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Agent skill

Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation

by mukul975 in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes…

Apache-2.0Auto-check: notesSecurity

Install Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation

skills CLI
$ npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation .claude/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation
GitHub stars
34k
Token cost
~2.4k tokens
SKILL.md length
876 words
Files
5 (incl. scripts, references)
Skills in repo
644
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
Apache-2.0

At a glance

Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes…

  • Works in 10 steps: Confirm the TPM is present and read its… → Read current PCR values → Replay the TPM event log against live PCRs → …
  • Confirm a system booted trusted firmware/kernel for Zero Trust device posture
  • SKILL.md covers Overview, When to Use, Prerequisites and Objectives, plus 4 more sections
  • Runs Python scripts from its folder; calls apt, dnf and openssl

What it does

Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2quote/tpm2checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware/kernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.

Its SKILL.md is about 2.4k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. The skill folder holds 6 other files, including scripts and reference files (for example `references/api-reference.md`, `references/standards.md` and `scripts/agent.py`).

It sits in Security. The repository describes itself as: 817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io…. The licence is Apache-2.0.

When your agent uses it

  • Confirm a system booted trusted firmware/kernel for Zero Trust device posture
  • Detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift
  • Build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation

Example prompts

  • “Use the validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation skill to verify TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading…”
  • “/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation”

Requirements

  • Python 3

Workflow steps

10 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Confirm the TPM is present and read its properties
  2. Read current PCR values
  3. Replay the TPM event log against live PCRs
  4. Create a primary key and an Attestation Key (AK)
  5. Produce a nonce-bound quote (attestor side)
  6. Verify the quote (verifier side)
  7. Build and compare against a golden baseline
  8. Seal a secret to a measured-boot policy (optional)
  9. Inspect IMA runtime measurements (PCR 10)
  10. Run the bundled attestation helper

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 54a7988. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Ships 1 file in scripts/ (Python), which the agent can run.

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • apt
    • dnf
    • openssl
    • python

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Links to these hosts (documentation or services it may open):

    • github.com
    • trustedcomputinggroup.org
    • sourceforge.net
    • datatracker.ietf.org

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation loads about 2.4k tokens when it runs, and up to ~3.5k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 118 tokens; SKILL.md has 876 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~118
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~2.4k
With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them
~3.5k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check: notes

The automated check noted patterns worth knowing about, such as sudo or a known installer.

  • NoteRuns commands with sudoSKILL.md:52
    sudo apt install tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd        # Debian/Ubuntu
  • NoteRuns commands with sudoSKILL.md:53
    sudo dnf install tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd        # Fedora/RHEL
  • NoteRuns commands with sudoSKILL.md:159
    sudo python scripts/agent.py --pcrs 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 --baseline golden_pcrs.json --output attest.json

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); the scripts in this folder are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills at commit 54a7988, republished under its Apache-2.0 licence (© mukul975). 876 words, ~2,447 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder). This skill also uses 4 other files; get the full folder from GitHub.
name
validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation
description
Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2_pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2_quote/tpm2_checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy. Use to confirm a system booted trusted firmware/kernel for Zero Trust device posture, detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift, or build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.
domain
cybersecurity
subdomain
hardware-firmware-security
tags
hardware-firmware-security, tpm, measured-boot, remote-attestation, pcr, tpm2-tools, integrity-verification, trusted-computing
version
1.0
author
mahipal
license
Apache-2.0
nist_csf
PR.PS-01
mitre_attack
T1542

Validating TPM Measured Boot and Attestation

Legal Notice: Perform TPM operations only on systems you own or are authorized to assess. Some operations (clearing the TPM, taking ownership, defining NV indices) are destructive or can lock the device. This skill is for defensive integrity verification and authorized assessment.

Overview

A Trusted Platform Module (TPM 2.0) is a hardware root of trust that supports measured boot: each stage of the boot chain hashes ("measures") the next stage and extends that measurement into a Platform Configuration Register (PCR) before handing off control. PCRs cannot be set arbitrarily — they can only be extended (new = hash(old || measurement)), so the final PCR value is a tamper-evident summary of everything that executed. The TCG firmware profile assigns specific meanings: UEFI firmware code/config measure into PCR 0–7 (PCR 7 specifically captures Secure Boot policy), bootloaders measure the kernel into PCR 8–9, and Linux IMA measures executables into PCR 10.

Two complementary verifications matter. Local validation reads current PCRs (tpm2_pcrread) and replays the TPM event log (tpm2_eventlog on /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements) to confirm the recorded measurements reproduce the live PCR values — proving the log is authentic and revealing exactly what changed if a value drifts from baseline. Remote attestation has the TPM produce a signed quote (tpm2_quote) over selected PCRs using an Attestation Key (AK), with a fresh nonce to prevent replay; a verifier then independently checks the signature and PCR digest (tpm2_checkquote) and compares against a golden/expected value. This lets a server cryptographically establish that a remote machine booted approved firmware and kernel before granting access, sealing secrets, or admitting it to a Zero Trust network.

This skill provides the full tpm2-tools workflow for enrolling an AK, capturing and verifying quotes, replaying event logs, sealing/unsealing data to a PCR policy, and building a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.

When to Use

  • Establishing that endpoints/servers booted a known-good firmware and kernel before granting access (Zero Trust device posture).
  • Detecting boot-chain tampering (bootkits, unauthorized firmware/kernel changes) via PCR drift from a baseline.
  • Verifying measured-boot integrity after a Secure Boot or firmware incident.
  • Sealing secrets (disk keys, credentials) to a measured-boot state so they only release on a trusted boot.
  • Building or auditing a remote-attestation service (e.g., Keylime, custom verifier).

Prerequisites

  • A system with a TPM 2.0 device and the resource manager:
    bash
    sudo apt install tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd        # Debian/Ubuntu
sudo dnf install tpm2-tools tpm2-abrmd        # Fedora/RHEL
  • Access to the TPM (/dev/tpm0 / /dev/tpmrm0) and the kernel measurement log at /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements.
  • Root for reading some sysfs entries and for NV/AK operations.
  • For remote attestation: a verifier host and a transport for the quote/nonce exchange.

Objectives

  • Read and interpret PCR banks and their TCG-assigned meanings.
  • Verify the TPM event log reproduces live PCR values (event-log replay).
  • Create an Attestation Key and produce a nonce-bound signed quote.
  • Independently verify the quote signature and PCR digest on a verifier.
  • Establish golden PCR baselines and detect drift across a fleet.
  • Optionally seal/unseal a secret to a measured-boot PCR policy.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique IDTechnique NameRelevance
T1542Pre-OS BootMeasured boot detects pre-OS tampering this technique relies on.
T1542.001Pre-OS Boot: System FirmwarePCR 0–7 drift reveals unauthorized firmware modification.
T1542.003Pre-OS Boot: BootkitBootloader/kernel measurements (PCR 8–10) expose bootkit changes.
T1014RootkitIMA measurements (PCR 10) and quote verification surface concealed tampering.
T1601.001Modify System Image: Patch System ImageAttestation against golden values flags unauthorized image patches.
Show full SKILL.md (329 more words)Show less

Workflow

1. Confirm the TPM is present and read its properties
bash
tpm2_getcap properties-fixed | grep -i manufacturer
tpm2_getcap pcrs                 # list supported PCR banks (sha1, sha256, ...)
2. Read current PCR values

PCR 7 = Secure Boot policy; PCR 0–7 = firmware; PCR 8–9 = bootloader/kernel; PCR 10 = IMA.

bash
tpm2_pcrread sha256                       # all sha256 PCRs
tpm2_pcrread sha256:0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7       # firmware + Secure Boot policy
tpm2_pcrread sha256:7                      # Secure Boot policy only
3. Replay the TPM event log against live PCRs

Confirm the recorded log reproduces the current PCR values (authenticity check).

bash
tpm2_eventlog /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements > eventlog.yaml
# The YAML includes a "pcrs" section with the calculated values — compare to step 2.
# Any mismatch means the event log and the live PCRs disagree (tampering or stale log).
4. Create a primary key and an Attestation Key (AK)

The AK signs quotes; its public part is shared with the verifier out-of-band.

bash
tpm2_createprimary -C e -g sha256 -G rsa -c primary.ctx
tpm2_create -C primary.ctx -G rsa -u ak.pub -r ak.priv \
  -a 'fixedtpm|fixedparent|sensitivedataorigin|userwithauth|restricted|sign'
tpm2_load -C primary.ctx -u ak.pub -r ak.priv -c ak.ctx
tpm2_readpublic -c ak.ctx -o ak.pem -f pem      # export AK public key for the verifier
5. Produce a nonce-bound quote (attestor side)

The verifier supplies a fresh random nonce to defeat replay.

bash
NONCE=$(openssl rand -hex 20)
tpm2_quote -c ak.ctx -l sha256:0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 \
  -q "$NONCE" -m quote.msg -s quote.sig -o quote.pcrs -g sha256
# Send quote.msg, quote.sig, quote.pcrs (and the nonce) to the verifier.
6. Verify the quote (verifier side)

Independently validate the signature, nonce, and PCR digest with the AK public key.

bash
tpm2_checkquote -u ak.pem -m quote.msg -s quote.sig -f quote.pcrs \
  -q "$NONCE" -g sha256
# Exit 0 + matching PCR digest == authentic, fresh, untampered quote.
7. Build and compare against a golden baseline

Compare attested PCRs to known-good values captured from a trusted reference build.

bash
# Capture golden values on a trusted reference machine:
tpm2_pcrread sha256:0,7 > golden_pcrs.txt
# On each attested host, diff the quote's PCR section against golden_pcrs.txt.
diff <(grep -A8 'sha256' quote.pcrs) golden_pcrs.txt
8. Seal a secret to a measured-boot policy (optional)

Bind a secret so the TPM only releases it when PCRs match the trusted state.

bash
tpm2_createpolicy --policy-pcr -l sha256:7 -L pcr7.policy -f pcr7.dat
echo -n "diskkey" | tpm2_create -C primary.ctx -L pcr7.policy \
  -i - -u sealed.pub -r sealed.priv
tpm2_load -C primary.ctx -u sealed.pub -r sealed.priv -c sealed.ctx
# Unseal succeeds only while PCR 7 matches the sealed policy:
tpm2_unseal -c sealed.ctx -p pcr:sha256:7
9. Inspect IMA runtime measurements (PCR 10)

If IMA is enabled, the runtime measurement list extends PCR 10.

bash
tpm2_pcrread sha256:10
head -20 /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
10. Run the bundled attestation helper

agent.py reads PCRs, replays the event log, optionally produces+verifies a quote, and diffs a baseline.

bash
sudo python scripts/agent.py --pcrs 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 --baseline golden_pcrs.json --output attest.json

Tools and Resources

ToolPurposeSource
tpm2-toolsCLI for all TPM 2.0 operationshttps://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools
tpm2-tssTSS2 stack the tools build onhttps://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss
KeylimeScalable remote attestation frameworkhttps://github.com/keylime/keylime
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware ProfilePCR usage specificationhttps://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
Linux IMA docsIntegrity Measurement Architecturehttps://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/
RFC 9683Remote integrity verification of TPM deviceshttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9683

Validation Criteria

  • TPM 2.0 presence and supported PCR banks confirmed.
  • Current PCR values read for firmware and Secure Boot policy PCRs.
  • Event log replayed and confirmed to reproduce live PCR values.
  • Attestation Key created and its public key exported to the verifier.
  • Nonce-bound quote produced and independently verified with tpm2_checkquote.
  • Attested PCRs compared against a golden baseline; drift flagged.
  • (Optional) Secret sealed/unsealed against a PCR policy successfully.
  • IMA runtime measurements reviewed where enabled.
  • Results documented per host with pass/fail and any drift evidence.

© mukul975, Apache-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 4 other files (scripts, references) in skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.

  • SKILL.md
  • LICENSE
  • references/api-reference.md
  • references/standards.md
  • scripts/agent.py

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 54a7988

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Categories

Questions about Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation

What does Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation do?

Verifies TPM 2.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes…. Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.0 measured-boot integrity and remote attestation with tpm2-tools -- reading PCRs (tpm2pcrread), replaying the boot event log, generating and checking signed quotes (tpm2quote/tpm2checkquote), and sealing secrets to a PCR policy.

When should I use Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation?

Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation fits situations like: confirm a system booted trusted firmware/kernel for Zero Trust device posture; detect boot-chain tampering via PCR drift; build a golden-value baseline for fleet attestation.

How do I install Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .claude/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation in Codex?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .agents/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation, .gemini/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation, .github/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation and .opencode/skills/validating-tpm-measured-boot-attestation in your project.

What does Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation needs Python for the scripts in its folder and the command-line tools its instructions call (apt, dnf, openssl and python). Our summary lists: Python 3.

Does Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation access the network?

SKILL.md names 4 domains. As links in the text: github.com, trustedcomputinggroup.org, sourceforge.net and datatracker.ietf.org. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found notes only (runs commands with sudo), nothing it rates as a warning. It is not a guarantee. The check reads SKILL.md only: the scripts in the folder are not scanned, so read them before running anything.

What licence does Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation use?

Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation is published under the Apache-2.0 licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation use?

About 2.4k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 9.8k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full. Its references folder adds about 1k tokens, read only when the agent opens those files.

What are the alternatives to Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation: Deepsec Documentation Guide (vercel-labs/deepsec, 8.1k stars), Skill Scanner (getsentry/skills, 1k stars), Serenity Aleabitoreddit (yan-labs/serenity-aleabitoreddit, 481 stars) and Security Alert Triage (elastic/agent-skills, 592 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Validating Tpm Measured Boot Attestation?

mukul975 (a GitHub user) maintains it in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, which has 34,116 GitHub stars. The repository holds 644 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on August 31, 2026.

Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.