consent.


Disclosed Report Citations (Backfill +5 — 2016-2023)

The following real, verified bug-bounty / coordinated-disclosure cases extend this skill. All five share a measurable financial-impact angle (actual $ loss demonstrated or quantifiable platform-wide exposure).

  1. Stripe — Fee discount race redemption (H1 #1849626)

    • Subclass: coupon/discount race-multi-redemption + financial primitive
    • Payload: Stripe Support applied a one-time $20,000 fee-credit. Researcher captured the "accept-discount" POST and replayed it 30× in parallel via Burp Turbo Intruder, each acceptance crediting the account anew
    • Root cause: idempotency missing on discount-acceptance endpoint; no unique constraint on (account_id, discount_id)
    • Year: 2023 — $5,000, $600,000 of fee-free transactions accrued before fix (~$18,000 real Stripe loss at 3% take rate)
  2. Reverb.com — Gift-card race multi-redemption (H1 #759247)

    • Subclass: gift-card / store-credit race-redemption
    • Payload: single valid gift card, parallel-POST to /redeem from 10 sockets via Turbo Intruder. Balance credits N× the face value
    • Root cause: no row-level lock on gift_card table; balance debit and credit live in separate transactions
    • Year: 2019 — $1,500
  3. Upserve / OLO — Negative-quantity price manipulation (H1 #364843)

    • Subclass: negative-quantity-in-cart price tampering
    • Payload: POST /api/order {"items":[{"id":1,"qty":1,"price":50},{"id":2,"qty":-3,"price":50}]} — order total computes to -$100, floors to ~$0 at payment capture, food still fulfills
    • Root cause: server multiplies qty * price with no qty >= 1 guard
    • Year: 2018 — textbook citation for the subclass (acknowledged-only program)
  4. Krisp — Pay-less-per-seat via PUT tampering (H1 #1446090)

    • Subclass: price-per-unit mass-assignment / quantity-discount manipulation
    • Payload: PUT /v2/seats body includes a server-trusted price field. Set price=1 instead of $60. Subscription updates, billing engine charges $1/seat for 100 seats
    • Root cause: server reads price from request body instead of looking it up by plan_id; classic mass-assignment
    • Year: 2021 — Stripe-billed SaaS pricing exposure
  5. Stripe — Pay using archived price via mid-flow swap (H1 #1328278)

    • Subclass: cart-state TOCTOU / cancel-then-deliver (price-version race at checkout)
    • Payload: merchant archives an old price (e.g., $5 instead of new $50). Buyer starts checkout via the new payment-link, then mid-flow swaps price_id back to the archived one. Stripe charges $5; subscription provisions at the new tier
    • Root cause: payment-link validates "is active", price object validates "exists" — but the join "price.active AND price ∈ link.allowed_prices" is missing
    • Year: 2021 — Stripe Medium (per-subscription recurring loss)

  • hunt-race-condition — Every uniqueness/quota check in a logic flow is a race candidate. Chain primitive: Business logic (coupon/credit/promotion) + race condition → coupon redeemed N times in a single TCP packet via Turbo Intruder.
  • hunt-idor — Logic flows that trust a client-supplied identifier (order_id, tenant_id, beneficiary_id) overlap directly with IDOR. Chain primitive: business-logic step-skip + IDOR on beneficiary_id → transfer funds from victim account.
  • hunt-api-misconfig — Step-skip and verification-bypass often live next to mass-assignment fields. Chain primitive: business-logic email-verify skip + API mass assignment (verified:true, role:admin) → ATO without email control.
  • hunt-ato — Logic bugs in password reset, email change, and recovery flows are core ATO paths. Chain primitive: business logic (email change accepts without re-auth) + hunt-ato Path 2 → silent victim email swap → password reset to attacker mailbox.
  • security-arsenal — Load the Business-Logic Probe Checklist (negative quantity, decimal overflow, currency swap, step-skip via direct URL nav, state-machine reverse) and the Always-Rejected list to avoid filing self-inflicted bugs.
  • triage-validation — Apply the 7-Question Gate (especially Q4 "Is this exploitable by an outside attacker without unrealistic preconditions?"): logic bugs need a concrete dollar/PII/state impact, not just "the flow looks weird".

When to Use

  • You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
  • You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

Limitations

  • Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
  • Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
  • Validate every finding (see triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Example
bash
# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief

Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.

© sickn33, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in skills/hunt-business-logic of sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit b84d35a

Used in 1 other repository

We found 5 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 1 other GitHub owner. This page covers the copy in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

Compare with similar skills

Hunt Business Logic next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Hunt Business Logic compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Hunt Business Logic this skillsickn33/agentic-awesome-skills47k1 repos~4.9kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Testing For Business Logic Vulnerabilitiesmukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills34k—~3.3kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Hunt Business Logicelementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter4.9k1 repos~4.4kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Performing Vulnerability Scanning With Nessusmukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills34k—~2.8kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Building Vulnerability Scanning Workflowmukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills34k—~3.2kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Performing Ot Vulnerability Assessment With Clarotymukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills34k—~3.1kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0

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Questions about Hunt Business Logic

What does Hunt Business Logic do?

Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities. An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunt Business Logic is an agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. Hunting skill for business logic vulnerabilities.

How do I install Hunt Business Logic in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-business-logic -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-business-logic in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .claude/skills/hunt-business-logic in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Hunt Business Logic in Codex?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-business-logic -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-business-logic in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .agents/skills/hunt-business-logic in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Hunt Business Logic in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-business-logic -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/hunt-business-logic, .gemini/skills/hunt-business-logic, .github/skills/hunt-business-logic and .opencode/skills/hunt-business-logic in your project.

What does Hunt Business Logic need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Hunt Business Logic needs the command-line tools its instructions call (curl). Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled..

Does Hunt Business Logic access the network?

SKILL.md names 2 domains. As links in the text: hackerone.com and github.com. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Hunt Business Logic safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does Hunt Business Logic use?

Hunt Business Logic is published under the MIT licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Hunt Business Logic use?

About 4.9k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 20k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to Hunt Business Logic?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Hunt Business Logic: Testing For Business Logic Vulnerabilities (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, 34k stars), Hunt Business Logic (elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter, 4.9k stars), Performing Vulnerability Scanning With Nessus (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, 34k stars) and Building Vulnerability Scanning Workflow (mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, 34k stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Hunt Business Logic?

sickn33 (a GitHub user) maintains it in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which has 47,405 GitHub stars. The repository holds 1,497 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 9, 2026.

Source: sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.