Agent skill

Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore

by mukul975 in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder…

Apache-2.0Auto-check passedDevOps & Cloud

Install Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore

skills CLI
$ npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore .claude/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore
GitHub stars
34k
Token cost
~2.7k tokens
SKILL.md length
824 words
Files
5 (incl. scripts, references)
Skills in repo
644
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
Apache-2.0

At a glance

Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder…

  • Works in 7 steps: Verify a keyless cosign signature on an… → Verify the SLSA provenance attestation… → Inspect the provenance predicate → …
  • Tasks that involve Supply chain security
  • SKILL.md covers Overview, When to Use, Prerequisites and Objectives, plus 5 more sections
  • Runs Python scripts from its folder; calls go, jq and curl; reaches github.com and token.actions.githubusercontent.com

What it does

Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI/CD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.

Its SKILL.md is about 2.7k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. The skill folder holds 6 other files, including scripts and reference files (for example `references/api-reference.md`, `references/standards.md` and `scripts/agent.py`).

It sits in DevOps & Cloud, covering Supply chain security. The repository describes itself as: 817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io…. The licence is Apache-2.0.

When your agent uses it

  • Tasks that involve Supply chain security

Example prompts

  • “Use the verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore skill to verify artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify…”
  • “/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore”

Requirements

  • Python 3

Workflow steps

7 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Verify a keyless cosign signature on an image
  2. Verify the SLSA provenance attestation on the image
  3. Inspect the provenance predicate
  4. Verify a release binary with slsa-verifier
  5. Verify GitHub artifact attestations / blob bundles
  6. Enforce verification as a gate
  7. Map findings to SLSA Build levels

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 54a7988. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Ships 1 file in scripts/ (Python), which the agent can run.

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • go
    • jq
    • curl
    • gh

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Hosts in commands or code, which the agent is likely to contact:

    • github.com
    • token.actions.githubusercontent.com
    • rekor.sigstore.dev

    Also links to:

    • slsa.dev
    • sigstore.dev
    • docs.sigstore.dev

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore loads about 2.7k tokens when it runs, and up to ~3.6k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 121 tokens; SKILL.md has 824 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~121
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~2.7k
With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them
~3.6k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); the scripts in this folder are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills at commit 54a7988, republished under its Apache-2.0 licence (© mukul975). 824 words, ~2,659 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder). This skill also uses 4 other files; get the full folder from GitHub.
name
verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore
description
Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels. Use in CI/CD before deploying artifacts, when consuming third-party attestations, establishing a SLSA Build L3 pipeline, or confirming provenance during incident response or admission control.
domain
cybersecurity
subdomain
supply-chain-security
tags
supply-chain, slsa, sigstore, cosign, provenance, attestation, keyless-signing, code-signing
version
1.0
author
mahipal
license
Apache-2.0
nist_csf
PR.DS-01
mitre_attack
T1195

Verifying Build Provenance with SLSA and Sigstore

Overview

Build-provenance verification answers a question that defeats many supply-chain attacks: was this artifact actually built from the source I think it was, by the builder I trust, without tampering? Attackers who compromise a build system, swap a compiled release, or inject a malicious step (as in the SolarWinds and 3CX incidents) produce artifacts that look legitimate but lack verifiable provenance. SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts, https://slsa.dev) defines Build levels (L1–L3) describing increasing provenance integrity, and Sigstore (https://www.sigstore.dev) provides the signing and transparency infrastructure: cosign for signing/verifying artifacts and attestations, Fulcio for short-lived keyless certificates bound to an OIDC identity, and Rekor as a tamper-evident transparency log.

This skill covers verifying signatures and SLSA provenance with cosign (cosign verify, cosign verify-attestation, cosign verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (slsa-verifier verify-artifact), enforcing the builder identity (the GitHub Actions workflow that produced the artifact) and the expected source repository. Keyless verification ties trust to an OIDC issuer (e.g., https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com) and a certificate identity rather than a long-lived private key.

This maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195 — Supply Chain Compromise (provenance verification detects/blocks tampered artifacts) and NIST CSF PR.DS-01 (the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected; CSF 2.0 absorbed the retired 1.1 PR.DS-06 integrity-checking outcome here).

When to Use

  • In CI/CD before deploying or promoting any container image or release binary.
  • When consuming third-party artifacts (base images, Go/npm releases) that publish attestations.
  • When establishing a SLSA Build L3 producer pipeline and enforcing it at the consumer side.
  • During incident response to confirm whether a deployed artifact's provenance is intact.
  • In admission control (e.g., Kubernetes via policy-controller / Kyverno) to admit only verified images.

Prerequisites

  • cosign (Sigstore CLI):
    bash
    go install github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2/cmd/cosign@latest
    # or download a release binary from https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases
  • slsa-verifier:
    bash
    go install github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier/v2/cli/slsa-verifier@latest
    # or:
    curl -sSL https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier/releases/latest/download/slsa-verifier-linux-amd64 \
      -o /usr/local/bin/slsa-verifier && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/slsa-verifier
  • Network access to Rekor (https://rekor.sigstore.dev) and Fulcio for transparency-log verification.
  • The artifact plus its provenance/attestation bundle (.sigstore, .intoto.jsonl, or attached OCI attestation).

Objectives

  • Verify a keyless cosign signature on a container image, pinning OIDC issuer and certificate identity.
  • Verify a SLSA provenance attestation on an image with cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance.
  • Verify a release binary's provenance with slsa-verifier verify-artifact, pinning source repo and tag.
  • Verify GitHub artifact attestations / blob bundles with cosign verify-blob-attestation.
  • Gate CI and admission control on successful verification; understand SLSA Build L1–L3.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

IDTacticTechnique NameRelevance
T1195Initial AccessSupply Chain CompromiseVerifying provenance and signatures detects artifacts that were tampered with or substituted in the build/distribution chain, preventing supply-chain compromise from reaching deployment.

Workflow

Step 1: Verify a keyless cosign signature on an image

Pin both the OIDC issuer and the certificate identity (the exact workflow that signed). A bare cosign verify without identity pinning is meaningless — anyone can sign.

bash
cosign verify \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/.github/workflows/.*@refs/tags/v.*" \
  ghcr.io/myorg/myrepo:v1.2.3

A non-zero exit or empty result means verification failed — do not deploy.

Step 2: Verify the SLSA provenance attestation on the image

The signature proves who signed; the provenance attestation proves how it was built. Verify the in-toto SLSA predicate type.

bash
cosign verify-attestation \
  --type slsaprovenance \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/.github/workflows/build-sign.yml@refs/heads/main" \
  ghcr.io/myorg/myrepo:v1.2.3

Supported predicate types include slsaprovenance, slsaprovenance02, and slsaprovenance1.

Show full SKILL.md (337 more words)Show less
Step 3: Inspect the provenance predicate

Decode the verified attestation to confirm the source repo, commit, and builder match expectations.

bash
cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --certificate-identity-regexp '.*' \
  ghcr.io/myorg/myrepo:v1.2.3 \
  | jq -r '.payload' | base64 -d | jq '.predicate.buildDefinition.externalParameters, .predicate.runDetails.builder.id'
Step 4: Verify a release binary with slsa-verifier

For downloadable binaries (e.g., produced by slsa-github-generator), pin the source URI and the tag. slsa-verifier checks the cryptographic signature on the provenance and that the expected builder produced it.

bash
slsa-verifier verify-artifact slsa-test-linux-amd64 \
  --provenance-path slsa-test-linux-amd64.intoto.jsonl \
  --source-uri github.com/myorg/myrepo \
  --source-tag v1.2.3

# Optionally pin the builder identity (SLSA L3)
slsa-verifier verify-artifact ./mybin \
  --provenance-path ./mybin.intoto.jsonl \
  --source-uri github.com/myorg/myrepo \
  --builder-id https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_generic_slsa3.yml@refs/tags/v2.0.0
Step 5: Verify GitHub artifact attestations / blob bundles

For artifacts signed via actions/attest-build-provenance, the bundle uses the new Sigstore bundle format.

bash
cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle ./myartifact.sigstore.json \
  --new-bundle-format \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer="https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --certificate-identity-regexp="^https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/" \
  ./myartifact

# Equivalent native GitHub CLI verification
gh attestation verify ./myartifact --repo myorg/myrepo
Step 6: Enforce verification as a gate

Wrap verification so the pipeline fails closed on any error.

bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
IMG="ghcr.io/myorg/myrepo:v1.2.3"
cosign verify \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/" "$IMG" >/dev/null
cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/" "$IMG" >/dev/null
echo "[+] $IMG verified: signature + SLSA provenance OK"
Step 7: Map findings to SLSA Build levels

Document the level each consumed artifact achieves:

  • Build L1 — provenance exists (the build process generates it), but it may be unsigned/forgeable.
  • Build L2 — provenance is signed by a hosted build service.
  • Build L3 — provenance is non-forgeable: generated on an isolated, hardened builder where secrets are unavailable to user-defined steps (e.g., slsa-github-generator reusable workflows). Require L3 for high-trust artifacts.

Tools and Resources

Tool / ResourcePurposeLink
cosignSign/verify artifacts and attestations (keyless)https://github.com/sigstore/cosign
slsa-verifierVerify SLSA provenance from compliant buildershttps://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier
slsa-github-generatorProduce SLSA L3 provenance in GitHub Actionshttps://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator
actions/attest-build-provenanceGitHub-native provenance attestationhttps://github.com/actions/attest-build-provenance
SLSA specificationBuild levels and provenance schemahttps://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/
Sigstore docsFulcio, Rekor, cosign verificationhttps://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/verifying/verify/

Verification Identity Reference

FieldWhere it comes fromWhy it matters
--certificate-oidc-issuerThe OIDC issuer (e.g., GitHub Actions)Restricts who could have requested the signing cert
--certificate-identity[-regexp]The exact/patterned workflow identity (SAN)Restricts which workflow signed; prevents impersonation
--source-uri (slsa-verifier)Expected source repoConfirms the artifact came from your repo
--source-tag / --source-versioned-tagExpected git tagPrevents rollback/substitution
--builder-idTrusted builder workflow refEnforces SLSA L3 non-forgeable builder

Validation Criteria

  • cosign and slsa-verifier installed and report versions
  • Image signature verified with pinned OIDC issuer AND certificate identity
  • SLSA provenance attestation verified (--type slsaprovenance)
  • Provenance predicate inspected; source repo/commit/builder match
  • Release binary verified with slsa-verifier (source-uri + tag pinned)
  • GitHub blob/bundle attestation verified
  • Verification wired as a fail-closed CI/admission gate
  • Each consumed artifact assigned a SLSA Build level

© mukul975, Apache-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 4 other files (scripts, references) in skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.

  • SKILL.md
  • LICENSE
  • references/api-reference.md
  • references/standards.md
  • scripts/agent.py

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 54a7988

Compare with similar skills

Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore this skillmukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills34k—~2.7kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
GitHub Actions Supply Chain Pinningasyncapi/generator1.1k—~1.9kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Vibe CI Supply Chainmistralai/mistral-vibe5.1k—~1kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Container Sbomcdxgen/cdxgen1.1k—~1.5kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
CI/CD Pipeline Principlesirahardianto/awesome-agv156—~2.7kAutomated safety check: NotesMIT
Atmos CIcloudposse/atmos1.4k—~4.7kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0

Similar skills

  • A skill your agent uses when editing, adding, or reviewing any file under .github/workflows/, or when a CI step installs a CLI tool (npm i -g, npx, pipx, uses: /setup-).

    1.1k GitHub stars~1.9k tokensUpdated yesterday
    DevOps & CloudAuto-check passed
  • Vibe CI Supply Chain

    mistralai/mistral-vibe

    Official

    Git workflow, CI/GitHub Actions, and supply-chain pinning rules for Mistral Vibe.

    5.1k GitHub stars~1k tokensUpdated yesterday
    DevOps & CloudAuto-check passed
  • Container Sbom

    cdxgen/cdxgen

    Generates CycloneDX BOMs for container images, OCI archives, mounted root filesystems, Electron ASAR archives, caxa executables, binaries, and Kubernetes or Dockerfile manifests using OWASP cdxgen…

    1.1k GitHub stars~1.5k tokensUpdated today
    DevOps & CloudAuto-check passed
  • CI/CD Pipeline Principles

    irahardianto/awesome-agv

    Rules for designing CI/CD pipelines in layers: universal lint, test and scan stages, container builds with SBOM attestation, and GitOps for orchestrated deployments.

    156 GitHub stars~2.7k tokensUpdated 6 days ago
    DevOps & CloudAuto-check: notes
  • Atmos CI

    cloudposse/atmos

    Atmos CI: Native CI with GitHub Actions containers, native outputs, SBOM workflow-artifact publication, collapsible log groups, affected/all matrix workflows, OIDC profiles, toolchain-aware jobs…

    1.4k GitHub stars~4.7k tokensUpdated yesterday
    DevOps & CloudAuto-check passed
  • Step-by-step cookbook for setting up cryptographically signed audit trails on Claude Code tool calls.

    40k GitHub stars~2.5k tokensUpdated 6 days ago
    DevOps & CloudAuto-check passed

More from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

All 644 skills in this repo
  • Campaign Attribution Evidence Analysis

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Weighs infrastructure, TTP, malware code and timing evidence with the Diamond Model and competing hypotheses to reach a confidence-rated attribution.

    34k GitHub stars~2.3k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • Go Malware Analysis in Ghidra

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Walks through reverse engineering Go-compiled malware in Ghidra: parsing buildinfo and pclntab, recovering stripped function names and extracting dependencies.

    34k GitHub stars~2.8k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • LNK and Jump List Forensics

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Guides forensic analysis of Windows LNK shortcut files and Jump Lists with LECmd, JLECmd and manual parsing to show file access and program execution.

    34k GitHub stars~2.8k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • Malware Persistence Analysis with Autoruns

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Hunts Windows malware persistence with Sysinternals Autoruns, covering run keys, services, scheduled tasks and drivers, with baseline comparison.

    34k GitHub stars~1.2k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • NTFS MFT Deleted File Recovery

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Guides a Windows forensic examination of the NTFS Master File Table to recover deleted-file evidence, build timelines and spot timestomping.

    34k GitHub stars~2.7k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • Network Covert Channel Analysis

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Detects DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration and HTTP-based covert channels in packet captures and DNS logs when hunting for hidden command-and-control traffic.

    34k GitHub stars~2k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed

Questions about Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore

What does Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore do?

Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder…. Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Verifies artifact signatures and SLSA provenance using Sigstore's cosign (verify, verify-attestation, verify-blob-attestation) and slsa-verifier (verify-artifact), enforcing keyless OIDC builder identity and source repo against SLSA Build levels.

When should I use Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore?

Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore fits situations like: tasks that involve Supply chain security.

How do I install Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .claude/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore in Codex?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .agents/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore, .gemini/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore, .github/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore and .opencode/skills/verifying-build-provenance-with-slsa-sigstore in your project.

What does Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore needs Python for the scripts in its folder and the command-line tools its instructions call (go, jq, curl and gh). Our summary lists: Python 3.

Does Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore access the network?

SKILL.md names 6 domains. In commands or code: github.com, token.actions.githubusercontent.com and rekor.sigstore.dev; the agent is likely to contact these when it follows the instructions. As links in the text: slsa.dev, sigstore.dev and docs.sigstore.dev. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. The check reads SKILL.md only: the scripts in the folder are not scanned, so read them before running anything.

What licence does Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore use?

Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore is published under the Apache-2.0 licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore use?

About 2.7k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 11k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full. Its references folder adds about 970 tokens, read only when the agent opens those files.

What are the alternatives to Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore: GitHub Actions Supply Chain Pinning (asyncapi/generator, 1.1k stars), Vibe CI Supply Chain (mistralai/mistral-vibe, 5.1k stars), Container Sbom (cdxgen/cdxgen, 1.1k stars) and CI/CD Pipeline Principles (irahardianto/awesome-agv, 156 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Verifying Build Provenance With Slsa Sigstore?

mukul975 (a GitHub user) maintains it in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, which has 34,116 GitHub stars. The repository holds 644 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on August 31, 2026.

Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.