Agent skill

Centralization Risk

by PlamenTSV in PlamenTSV/plamen

Trigger Pattern Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority, admin, operator, governance, multisig) - Inject Into Breadth agents (optional), depth-state-trace

MITAuto-check passed

Install Centralization Risk

skills CLI
$ npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill centralization-risk -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install PlamenTSV/plamen centralization-risk --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamen.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/agents/skills/solana/centralization-risk .claude/skills/centralization-risk && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
centralization-risk
GitHub stars
303
Token cost
~2.8k tokens
SKILL.md length
1,166 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
87
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

Trigger Pattern Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority, admin, operator, governance, multisig) - Inject Into Breadth agents (optional), depth-state-trace

  • Works in 6 steps: Privilege Inventory → Role Hierarchy and Separation → Single Points of Failure → …
  • Pattern Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority
  • SKILL.md covers Step 1: Privilege Inventory, Step 2: Role Hierarchy and…, Step 3: Single Points of Failure and Step 4: External Governance…, plus 4 more sections
  • Instructions only: no scripts, shell commands, URLs or credentials in SKILL.md

What it does

Centralization Risk is an agent skill from PlamenTSV/plamen. Trigger Pattern Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority, admin, operator, governance, multisig) - Inject Into Breadth agents (optional), depth-state-trace

Its SKILL.md is about 2.8k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts.

It works with Solana. The repository describes itself as: Autonomous Web3 security audit agent for Claude Code. The licence is MIT.

When your agent uses it

  • Pattern Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority
  • Multisig) - Inject Into Breadth agents (optional)
  • Depth-state-trace

Example prompts

  • “/centralization-risk”

Workflow steps

6 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Privilege Inventory
  2. Role Hierarchy and Separation
  3. Single Points of Failure
  4. External Governance Dependencies
  5. Emergency Powers
  6. Authority Revocation Assessment

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 795962b. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    No scripts in the folder and no shell commands in SKILL.md (its code samples are markdown).

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    No URLs in SKILL.md.

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Centralization Risk loads about 2.8k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 47 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,166 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~47
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~2.8k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from PlamenTSV/plamen at commit 795962b, republished under its MIT licence (© PlamenTSV). 1,166 words, ~2,848 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/centralization-risk/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
centralization-risk
description
Trigger Pattern Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority, admin, operator, governance, multisig) - Inject Into Breadth agents (optional), depth-state-trace

CENTRALIZATION_RISK Skill (Solana)

Trigger Pattern: Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority, admin, operator, governance, multisig) Inject Into: Breadth agents (optional), depth-state-trace Finding prefix: [CR-N] Rules referenced: R2, R6, R9, R10, R13 Required: NO (recommended when protocol has 3+ distinct privileged roles)

Covers: single points of failure, privilege escalation, program upgrade risk, external governance dependencies, emergency powers. On Solana, centralization risk has unique dimensions: BPFLoaderUpgradeable allows full program replacement, freeze authority can lock user token accounts, close authority can destroy accounts and their lamports, and PDA self-authority patterns can create hidden centralization.


Step 1: Privilege Inventory

Enumerate ALL privileged instructions by scanning for signer checks against stored authority pubkeys:

#InstructionProgramAuthority/SignerWhat It ControlsImpact If Abused
1{ix_name}{program}{authority pubkey field}{parameter/state}{worst case}

Solana authority patterns to scan for:

  • has_one = authority / has_one = admin / has_one = owner in Anchor account constraints
  • require!(ctx.accounts.authority.key() == config.authority) manual checks
  • Signer constraints: #[account(signer)] or Signer<'info> combined with stored pubkey comparison
  • upgrade_authority in program deploy config (BPFLoaderUpgradeable)
  • mint_authority / freeze_authority / close_authority on SPL Token mints
  • PDA-based authorities: programs that use their own PDA as authority for token mints or other programs

Categorize each by impact:

  • FUND_CONTROL: Can move, lock, freeze, or close user token accounts/SOL
  • PARAMETER_CONTROL: Can change fees, rates, thresholds, delays
  • OPERATIONAL_CONTROL: Can pause, unpause, add/remove validators/pools/markets
  • UPGRADE_CONTROL: Can replace program logic entirely via BPFLoaderUpgradeable
  • MINT_CONTROL: Can mint new tokens (SPL Token mint authority)

Step 2: Role Hierarchy and Separation

Map the role hierarchy:

RoleStored In (Account)Granted ByCan Grant Others?Revocable?Timelock?
{role}{config PDA / mint}{grantor instruction}YES/NOYES/NOYES/NO ({mechanism})
Solana-Specific Hierarchy Checks
  • Are FUND_CONTROL and UPGRADE_CONTROL held by different keys?
  • Does any single keypair have both PARAMETER_CONTROL and FUND_CONTROL?
  • Is the upgrade authority a multisig (Squads) or DAO (Realms), not a single EOA?
  • Are authority transfers behind timelocks (Clockwork scheduler, Squads time-lock vault)?
  • Can roles be revoked? Does revocation require the role-holder's cooperation?
  • Is there a two-step authority transfer pattern? (propose new authority -> accept authority)
Program Upgrade Authority Analysis (CRITICAL)
ProgramUpgrade AuthorityTypeImmutable?Risk Level
{program_id}{authority pubkey}EOA / Squads / Realms / RevokedYES/NO{assessment}

Check via: solana program show <program_id> or read BPFLoaderUpgradeable programdata account.

Risk levels:

  • Revoked (immutable): No upgrade risk. Verify: upgrade_authority: None
  • Realms DAO: Low risk if DAO has sufficient voter distribution and timelock
  • Squads multisig (3/5+): Low-Medium risk. Check: threshold, signer count, timelock
  • Squads multisig (2/3 or lower): Medium risk. Collusion of 2 signers can replace program
  • Single EOA: CRITICAL risk. One compromised key replaces entire program

Step 3: Single Points of Failure

For each privileged role:

RoleKey Compromise ImpactMitigationResidual Risk
{role}{what attacker can do}{multisig? timelock? immutable?}{what remains}
Solana-Specific SPOF Analysis
RiskDescriptionSeverity
Upgrade authority compromiseAttacker replaces program with malicious version. ALL user funds at risk.CRITICAL if single EOA, HIGH if multisig without timelock
Freeze authority activeAuthority can freeze any user's token account. Users cannot transfer, sell, or withdraw.HIGH if single key, MEDIUM if multisig
Close authority on user accountsAuthority can close user PDAs, reclaiming lamports and destroying state.HIGH - user data and rent-exempt lamports lost
Mint authority activeAuthority can mint unlimited tokens, diluting all holders.HIGH if supply-sensitive protocol
PDA self-authorityProgram uses its own PDA as authority - program upgrade changes PDA behavior. Upgrade authority effectively controls all PDA-authorized actions.Severity inherits from upgrade authority risk

Severity assessment:

  • Single EOA with FUND_CONTROL or UPGRADE_CONTROL -> HIGH centralization risk (minimum)
  • Multisig with FUND_CONTROL but no timelock -> MEDIUM
  • Multisig + timelock with FUND_CONTROL -> LOW (but document)
  • Immutable program + no freeze/close/mint authority -> INFO

Step 4: External Governance Dependencies

Identify parameters or behaviors controlled by EXTERNAL governance:

DependencyExternal EntityWhat They ControlProtocol Impact If ChangedNotification?
{dep}{entity}{parameter/behavior}{impact on this protocol}YES/NO

Solana-specific external governance:

  • Pyth/Switchboard oracle governance: Can change feed configurations, add/remove publishers
  • SPL Governance (Realms): External DAO decisions affecting shared infrastructure
  • Liquid staking governance: Protocol parameter changes affecting staked assets
  • DEX aggregator routing changes: If protocol depends on external routing for swaps, routing/fee changes
  • Wormhole guardian set rotation: Can affect cross-chain message validation

Check:

  • Can external governance changes break protocol invariants?
  • Does the protocol have circuit breakers or fallback paths for external changes?
  • Are external governance timelines aligned with this protocol's operational timelines?
  • Does the protocol verify external program IDs at CPI call sites? (If not, external program upgrade = arbitrary code execution within protocol context)

Show full SKILL.md (440 more words)Show less

Step 5: Emergency Powers

Document emergency/pause capabilities:

Emergency FunctionWho Can CallWhat It AffectsRecovery PathTime to Recover
{instruction}{authority}{scope}{how to resume}{estimate}
Solana Emergency Patterns
PatternDescriptionRisk
Global pause flagConfig account has paused: bool. All user instructions check it.Standard - check: can users emergency-withdraw when paused?
Account freeze via SPL TokenFreeze authority freezes user token accounts.HIGH if no thaw path independent of authority
Program closeBPFLoaderUpgradeable allows closing the program entirely. All CPI calls to it fail.CRITICAL if user funds locked in PDAs
Account close cascadeAuthority closes critical config/state accounts. Program instructions fail due to missing accounts.HIGH - effectively a permanent pause

Check:

  • Can pausing strand user funds permanently? (Rule 9 - stranded asset severity floor)
  • Is there a maximum pause duration enforced on-chain?
  • Can users exit during pause (emergency withdraw instruction)?
  • If program is closed: can PDAs still be accessed? (No - PDA authority is gone)
  • If no exit during pause -> apply Rule 9 (stranded asset severity floor: minimum MEDIUM)

Step 6: Authority Revocation Assessment

For each authority type, assess revocation status and path:

AuthorityCurrent StateRevocation PathShould Be Revoked?Risk If Not Revoked
Upgrade authority{active/revoked}solana program set-upgrade-authority --final{assessment}{risk level}
Mint authority{active/revoked}spl-token authorize <mint> mint --disable{assessment}{risk level}
Freeze authority{active/revoked}spl-token authorize <mint> freeze --disable{assessment}{risk level}
Close authority (per account type){active/none}{code change required}{assessment}{risk level}

Rule 13 check: Is the authority retention documented? If the protocol claims to be "decentralized" or "trustless" but retains upgrade/freeze/mint authority, apply the 5-question test:

  1. Who is harmed by this authority retention?
  2. Can affected users avoid the harm?
  3. Is the authority retention documented in protocol docs?
  4. Could the protocol achieve the same goal without this authority?
  5. Does the program fulfill its stated trustlessness completely?

Output Schema

markdown
## Finding [CR-N]: Title

**Verdict**: CONFIRMED / PARTIAL / REFUTED
**Step Execution**: check1,2,3,4,5,6 | skip(reason) | uncertain
**Severity**: Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info
**Location**: program_id or instruction name

**Centralization Type**: FUND_CONTROL / PARAMETER_CONTROL / OPERATIONAL_CONTROL / UPGRADE_CONTROL / MINT_CONTROL
**Affected Role**: {authority_name}
**Mitigation Present**: {Squads multisig / Realms DAO / Clockwork timelock / Immutable / NONE}

**Description**: What is wrong
**Impact**: What can happen if authority is compromised or acts maliciously
**Recommendation**: How to mitigate (add timelock, revoke authority, use multisig, separate roles)

Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)

StepRequiredCompleted?Notes
1. Privilege Inventory (all instructions with authority checks)YES
2. Role Hierarchy and SeparationYES
3. Single Points of Failure (per role)YES
4. External Governance DependenciesYES
5. Emergency Powers and Recovery PathsYES
6. Authority Revocation AssessmentYES
Cross-Reference Markers

After Step 1: Cross-reference with ACCOUNT_VALIDATION skill - are all authority checks properly validated (not just signer, but signer == stored authority)?

After Step 2: If upgrade authority is single EOA -> immediate finding (minimum HIGH).

After Step 3: If PDA self-authority pattern detected, severity inherits from upgrade authority assessment.

After Step 5: If no emergency withdraw exists AND pause is possible -> Rule 9 stranded asset finding.

After Step 6: If protocol claims trustlessness but retains mutable authorities -> Rule 13 anti-normalization finding.

© PlamenTSV, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in agents/skills/solana/centralization-risk of PlamenTSV/plamen.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 795962b

Compare with similar skills

Centralization Risk next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Centralization Risk compared with similar skills
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Centralization Risk this skillPlamenTSV/plamen303—~2.8kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
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NEAR Intents Swap Integrationinternet-court/internet-court-skill6.4k2 repos~939Automated safety check: PassCustom licence
Solana Devsolana-foundation/solana-dev-skill574—~3.8kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Meme Coin Security Auditawarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter5.3k1 repos~2.4kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Swapper Depositswapperfinance/swapper-toolkit852—~1.8kAutomated safety check: PassMIT

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Works with

Questions about Centralization Risk

What does Centralization Risk do?

Trigger Pattern Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority, admin, operator, governance, multisig) - Inject Into Breadth agents (optional), depth-state-trace. Centralization Risk is an agent skill from PlamenTSV/plamen.

When should I use Centralization Risk?

Centralization Risk fits situations like: pattern Protocol has privileged authorities (upgrade authority; multisig) - Inject Into Breadth agents (optional); depth-state-trace.

How do I install Centralization Risk in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill centralization-risk -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (agents/skills/solana/centralization-risk in PlamenTSV/plamen) into .claude/skills/centralization-risk in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Centralization Risk in Codex?

Run `npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill centralization-risk -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (agents/skills/solana/centralization-risk in PlamenTSV/plamen) into .agents/skills/centralization-risk in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Centralization Risk in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill centralization-risk -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/centralization-risk, .gemini/skills/centralization-risk, .github/skills/centralization-risk and .opencode/skills/centralization-risk in your project.

What does Centralization Risk need to run?

SKILL.md names no scripts, command-line tools or credentials: Centralization Risk is instructions for the agent only.

Does Centralization Risk access the network?

SKILL.md contains no URLs. Any network use would come from the scripts or tools the agent runs. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Centralization Risk safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. Review the folder before installing.

What licence does Centralization Risk use?

Centralization Risk is published under the MIT licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Centralization Risk use?

About 2.8k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 11k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to Centralization Risk?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Centralization Risk: Minara Crypto Trading and Wallet (Minara-AI/minara-skills, 358 stars), NEAR Intents Swap Integration (internet-court/internet-court-skill, 6.4k stars), Solana Dev (solana-foundation/solana-dev-skill, 574 stars) and Meme Coin Security Audit (awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter, 5.3k stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Centralization Risk?

PlamenTSV (a GitHub user) maintains it in PlamenTSV/plamen, which has 303 GitHub stars. The repository holds 87 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on September 26, 2026.

Source: PlamenTSV/plamen on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.