Agent skill

Performing Lateral Movement Detection

by mukul975 in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading by correlating Windows Security/Sysmon event logs, network flow data…

Apache-2.0Auto-check passedSecurity

Install Performing Lateral Movement Detection

skills CLI
$ npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-lateral-movement-detection -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills performing-lateral-movement-detection --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection .claude/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
performing-lateral-movement-detection
GitHub stars
34k
Token cost
~3.1k tokens
SKILL.md length
457 words
Files
4 (incl. scripts, references)
Skills in repo
644
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
Apache-2.0

At a glance

Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading by correlating Windows Security/Sysmon event logs, network flow data…

  • Works in 6 steps: Detect Pass-the-Hash / Pass-the-Ticket… → Detect Remote Service Exploitation (T1021) → Detect SMB-Based Lateral Movement → …
  • A SOC team needs to detect attackers pivoting between internal systems after initial compromise
  • SKILL.md covers When to Use, Prerequisites, Workflow and Key Concepts, plus 3 more sections
  • Runs Python scripts from its folder

What it does

Performing Lateral Movement Detection is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading by correlating Windows Security/Sysmon event logs, network flow data (NetFlow/Zeek), and endpoint telemetry in a SIEM, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement (TA0008) techniques with sample SPL detection queries. Use when a SOC team needs to detect attackers pivoting between internal systems after initial compromise, trace an attacker's movement path during an incident investigation, or build…

Its SKILL.md is about 3.1k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. The skill folder holds 5 other files, including scripts and reference files (for example `references/api-reference.md` and `scripts/agent.py`).

It sits in Security, covering Red teaming and adversary simulation and Security operations. The repository describes itself as: 817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io…. The licence is Apache-2.0.

When your agent uses it

  • A SOC team needs to detect attackers pivoting between internal systems after initial compromise
  • Trace an attackers movement path during an incident investigation
  • Build detection engineering rules for TA0008
  • Not for detecting initial access

Example prompts

  • “Use the performing-lateral-movement-detection skill to detect lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP…”
  • “/performing-lateral-movement-detection”

Requirements

  • Python 3

Workflow steps

6 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Detect Pass-the-Hash / Pass-the-Ticket (T1550)
  2. Detect Remote Service Exploitation (T1021)
  3. Detect SMB-Based Lateral Movement
  4. Build Lateral Movement Graph
  5. Detect DCOM and Scheduled Task-Based Movement
  6. Correlate Movement with Kill Chain Phases

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 54a7988. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Ships 1 file in scripts/ (Python), which the agent can run.

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    No URLs in SKILL.md.

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Performing Lateral Movement Detection loads about 3.1k tokens when it runs, and up to ~3.6k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 163 tokens; SKILL.md has 457 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~163
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~3.1k
With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them
~3.6k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); the scripts in this folder are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills at commit 54a7988, republished under its Apache-2.0 licence (© mukul975). 457 words, ~3,123 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder). This skill also uses 3 other files; get the full folder from GitHub.
name
performing-lateral-movement-detection
description
Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading by correlating Windows Security/Sysmon event logs, network flow data (NetFlow/Zeek), and endpoint telemetry in a SIEM, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement (TA0008) techniques with sample SPL detection queries. Use when a SOC team needs to detect attackers pivoting between internal systems after initial compromise, trace an attacker's movement path during an incident investigation, or build detection engineering rules for TA0008; not for detecting initial access or external attacks.
domain
cybersecurity
subdomain
soc-operations
tags
soc, lateral-movement, mitre-attack, pass-the-hash, psexec, wmi, rdp, smb, detection
version
1.0
author
mahipal
license
Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques
Token Binding, Execution Isolation, Restore Access, Application Protocol Command Analysis, Process Termination
nist_csf
DE.CM-01, DE.AE-02, RS.MA-01, DE.AE-06
mitre_attack
T1078, T1685.002, T1685.005, T1566, T1021

Performing Lateral Movement Detection

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • SOC teams need to detect attackers pivoting between systems after initial compromise
  • Incident investigations require tracking an attacker's movement path through the network
  • Detection engineering needs lateral movement rules mapped to ATT&CK TA0008 techniques
  • Red/purple team exercises identify lateral movement detection gaps

Do not use for detecting initial access or external attacks — lateral movement detection focuses on internal host-to-host pivot activity.

Prerequisites

  • Windows Security Event Logs (EventCode 4624, 4625, 4648, 4672) from all endpoints and servers
  • Sysmon deployed with process creation (EventCode 1), network connections (EventCode 3), and named pipe (EventCode 17/18)
  • Network flow data (NetFlow/sFlow, Zeek connection logs) for internal traffic analysis
  • SIEM with cross-source correlation capability
  • Baseline of normal internal authentication patterns

Workflow

Step 1: Detect Pass-the-Hash / Pass-the-Ticket (T1550)

Pass-the-Hash Detection (EventCode 4624 with NTLM):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3
AuthenticationPackageName="NTLM"
| where TargetUserName!="ANONYMOUS LOGON" AND TargetUserName!="$"
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets, values(ComputerName) AS targets
  by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where unique_targets > 3
| eval alert = "Possible Pass-the-Hash: NTLM network logon to ".unique_targets." hosts"
| sort - unique_targets
| table src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_targets, count, targets, alert

Overpass-the-Hash Detection (Kerberos with RC4):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4769
TicketEncryptionType="0x17"
| where ServiceName!="krbtgt" AND ServiceName!="$"
| stats count, dc(ServiceName) AS unique_services by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where count > 5
| eval alert = "Possible Overpass-the-Hash: RC4 Kerberos tickets from ".src_ip
| table _time, src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_services, count, alert

Golden/Silver Ticket Detection (T1558):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4769
| where TicketOptions="0x40810000" OR TicketOptions="0x40800000"
| eval ticket_lifetime = TicketExpireTime - TicketIssueTime
| where ticket_lifetime > 36000  --- >10 hours (abnormal)
| stats count by src_ip, TargetUserName, ServiceName, TicketEncryptionType, TicketOptions
| eval alert = "Possible Golden/Silver Ticket: Abnormal ticket properties"
Step 2: Detect Remote Service Exploitation (T1021)

PsExec Detection (T1021.002):

spl
--- Via Sysmon process creation
index=sysmon EventCode=1
(Image="*\\psexec.exe" OR Image="*\\psexesvc.exe"
 OR OriginalFileName="psexec.c" OR OriginalFileName="psexesvc.exe"
 OR ParentImage="*\\psexesvc.exe")
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, Hashes

--- Via named pipe creation (Sysmon EventCode 17)
index=sysmon EventCode=17
PipeName IN ("\\PSEXESVC*", "\\RemCom*", "\\csexec*")
| table _time, Computer, User, Image, PipeName

--- Via Windows service creation (EventCode 7045)
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" EventCode=7045
ServiceName="PSEXESVC" OR ServiceFileName="*PSEXESVC*"
| table _time, Computer, ServiceName, ServiceFileName, AccountName

WMI Remote Execution (T1047):

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
(Image="*\\wmic.exe" AND CommandLine="*/node:*")
OR (ParentImage="*\\WmiPrvSE.exe" AND Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\powershell.exe"))
| eval execution_type = case(
    match(Image, "wmic"), "WMI Command Line",
    match(ParentImage, "WmiPrvSE"), "WMI Provider Host (remote execution)"
  )
| table _time, Computer, User, execution_type, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine

WinRM/PowerShell Remoting (T1021.006):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624
Logon_Type=3 AuthenticationPackageName="Kerberos"
| where ProcessName="*\\wsmprovhost.exe" OR ProcessName="*\\powershell.exe"
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS unique_targets by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where unique_targets > 2
| eval alert = "PowerShell Remoting to ".unique_targets." hosts from ".src_ip

--- Sysmon variant
index=sysmon EventCode=1
ParentImage="*\\wsmprovhost.exe"
Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\csc.exe")
| table _time, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine

RDP Lateral Movement (T1021.001):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS rdp_targets, values(ComputerName) AS destinations,
        earliest(_time) AS first_rdp, latest(_time) AS last_rdp
  by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where rdp_targets > 2
| eval duration_hours = round((last_rdp - first_rdp) / 3600, 1)
| eval alert = TargetUserName." RDP'd to ".rdp_targets." hosts in ".duration_hours." hours"
| sort - rdp_targets
Step 3: Detect SMB-Based Lateral Movement

Anomalous SMB Traffic Patterns:

spl
index=firewall OR index=zeek sourcetype IN ("pan:traffic", "bro:conn:json")
dest_port=445 action=allowed
| where src_ip!=dest_ip
| stats count AS smb_sessions, dc(dest_ip) AS unique_targets,
        sum(bytes_out) AS total_bytes
  by src_ip
| where unique_targets > 10
| eval alert = case(
    unique_targets > 50, "CRITICAL: Mass SMB enumeration from ".src_ip,
    unique_targets > 20, "HIGH: Significant SMB lateral movement",
    unique_targets > 10, "MEDIUM: Elevated SMB connections"
  )
| sort - unique_targets

Admin Share Access (C$, ADMIN$):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=5140
ShareName IN ("\\\\*\\C$", "\\\\*\\ADMIN$", "\\\\*\\IPC$")
| where SubjectUserName!="SYSTEM" AND SubjectUserName!="$"
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS unique_hosts by SubjectUserName, ShareName, src_ip
| where unique_hosts > 3
| eval alert = "Admin share access to ".unique_hosts." hosts by ".SubjectUserName
| sort - unique_hosts
Step 4: Build Lateral Movement Graph

Visualize the attack path:

spl
--- Build source->destination graph for authentication events
index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 Logon_Type IN (3, 10)
earliest=-24h
| stats count AS connections, latest(_time) AS last_connection
  by src_ip, ComputerName, TargetUserName, Logon_Type
| eval edge = src_ip." -> ".ComputerName." (User: ".TargetUserName.", Type: ".Logon_Type.")"
| sort - connections
| table edge, connections, last_connection

--- Network flow correlation
index=netflow earliest=-24h
dest_port IN (445, 135, 3389, 5985, 5986)
| stats sum(bytes) AS total_bytes, count AS flow_count,
        dc(dest_ip) AS targets by src_ip, dest_port
| where targets > 5
| eval service = case(
    dest_port=445, "SMB",
    dest_port=135, "RPC/WMI",
    dest_port=3389, "RDP",
    dest_port IN (5985, 5986), "WinRM"
  )
| sort - targets
| table src_ip, service, targets, flow_count, total_bytes
Step 5: Detect DCOM and Scheduled Task-Based Movement

DCOM Lateral Execution (T1021.003):

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
ParentImage IN ("*\\mmc.exe", "*\\excel.exe", "*\\outlook.exe")
Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\mshta.exe")
| where ParentCommandLine="*-Embedding*"
| eval alert = "DCOM-based lateral movement: ".ParentImage." spawned ".Image
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, alert

Remote Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):

spl
index=wineventlog EventCode=4698
| where SubjectUserName!="SYSTEM"
| eval task_xml = TaskContent
| search task_xml="*http*" OR task_xml="*powershell*" OR task_xml="*cmd*" OR task_xml="*\\Temp\\*"
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_xml
Step 6: Correlate Movement with Kill Chain Phases

Build end-to-end attack chain detection:

spl
--- Detect complete lateral movement sequence
index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon
(EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=1 OR EventCode=4698 OR EventCode=5140)
| eval phase = case(
    EventCode=4625, "1-Recon/BruteForce",
    EventCode=4624 AND Logon_Type=3, "2-Lateral Movement",
    EventCode=5140 AND match(ShareName, "C\$|ADMIN\$"), "3-Admin Share Access",
    EventCode=1 AND match(ParentImage, "psexesvc|WmiPrvSE|wsmprovhost"), "4-Remote Execution",
    EventCode=4698, "5-Persistence (Scheduled Task)",
    1=1, "other"
  )
| where phase!="other"
| stats count by phase, src_ip, ComputerName, TargetUserName
| sort phase, _time
| table phase, src_ip, ComputerName, TargetUserName, count

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
Lateral MovementPost-compromise technique where attackers pivot between systems to reach targets
Pass-the-HashUsing stolen NTLM hash for authentication without knowing the plaintext password
Pass-the-TicketUsing stolen Kerberos TGT/TGS tickets for authentication across the domain
PsExecSysinternals tool (and attack technique) for remote process execution via SMB and named pipes
WMI ExecutionUsing Windows Management Instrumentation for remote command execution via DCOM or WinRM
Admin ShareDefault Windows administrative shares (C$, ADMIN$, IPC$) used for remote system management
Show full SKILL.md (152 more words)Show less

Tools & Systems

  • Splunk Enterprise Security: SIEM platform for correlating Windows events, Sysmon, and network flows
  • Microsoft Defender for Identity: Cloud service detecting lateral movement via domain controller monitoring
  • BloodHound: Active Directory attack path analysis tool for identifying lateral movement opportunities
  • CrowdStrike Falcon: EDR platform with lateral movement detection and automated containment
  • Zeek (Bro): Network monitor generating connection logs for SMB, RDP, and WinRM traffic analysis

Common Scenarios

  • PsExec Spread: Attacker uses PsExec to execute malware across 20 workstations — detect via service creation events
  • RDP Pivoting: Compromised VPN account used to RDP through multiple internal hosts — detect via Logon_Type 10 chains
  • WMI Recon and Execution: Attacker uses WMI for discovery then execution — detect via WmiPrvSE child processes
  • Pass-the-Hash Campaign: Stolen local admin hash used across subnet — detect via NTLM Logon_Type 3 to multiple hosts
  • Scheduled Task Persistence: Remote scheduled task created on domain controller — detect via EventCode 4698 from non-admin source

Output Format

LATERAL MOVEMENT DETECTION REPORT
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Period:       2024-03-15 14:00 to 18:00 UTC
Source:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042)

Movement Path:
  14:23  192.168.1.105 → 10.0.5.20  (DC-PRIMARY) — PtH via NTLM Type 3
  14:25  10.0.5.20 → 10.0.5.21     (DC-BACKUP)  — Kerberos ticket reuse
  14:28  10.0.5.20 → 10.0.10.15    (FILESERVER-01) — PsExec service creation
  14:32  10.0.10.15 → 10.0.10.20   (DB-PRIMARY) — WMI remote execution
  14:35  10.0.10.20 → 10.0.10.25   (DB-BACKUP)  — SMB admin share access

Techniques Detected:
  T1550.002 — Pass-the-Hash (NTLM authentication to DC)
  T1021.002 — PsExec (remote service installation)
  T1047     — WMI Execution (WmiPrvSE child process)
  T1021.002 — SMB Admin Share (C$ access on DB-BACKUP)

Affected Systems: 5 hosts across 2 network segments
User Account:     admin_compromised (Domain Admin)
Containment:      All 5 hosts isolated at 14:45 UTC

© mukul975, Apache-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 3 other files (scripts, references) in skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.

  • SKILL.md
  • LICENSE
  • references/api-reference.md
  • scripts/agent.py

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 54a7988

Compare with similar skills

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SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
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Rational Red Blue Debatedigoal/blog8.6k—~2.2kAutomated safety check: PassGPL-2.0
Secops Investigategoogle/skills21k1 repos~4.2kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Threat Huntinghypnguyen1209/offensive-claude388—~2.4kAutomated safety check: PassMIT

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Categories

Questions about Performing Lateral Movement Detection

What does Performing Lateral Movement Detection do?

Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading by correlating Windows Security/Sysmon event logs, network flow data…. Performing Lateral Movement Detection is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Detects lateral movement techniques including Pass-the-Hash, PsExec, WMI execution, RDP pivoting, and SMB-based spreading by correlating Windows Security/Sysmon event logs, network flow data (NetFlow/Zeek), and endpoint telemetry in a SIEM, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement (TA0008) techniques with sample SPL detection queries.

When should I use Performing Lateral Movement Detection?

Performing Lateral Movement Detection fits situations like: A SOC team needs to detect attackers pivoting between internal systems after initial compromise; trace an attackers movement path during an incident investigation; build detection engineering rules for TA0008; not for detecting initial access.

How do I install Performing Lateral Movement Detection in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-lateral-movement-detection -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .claude/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Performing Lateral Movement Detection in Codex?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-lateral-movement-detection -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .agents/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Performing Lateral Movement Detection in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-lateral-movement-detection -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection, .gemini/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection, .github/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection and .opencode/skills/performing-lateral-movement-detection in your project.

What does Performing Lateral Movement Detection need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Performing Lateral Movement Detection needs Python for the scripts in its folder. Our summary lists: Python 3.

Does Performing Lateral Movement Detection access the network?

SKILL.md contains no URLs. Any network use would come from the scripts or tools the agent runs. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Performing Lateral Movement Detection safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. The check reads SKILL.md only: the scripts in the folder are not scanned, so read them before running anything.

What licence does Performing Lateral Movement Detection use?

Performing Lateral Movement Detection is published under the Apache-2.0 licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Performing Lateral Movement Detection use?

About 3.1k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 12k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full. Its references folder adds about 449 tokens, read only when the agent opens those files.

What are the alternatives to Performing Lateral Movement Detection?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Performing Lateral Movement Detection: Council (warpdotdev/common-skills, 610 stars), Cybersecurity (ohmyjahh/xquads-squads, 277 stars), Rational Red Blue Debate (digoal/blog, 8.6k stars) and Secops Investigate (google/skills, 21k stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Performing Lateral Movement Detection?

mukul975 (a GitHub user) maintains it in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, which has 34,116 GitHub stars. The repository holds 644 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on August 31, 2026.

Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.