New: 98,000+ skills indexed from GitHub repos with 100+ stars · every skill safety-checkedBrowse top skillsTop skills
Esc to closeBrowse all skills
Submit a skillBrowse skills
Submit a skillBrowse skills

Agent skill

Conducting Cloud Incident Response

by mukul975 in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic…

Apache-2.0Auto-check passedDevOps & Cloud

Install Conducting Cloud Incident Response

skills CLI
$ npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill conducting-cloud-incident-response -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills conducting-cloud-incident-response --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response .claude/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
conducting-cloud-incident-response
GitHub stars
34k
Token cost
~3k tokens
SKILL.md length
831 words
Files
4 (incl. scripts, references)
Skills in repo
644
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
Apache-2.0

At a glance

Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic…

  • Works in 6 steps: Detect and Confirm the Cloud Incident → Contain Cloud Identity Compromise → Preserve Cloud Evidence → …
  • Audit logs show compromised cloud credentials
  • SKILL.md covers When to Use, Prerequisites, Workflow and Key Concepts, plus 3 more sections
  • Runs Python scripts from its folder; calls aws and jq

What it does

Conducting Cloud Incident Response is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition adapted for ephemeral cloud infrastructure. Use when CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services.

Its SKILL.md is about 3k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. The skill folder holds 5 other files, including scripts and reference files (for example `references/api-reference.md` and `scripts/agent.py`).

It sits in DevOps & Cloud, covering Incident response, Cloud security and Security operations. It works with Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. The repository describes itself as: 817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io…. The licence is Apache-2.0.

When your agent uses it

  • Audit logs show compromised cloud credentials
  • Unauthorized IAM changes
  • A breach spanning cloud services

Example prompts

  • “/conducting-cloud-incident-response”

Requirements

  • Python 3

Workflow steps

6 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Detect and Confirm the Cloud Incident
  2. Contain Cloud Identity Compromise
  3. Preserve Cloud Evidence
  4. Investigate Cloud-Specific Attack Patterns
  5. Eradicate and Recover
  6. Post-Incident Cloud Hardening

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 54a7988. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Ships 1 file in scripts/ (Python), which the agent can run.

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • aws
    • jq

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    No URLs in SKILL.md. Its commands use aws, which can reach the network depending on how they are called.

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Conducting Cloud Incident Response loads about 3k tokens when it runs, and up to ~3.6k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 107 tokens; SKILL.md has 831 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~107
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~3k
With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them
~3.6k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); the scripts in this folder are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills at commit 54a7988, republished under its Apache-2.0 licence (© mukul975). 831 words, ~2,954 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder). This skill also uses 3 other files; get the full folder from GitHub.
name
conducting-cloud-incident-response
description
Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition adapted for ephemeral cloud infrastructure. Use when CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services.
domain
cybersecurity
subdomain
incident-response
tags
cloud-IR, AWS-forensics, Azure-incident-response, GCP-security, identity-containment
mitre_attack
T1078, T1537, T1580, T1525
version
1.0.0
author
mahipal
license
Apache-2.0
nist_csf
RS.MA-01, RS.MA-02, RS.AN-03, RC.RP-01

Conducting Cloud Incident Response

When to Use

  • Cloud security posture management (CSPM) alerts on unauthorized resource changes
  • CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, or GCP Audit Logs show suspicious API calls
  • Cloud access keys or service principal credentials are suspected compromised
  • Unauthorized compute instances, storage buckets, or IAM changes are detected
  • A cloud-hosted application is breached and attacker activity spans cloud services

Do not use for on-premises-only incidents with no cloud component; use standard enterprise IR procedures.

Prerequisites

  • Cloud-native logging enabled and centralized: AWS CloudTrail (all regions), Azure Activity/Sign-in Logs, GCP Cloud Audit Logs
  • IR-specific cloud IAM roles pre-provisioned with read-only forensic access
  • Isolated forensic account/subscription/project for evidence preservation
  • Cloud incident response runbooks specific to each cloud provider
  • Cloud-native security tools: AWS GuardDuty, Azure Defender for Cloud, GCP Security Command Center
  • Network traffic logging: VPC Flow Logs (AWS/GCP), NSG Flow Logs (Azure)

Workflow

Step 1: Detect and Confirm the Cloud Incident

Identify the scope and nature of the compromise:

AWS Indicators:

CloudTrail suspicious events to investigate:
- ConsoleLogin from unexpected geolocation or IP
- CreateAccessKey for existing IAM user (persistence)
- RunInstances for crypto-mining (large instance types)
- PutBucketPolicy making S3 bucket public
- AssumeRole to cross-account roles
- DeleteTrail or StopLogging (defense evasion)
- CreateUser or AttachUserPolicy (privilege escalation)

Azure Indicators:

Azure Activity Log events to investigate:
- Sign-in from anonymous IP or TOR exit node
- Service principal credential added
- Role assignment changes (Owner, Contributor added)
- VM created in unusual region
- Storage account access key regenerated
- Conditional Access policy modified or deleted
- MFA disabled for user account

GCP Indicators:

GCP Audit Log events to investigate:
- SetIamPolicy changes granting broad access
- CreateServiceAccountKey for existing SA
- InsertInstance in unexpected zone
- SetBucketIamPolicy with allUsers
- DeleteLog or UpdateSink (log tampering)
Step 2: Contain Cloud Identity Compromise

Cloud containment is primarily an identity operation:

AWS Containment:

bash
# Disable compromised IAM access keys
aws iam update-access-key --user-name compromised-user \
  --access-key-id AKIA... --status Inactive

# Attach deny-all policy to compromised user
aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name compromised-user \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AWSDenyAll

# Revoke all active sessions for compromised IAM role
aws iam put-role-policy --role-name compromised-role \
  --policy-name RevokeOlderSessions --policy-document '{
    "Version":"2012-10-17",
    "Statement":[{
      "Effect":"Deny",
      "Action":"*",
      "Resource":"*",
      "Condition":{"DateLessThan":
        {"aws:TokenIssueTime":"2025-11-15T15:00:00Z"}}
    }]
  }'

# Isolate compromised EC2 instance
aws ec2 modify-instance-attribute --instance-id i-0abc123 \
  --groups sg-isolate-forensic

Azure Containment:

powershell
# Disable compromised user
Set-AzureADUser -ObjectId "user@tenant.onmicrosoft.com" -AccountEnabled $false

# Revoke all sessions
Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken -ObjectId "user-object-id"

# Remove role assignments
Remove-AzRoleAssignment -ObjectId "sp-object-id" -RoleDefinitionName "Contributor"

# Isolate VM with NSG deny-all rule
$nsg = New-AzNetworkSecurityGroup -Name "isolate-nsg" -ResourceGroupName "rg" -Location "eastus"
$nsg | Add-AzNetworkSecurityRuleConfig -Name "DenyAll" -Priority 100 -Direction Inbound `
  -Access Deny -Protocol * -SourceAddressPrefix * -SourcePortRange * `
  -DestinationAddressPrefix * -DestinationPortRange *
Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence

Collect evidence before ephemeral resources are terminated or logs rotate:

AWS Evidence Collection:

  • Export CloudTrail events to S3 in the forensic account
  • Snapshot EBS volumes of compromised EC2 instances
  • Copy S3 access logs and object versions
  • Export VPC Flow Logs for the affected VPC
  • Capture IAM credential reports and access advisor data

Azure Evidence Collection:

  • Export Azure Activity Logs and Sign-in Logs (90-day retention by default)
  • Snapshot managed disks of compromised VMs
  • Export Azure AD audit logs
  • Capture NSG flow logs
  • Export Conditional Access sign-in details

GCP Evidence Collection:

  • Export Cloud Audit Logs to a forensic storage bucket
  • Snapshot persistent disks of compromised VMs
  • Export VPC Flow Logs
  • Capture IAM policy snapshots
Step 4: Investigate Cloud-Specific Attack Patterns

Analyze logs for common cloud attack techniques:

Common Cloud Attack Patterns:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. Credential Compromise → IAM Privilege Escalation → Resource Abuse
2. Public S3/Blob → Data Exfiltration
3. SSRF from Web App → IMDS Token Theft → Lateral Movement
4. Compromised CI/CD Pipeline → Malicious Deployment
5. Cross-Account Role Abuse → Multi-Account Pivot
6. Lambda/Function Abuse → Crypto-mining or Data Processing

IMDS Token Theft Investigation (AWS):

bash
# Search CloudTrail for API calls using instance role credentials from external IP
aws cloudtrail lookup-events --lookup-attributes \
  AttributeKey=EventSource,AttributeValue=ec2.amazonaws.com \
  --start-time 2025-11-14 --end-time 2025-11-16 \
  | jq '.Events[] | select(.CloudTrailEvent | fromjson | .sourceIPAddress != "internal")'
Step 5: Eradicate and Recover

Remove adversary access and restore secure state:

  • Rotate all compromised credentials (access keys, passwords, service principal secrets)
  • Remove unauthorized IAM users, roles, policies, and access keys created by the attacker
  • Terminate unauthorized compute instances (crypto-miners, C2 servers)
  • Restore modified S3 bucket policies and storage access policies to pre-incident state
  • Re-enable security controls that were disabled (CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Defender for Cloud)
  • Review and restore Conditional Access policies and MFA configurations
Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening

Implement controls to prevent recurrence:

  • Enable MFA for all IAM users and require MFA for sensitive API calls
  • Implement SCPs (AWS) or Azure Policy to prevent logging disablement
  • Enable GuardDuty / Defender for Cloud / Security Command Center with auto-remediation
  • Implement least-privilege IAM policies using access analyzer data
  • Enable IMDS v2 (token-required) on all EC2 instances to prevent SSRF-based token theft
  • Configure budget alerts to detect crypto-mining cost spikes
Show full SKILL.md (370 more words)Show less

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
IMDS (Instance Metadata Service)Cloud service providing instance credentials accessible from within a VM; SSRF attacks target IMDS to steal tokens
CloudTrailAWS service logging all API calls across the AWS account; primary evidence source for AWS incident response
Service PrincipalNon-human identity in Azure AD used by applications and services; compromise enables persistent API access
SCP (Service Control Policy)AWS Organizations policy that limits the maximum permissions available to accounts; useful for guardrails
Ephemeral InfrastructureCloud resources (containers, functions, auto-scaled instances) that may be terminated before evidence can be collected
Cross-Account Role AssumptionAWS mechanism allowing one account to temporarily access resources in another; attackers pivot through assumed roles

Tools & Systems

  • AWS CloudTrail / Azure Activity Logs / GCP Audit Logs: Cloud-native API logging services providing the primary audit trail
  • Cado Response: Cloud-native forensics platform for automated evidence capture from AWS, Azure, and GCP
  • Prowler (AWS) / ScoutSuite (multi-cloud): Open-source cloud security assessment tools for post-incident posture review
  • Steampipe: Open-source SQL-based tool for querying cloud APIs to investigate IAM configurations and resource states
  • Cartography (Lyft): Open-source tool for mapping cloud infrastructure relationships and identifying attack paths

Common Scenarios

Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository

Context: AWS GuardDuty alerts on API calls from an unexpected IP address using an IAM user's access key. The key was accidentally committed to a public GitHub repository 4 hours ago.

Approach:

  1. Immediately disable the compromised access key via AWS IAM
  2. Attach AWSDenyAll policy to the affected IAM user
  3. Query CloudTrail for all API calls made with the compromised key since exposure
  4. Identify resources created or modified by the attacker (EC2 instances for crypto-mining, new IAM users for persistence)
  5. Terminate unauthorized resources and remove backdoor IAM entities
  6. Rotate all credentials the compromised user had access to
  7. Enable GitHub secret scanning to prevent future credential leaks

Pitfalls:

  • Only disabling the access key without checking for new access keys or IAM users created as persistence
  • Not checking all AWS regions for attacker-created resources (crypto-miners deployed in every region)
  • Forgetting to revoke temporary credentials from assumed roles (STS tokens remain valid until expiry)
  • Not calculating the financial impact of unauthorized resource usage for insurance claims

Output Format

CLOUD INCIDENT RESPONSE REPORT
================================
Incident:          INC-2025-1705
Cloud Provider:    AWS (Account: 123456789012)
Date Detected:     2025-11-15T14:00:00Z
Detection Source:  GuardDuty - UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration

COMPROMISE SUMMARY
Initial Access:    IAM access key exposed in public GitHub repo
Affected Identity: iam-user: deploy-bot (AKIA...)
Attacker IP:       203.0.113.42 (VPN exit node, Netherlands)
Duration:          4 hours (10:00 UTC - 14:00 UTC)

ATTACKER ACTIVITY (from CloudTrail)
10:15 UTC - DescribeInstances (reconnaissance)
10:18 UTC - RunInstances x 12 (c5.4xlarge, all regions - crypto-mining)
10:22 UTC - CreateUser "backup-admin" (persistence)
10:23 UTC - CreateAccessKey for "backup-admin"
10:25 UTC - AttachUserPolicy - AdministratorAccess to "backup-admin"
10:30 UTC - PutBucketPolicy - s3://data-bucket made public (exfiltration)

CONTAINMENT ACTIONS
[x] Original access key disabled
[x] User policy set to AWSDenyAll
[x] Backdoor IAM user "backup-admin" deleted
[x] 12 crypto-mining instances terminated (all regions)
[x] S3 bucket policy restored to private

FINANCIAL IMPACT
Unauthorized EC2: $2,847 (4 hours x 12 x c5.4xlarge)
Data Transfer:    $127 (S3 public access data egress)
Total:            $2,974

POST-INCIDENT HARDENING
1. GitHub secret scanning enabled
2. Access key rotation policy implemented
3. SCP preventing CloudTrail disablement deployed
4. GuardDuty auto-remediation Lambda configured

© mukul975, Apache-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 3 other files (scripts, references) in skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.

  • SKILL.md
  • LICENSE
  • references/api-reference.md
  • scripts/agent.py

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 54a7988

Compare with similar skills

Conducting Cloud Incident Response next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Conducting Cloud Incident Response compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Conducting Cloud Incident Response this skillmukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills34k—~3kAutomated safety check: PassApache-2.0
Cloud Misconfig Auditorcriptogus/agent-evolve-network288—~965Automated safety check: PassCC-BY-SA-4.0
Defender For Cloud Hardeningvinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills175—~1.9kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Cloud AuditCommonHuman-Lab/nyxstrike157—~1.1kAutomated safety check: PassCustom licence
Cloud Auditbriiirussell/cybersecurity-skills413—~1.3kAutomated safety check: NotesMIT
Configuring Firewallsancoleman/ai-design-components526—~3.5kAutomated safety check: NotesMIT

Similar skills

  • Cloud Misconfig Auditor

    criptogus/agent-evolve-network

    Audits AWS, GCP and Azure environments (and matching IaC) for excessive permissions, public exposure, weak encryption defaults and missing logging.

    288 GitHub stars~965 tokensUpdated yesterday
    DevOps & CloudAuto-check passed

  • Defender For Cloud Hardening

    vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills

    Guidance for Microsoft Defender for Cloud — cloud security posture management (CSPM) and cloud workload protection (CWPP) across Azure, AWS, and GCP.

    175 GitHub stars~1.9k tokensUpdated 3 mo ago
    SecurityAuto-check passed

  • Cloud Audit

    CommonHuman-Lab/nyxstrike

    Cloud and container security auditing workflow using prowler, trivy, kube-hunter, and docker-bench for AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, and container images

    157 GitHub stars~1.1k tokensUpdated 2 days ago
    DevOps & CloudAuto-check passed

  • Cloud Audit

    briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills

    Audit cloud infrastructure (AWS, GCP, Azure) for misconfigurations, excessive permissions, and security gaps.

    413 GitHub stars~1.3k tokensUpdated 4 mo ago
    SecurityAuto-check: notes

  • Configuring Firewalls

    ancoleman/ai-design-components

    Configure host-based firewalls (iptables, nftables, UFW) and cloud security groups (AWS, GCP, Azure) with practical rules for common scenarios like web servers, databases, and bastion hosts.

    526 GitHub stars~3.5k tokensUpdated 10 mo ago
    SecurityAuto-check: notes

  • Hardening Cloud Posture

    trilwu/secskills

    Proactively harden a cloud account or organization before an incident — prioritizing IAM and identity risk over checkbox findings, closing the exposures that become attack paths (public storage…

    157 GitHub stars~1.9k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    SecurityAuto-check passed

More from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

All 644 skills in this repo

  • Campaign Attribution Evidence Analysis

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Weighs infrastructure, TTP, malware code and timing evidence with the Diamond Model and competing hypotheses to reach a confidence-rated attribution.

    34k GitHub stars~2.3k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed

  • Go Malware Analysis in Ghidra

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Walks through reverse engineering Go-compiled malware in Ghidra: parsing buildinfo and pclntab, recovering stripped function names and extracting dependencies.

    34k GitHub stars~2.8k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed

  • LNK and Jump List Forensics

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Guides forensic analysis of Windows LNK shortcut files and Jump Lists with LECmd, JLECmd and manual parsing to show file access and program execution.

    34k GitHub stars~2.8k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed

  • Malware Persistence Analysis with Autoruns

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Hunts Windows malware persistence with Sysinternals Autoruns, covering run keys, services, scheduled tasks and drivers, with baseline comparison.

    34k GitHub stars~1.2k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed

  • NTFS MFT Deleted File Recovery

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Guides a Windows forensic examination of the NTFS Master File Table to recover deleted-file evidence, build timelines and spot timestomping.

    34k GitHub stars~2.7k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed

  • Network Covert Channel Analysis

    mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

    Detects DNS tunneling, ICMP exfiltration and HTTP-based covert channels in packet captures and DNS logs when hunting for hidden command-and-control traffic.

    34k GitHub stars~2k tokensUpdated 1 mo ago
    Auto-check passed

Works with

Categories

Questions about Conducting Cloud Incident Response

What does Conducting Cloud Incident Response do?

Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic…. Conducting Cloud Incident Response is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition adapted for ephemeral cloud infrastructure.

When should I use Conducting Cloud Incident Response?

Conducting Cloud Incident Response fits situations like: audit logs show compromised cloud credentials; unauthorized IAM changes; A breach spanning cloud services.

How do I install Conducting Cloud Incident Response in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill conducting-cloud-incident-response -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .claude/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Conducting Cloud Incident Response in Codex?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill conducting-cloud-incident-response -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .agents/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Conducting Cloud Incident Response in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill conducting-cloud-incident-response -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response, .gemini/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response, .github/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response and .opencode/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response in your project.

What does Conducting Cloud Incident Response need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Conducting Cloud Incident Response needs Python for the scripts in its folder and the command-line tools its instructions call (aws and jq). Our summary lists: Python 3.

Does Conducting Cloud Incident Response access the network?

SKILL.md contains no URLs. Any network use would come from the scripts or tools the agent runs. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Conducting Cloud Incident Response safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. The check reads SKILL.md only: the scripts in the folder are not scanned, so read them before running anything.

What licence does Conducting Cloud Incident Response use?

Conducting Cloud Incident Response is published under the Apache-2.0 licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Conducting Cloud Incident Response use?

About 3k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 12k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full. Its references folder adds about 616 tokens, read only when the agent opens those files.

What are the alternatives to Conducting Cloud Incident Response?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Conducting Cloud Incident Response: Cloud Misconfig Auditor (criptogus/agent-evolve-network, 288 stars), Defender For Cloud Hardening (vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills, 175 stars), Cloud Audit (CommonHuman-Lab/nyxstrike, 157 stars) and Cloud Audit (briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills, 413 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Conducting Cloud Incident Response?

mukul975 (a GitHub user) maintains it in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, which has 33,993 GitHub stars. The repository holds 644 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on August 31, 2026.

Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.