Takeover

Subdomain takeover playbook

A subdomain points (via CNAME, NS, or an A record on a shared host) at a third-party service. The resource on that service was deleted, expired, or never claimed — but the DNS record still exists. An attacker registers the same resource on the provider and serves arbitrary content on the victim's hostname. Severity is usually high to critical because the takeover puts the attacker inside the victim's origin (cookie scope, CSP allowlists, OAuth redirect_uri allowlists, SAML SP entity IDs, email DKIM/SPF includes, ...).

Stay in scope. Only test takeovers against domains the program explicitly authorizes. A successful takeover is serving content on someone else's host — drop a benign HTML file (takeover proof for <handle>, contact <email>) and stop.

Execution rule: operate on real subdomains and provider fingerprints from the scoped program. Never write literal placeholders such as <provider>, <handle>, or <email> to files; ask once for proof text if a provider requires a claim page.

1. Enumerate every subdomain

Use whatever recon you have. Curl-first sources you can hit without extra tooling:

# CT logs via crt.sh
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.target.example.com&output=json' \
  | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sed 's/^\*\.//' | sort -u > subs.txt

# Anubis-DB
curl -s 'https://jldc.me/anubis/subdomains/target.example.com' \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> subs.txt

# Hackertarget (rate-limited)
curl -s 'https://api.hackertarget.com/hostsearch/?q=target.example.com' \
  | cut -d, -f1 >> subs.txt

sort -u subs.txt -o subs.txt

If [[recon]] is loaded, prefer those flows for the enumeration step.

2. Resolve each name — CNAME first, then A/AAAA

# Pull CNAMEs in one batch (works on macOS/Linux with dig)
while read -r sub; do
  cname=$(dig +short CNAME "$sub" | head -n1)
  if [ -n "$cname" ]; then printf '%s\tCNAME\t%s\n' "$sub" "$cname"; fi
done < subs.txt > resolved.tsv

# NS delegation (rare but high-severity)
while read -r sub; do
  ns=$(dig +short NS "$sub")
  if [ -n "$ns" ]; then printf '%s\tNS\t%s\n' "$sub" "$(echo "$ns" | tr '\n' ',')"; fi
done < subs.txt >> resolved.tsv

You're looking for:

• CNAME → third-party provider (e.g. app.target.com → app.elasticbeanstalk.com) where the resource at that provider is unclaimed.
• NS → vanished zone (zone.target.com NS ns1.dnsmadeeasy.com where the zone no longer exists on dnsmadeeasy).
• CNAME → NXDOMAIN — the cleanest signal: the CNAME target itself doesn't resolve. Always investigate.

# Find CNAMEs whose target doesn't resolve at all
awk -F'\t' '$2=="CNAME" {print $3}' resolved.tsv | while read -r t; do
  dig +short "$t" >/dev/null 2>&1 || echo "$t (NXDOMAIN target)"
done

3. Match HTTP fingerprints

Pull the full fingerprint database:

read_payloads(skill="takeover", file="fingerprints.json")

The JSON Lines file lists, for each provider:

• service — human label.
• cname — regex of the target hostname.
• status — vulnerable / edge-case / not-vulnerable.
• fingerprint — string to grep for in the HTTPS response body.
• http_status — typical status code (404, 200, etc.).
• notes — claim-flow gotchas.

For each CNAME match, fetch the response and grep:

# Example: subdomain points at GitHub Pages
curl -sk -H "Host: lost.target.com" https://lost.target.com/ \
  | grep -F "There isn't a GitHub Pages site here."

A hit on status: vulnerable plus the fingerprint in the response body is the takeover signal. Don't trust the fingerprint alone — many providers serve the same string on a legitimately-not-yet-deployed site that's still claimed by the owner. Confirm-step (4) is mandatory.

4. Confirm before reporting

The trap: the resource may be unclaimed by anyone visible to you, but the legitimate owner may still hold it via an account you can't see (e.g. the Heroku app exists in their account but is paused). False-positive report rates on subdomain takeover are notorious.

Confirmation paths, in order of preference:

1. Out-of-band canary. Attempt to register the resource (e.g. create a Heroku app named lost-target). If the provider says "name taken" without serving you the fingerprint, it's a false positive — someone has it.

2. Successful claim + benign content. When the registration succeeds, serve a static HTML file proving ownership:

   <!doctype html>
   <title>Subdomain Takeover PoC</title>
   <h1>Subdomain Takeover</h1>
   <p>This subdomain (<code>lost.target.com</code>) was claimable on
      <em>&lt;provider&gt;</em> by anyone. Reported by &lt;handle&gt;
      to &lt;program&gt;. Contact: &lt;email&gt;.</p>

   Fetch the subdomain again over HTTPS — your content must come back.

3. Screenshot + curl response in the report.

Do NOT:

• Serve real-looking content (login forms, fake updates).
• Run any script in the page.
• Hold the resource beyond what's needed for the PoC; release it after the report is triaged.
• Use takeovers to phish, even for "research."

5. NS takeover (variant)

If a subdomain delegates DNS to a third-party provider via NS records and the zone is unclaimed on that provider, you control all records under the subdomain — far more dangerous than a single CNAME takeover. Common providers seen here: DNSMadeEasy, Bizland, EasyDNS, Yahoo Small Business, NS1, Hurricane Electric, MyDomain, Domain.com.

Detection: dig NS sub.target.com returns a provider's nameservers, but querying those nameservers for the zone returns REFUSED or SERVFAIL.

for ns in $(dig +short NS sub.target.com); do
  echo "=== $ns ==="
  dig @"$ns" sub.target.com SOA
done

A REFUSED/SERVFAIL from all of the listed nameservers, combined with the provider being one that lets you create zones with arbitrary names, is the takeover primitive.

6. Key engines (quick reference — full DB in payloads)