Detecting Lateral Movement In Network

# Windows Event Logs to collect (via WEF or agent):
# Security Log:
#   4624 - Successful logon (Type 3=Network, Type 10=RemoteInteractive)
#   4625 - Failed logon
#   4648 - Logon using explicit credentials (RunAs, PsExec)
#   4672 - Special privileges assigned (admin logon)
#   4768 - Kerberos TGT request
#   4769 - Kerberos service ticket request
#   4776 - NTLM authentication (credential validation)
# System Log:
#   7045 - New service installed (PsExec indicator)
#   7036 - Service started/stopped

# Configure Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) subscription
# On the collector server (PowerShell):
# wecutil cs lateral-movement-subscription.xml

# Filebeat configuration for Windows Event Log shipping
cat > /etc/filebeat/modules.d/security.yml << 'EOF'
- module: system
  auth:
    enabled: true
    var.paths: ["/var/log/auth.log"]
  syslog:
    enabled: true

- module: zeek
  connection:
    enabled: true
    var.paths: ["/opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log"]
  dns:
    enabled: true
    var.paths: ["/opt/zeek/logs/current/dns.log"]
  smb_mapping:
    enabled: true
    var.paths: ["/opt/zeek/logs/current/smb_mapping.log"]
  dce_rpc:
    enabled: true
    var.paths: ["/opt/zeek/logs/current/dce_rpc.log"]
EOF

# Zeek configuration for lateral movement detection
# Enable SMB, DCE-RPC, and Kerberos logging
cat >> /opt/zeek/share/zeek/site/local.zeek << 'EOF'
@load policy/protocols/smb
@load policy/protocols/conn/known-hosts
@load policy/protocols/conn/known-services
@load frameworks/intel/seen
EOF

sudo zeekctl deploy

# Splunk SPL queries for lateral movement detection

# 1. Detect PsExec usage (new service creation on remote hosts)
# index=wineventlog EventCode=7045 ServiceName="PSEXESVC" OR ServiceName="*psexec*"
# | stats count by ComputerName, ServiceName, ImagePath
# | where count > 0

# 2. Detect Pass-the-Hash (Type 3 logon with NTLM)
# index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 AuthenticationPackageName="NTLM"
# | where TargetUserName!="ANONYMOUS LOGON" AND TargetUserName!="$"
# | stats count dc(ComputerName) as unique_hosts by TargetUserName, IpAddress
# | where unique_hosts > 3

# 3. Detect RDP lateral movement (Type 10 logon from internal IPs)
# index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=10
# | where cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", IpAddress) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", IpAddress)
# | stats count dc(ComputerName) as rdp_hosts by TargetUserName, IpAddress
# | where rdp_hosts > 2

# Elastic SIEM detection rules (KQL)
# event.code: "4624" and winlog.event_data.LogonType: "3"
#   and winlog.event_data.AuthenticationPackageName: "NTLM"
#   and not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName: *$
#   and source.ip: (10.0.0.0/8 or 172.16.0.0/12 or 192.168.0.0/16)

# Sigma rules for lateral movement detection
# Install sigma and convert to target SIEM format
pip3 install sigma-cli

cat > lateral_movement_pth.yml << 'EOF'
title: Pass-the-Hash Lateral Movement Detection
id: f8d98d6c-7a07-4d74-b064-dd4a3c244528
status: experimental
description: Detects network logon with NTLM authentication to multiple hosts
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 3
        AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
    filter:
        TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter
    timeframe: 15m
    count:
        field: ComputerName
        min: 3
        group-by: TargetUserName
level: high
tags:
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1550.002
EOF

# Convert Sigma rule to Splunk SPL
sigma convert -t splunk lateral_movement_pth.yml

# Convert to Elastic query
sigma convert -t elasticsearch lateral_movement_pth.yml

# Detect SMB lateral movement (admin$ and c$ share access)
cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/smb_mapping.log | \
  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h path | \
  grep -iE "(admin\$|c\$|ipc\$)" | \
  sort -t$'\t' -k2 | uniq -c | sort -rn

# Detect hosts connecting to many internal hosts on port 445 (SMB spreading)
cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | \
  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p | \
  awk '$4 == 445' | \
  awk '{print $2}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -10

# Detect WMI lateral movement (DCE-RPC to IWbemServices)
cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/dce_rpc.log | \
  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h operation | \
  grep -i "wbem\|wmi" | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn

# Detect RDP connections between internal hosts
cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | \
  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p duration | \
  awk '$4 == 3389 && $5 > 60' | \
  sort -t$'\t' -k2 | head -20

# Detect Kerberos ticket-granting anomalies
cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/kerberos.log | \
  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h client service success error_msg | \
  grep -v "true" | head -20

# Custom Zeek script for lateral movement detection
sudo tee /opt/zeek/share/zeek/site/custom-detections/lateral-movement.zeek << 'ZEEKEOF'
@load base/frameworks/notice
@load base/frameworks/sumstats

module LateralMovement;

export {
    redef enum Notice::Type += {
        SMB_Lateral_Spread,
        RDP_Lateral_Chain
    };
    const smb_host_threshold: count = 5 &redef;
    const smb_time_window: interval = 15min &redef;
}

event zeek_init()
{
    local r1 = SumStats::Reducer(
        $stream="lateral.smb",
        $apply=set(SumStats::UNIQUE)
    );

    SumStats::create([
        $name="detect-smb-lateral",
        $epoch=smb_time_window,
        $reducers=set(r1),
        $threshold_val(key: SumStats::Key, result: SumStats::Result) = {
            return result["lateral.smb"]$unique + 0.0;
        },
        $threshold=smb_host_threshold + 0.0,
        $threshold_crossed(key: SumStats::Key, result: SumStats::Result) = {
            NOTICE([
                $note=SMB_Lateral_Spread,
                $msg=fmt("Host %s connected to %d SMB hosts in %s",
                         key$str, result["lateral.smb"]$unique, smb_time_window),
                $identifier=key$str
            ]);
        }
    ]);
}

event connection_state_remove(c: connection)
{
    if ( c$id$resp_p == 445/tcp && c$id$resp_h in Site::local_nets )
    {
        SumStats::observe("lateral.smb",
            [$str=cat(c$id$orig_h)],
            [$str=cat(c$id$resp_h)]
        );
    }
}
ZEEKEOF

sudo zeekctl deploy

# Hunt for authentication anomalies in Windows logs
# Splunk query: Users authenticating from unusual source hosts
# index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3
# | stats values(IpAddress) as source_ips dc(IpAddress) as source_count by TargetUserName
# | where source_count > 5
# | sort -source_count

# Hunt for service accounts used interactively
# index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 (LogonType=2 OR LogonType=10)
# | where match(TargetUserName, "^svc-.*")
# | table _time ComputerName TargetUserName IpAddress LogonType

# Network flow analysis for lateral movement patterns
# Look for hosts that suddenly start communicating with many internal hosts
cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | \
  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h | \
  awk '{
    key = $2
    targets[key][$3] = 1
  }
  END {
    for (src in targets) {
      count = 0
      for (dst in targets[src]) count++
      if (count > 20) print src, count
    }
  }' | sort -k2 -rn

# Detect credential dumping artifacts (large LSASS reads)
# Look for connections from hosts that suddenly pivot
cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | \
  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p orig_bytes | \
  awk '$4 == 445 && $5 > 10000000' | sort -t$'\t' -k5 -rn

# Timeline analysis: map the attack path
# index=wineventlog (EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=7045)
# | eval stage=case(
#     EventCode=4624 AND LogonType=3, "Network Logon",
#     EventCode=4624 AND LogonType=10, "RDP Logon",
#     EventCode=7045, "Service Creation"
#   )
# | timechart span=5m count by stage

# SOAR playbook for lateral movement response (pseudocode)
# When lateral movement alert triggers:

# 1. Enrich the alert with context
# - Query AD for user group membership and role
# - Check if source IP is a known admin workstation
# - Look up recent vulnerability scan results for affected hosts

# 2. Automated containment actions
# Option A: Isolate the host via switch port shutdown
# ssh admin@switch "conf t; interface Gi1/0/5; shutdown"

# Option B: Quarantine via VLAN change (less disruptive)
# ssh admin@switch "conf t; interface Gi1/0/5; switchport access vlan 999"

# Option C: Block at firewall
sudo iptables -I FORWARD -s 10.10.5.23 -j DROP

# 3. Disable the compromised account
# PowerShell: Disable-ADAccount -Identity compromised_user

# 4. Force password reset
# PowerShell: Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity compromised_user -Reset

# 5. Collect forensic evidence before full containment
# velociraptor artifact collect Windows.KapeFiles.Targets --target BasicCollection

# Elastic Kibana dashboard queries for lateral movement monitoring

# Panel 1: Authentication heatmap (source vs destination)
# Aggregation: Terms on source.ip (rows) and destination.ip (columns)
# Metric: Count of event.code:4624

# Panel 2: SMB connections between internal hosts
# Filter: destination.port:445 and source.ip:10.0.0.0/8
# Aggregation: Top 20 source IPs by unique destination count

# Panel 3: RDP sessions timeline
# Filter: destination.port:3389 and event.code:4624 and winlog.event_data.LogonType:10
# Visualization: Timeline by source.ip

# Panel 4: New service installations
# Filter: event.code:7045
# Aggregation: Terms on winlog.event_data.ServiceName

# Panel 5: Failed authentication spike detection
# Filter: event.code:4625
# Aggregation: Date histogram with anomaly detection

# Export Kibana dashboard
# curl -X GET "elastic-siem:5601/api/saved_objects/_export" \
#   -H "kbn-xsrf: true" \
#   -d '{"type":"dashboard","objects":[{"id":"lateral-movement-dashboard","type":"dashboard"}]}' \
#   > lateral_movement_dashboard.ndjson