Agent skill

Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk

by mukul975 in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to…

Apache-2.0Auto-check passedSecurity

Install Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk

skills CLI
$ npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk .claude/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk
GitHub stars
34k
Token cost
~2.8k tokens
SKILL.md length
430 words
Files
4 (incl. scripts, references)
Skills in repo
644
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
Apache-2.0

At a glance

Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to…

  • Works in 6 steps: Authentication Attack Detection → Privilege Escalation Detection → Persistence Mechanism Detection → …
  • SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats
  • SKILL.md covers When to Use, Prerequisites, Workflow and Key Concepts, plus 3 more sections
  • Runs Python scripts from its folder

What it does

Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.

Its SKILL.md is about 2.8k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. The skill folder holds 5 other files, including scripts and reference files (for example `references/api-reference.md` and `scripts/agent.py`).

It sits in Security, covering Red teaming and adversary simulation and Digital forensics. It works with Splunk. The repository describes itself as: 817 structured cybersecurity skills for AI agents · Mapped to 6 frameworks: MITRE ATT&CK, NIST CSF 2.0, MITRE ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF & MITRE F3 (Fight Fraud) · agentskills.io…. The licence is Apache-2.0.

When your agent uses it

  • SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats
  • Build detection queries
  • Perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers

Example prompts

  • “Use the analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk skill to analyz Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication…”
  • “/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk”

Requirements

  • Python 3

Workflow steps

6 steps, taken from the step headings in SKILL.md.

  1. Authentication Attack Detection
  2. Privilege Escalation Detection
  3. Persistence Mechanism Detection
  4. Lateral Movement Detection
  5. Build Forensic Timeline
  6. Create Lookup Tables for Enrichment

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit 54a7988. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Ships 1 file in scripts/ (Python), which the agent can run.

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    No URLs in SKILL.md.

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names no API keys, tokens, secrets or passwords.

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk loads about 2.8k tokens when it runs, and up to ~3.3k if it reads all its reference files. Until then it costs about 108 tokens; SKILL.md has 430 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~108
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~2.8k
With references · SKILL.md plus every file in references/, read only if the agent opens them
~3.3k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check passed

The automated check found no risky patterns in SKILL.md.

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); the scripts in this folder are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills at commit 54a7988, republished under its Apache-2.0 licence (© mukul975). 430 words, ~2,816 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder). This skill also uses 3 other files; get the full folder from GitHub.
name
analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk
description
Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.
domain
cybersecurity
subdomain
soc-operations
tags
soc, splunk, windows-events, sysmon, event-logs, mitre-attack, active-directory
version
1.0
author
mahipal
license
Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques
Restore Access, Password Authentication, Biometric Authentication, Strong Password Policy, Restore User Account Access
nist_csf
DE.CM-01, DE.AE-02, RS.MA-01, DE.AE-06
mitre_attack
T1110, T1053.005, T1547.001, T1021.002, T1558.003, T1003.006

Analyzing Windows Event Logs in Splunk

When to Use

Use this skill when:

  • SOC analysts investigate alerts related to Windows authentication, process execution, or AD changes
  • Detection engineers build SPL queries for Windows-based threat detection
  • Incident responders need forensic timelines of Windows endpoint or domain controller activity
  • Periodic threat hunting targets Windows-specific ATT&CK techniques

Do not use for Linux/macOS endpoint analysis or network-only investigations.

Prerequisites

  • Splunk with Windows Event Log data ingested (sourcetype WinEventLog:Security, WinEventLog:System, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational)
  • Sysmon deployed on endpoints with SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong configuration
  • CIM data model acceleration for Endpoint and Authentication data models
  • Knowledge of Windows Security Event IDs and Sysmon event types

Workflow

Step 1: Authentication Attack Detection

Brute Force Detection (EventCode 4625 — Failed Logon):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625
| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, values(TargetUserName) AS targeted_users
  by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status
| where count > 20
| eval attack_type = case(
    Logon_Type=3, "Network Brute Force",
    Logon_Type=10, "RDP Brute Force",
    Logon_Type=2, "Interactive Brute Force",
    1=1, "Other"
  )
| eval status_meaning = case(
    Status="0xc000006d", "Bad Username or Password",
    Status="0xc000006a", "Incorrect Password (valid user)",
    Status="0xc0000234", "Account Locked Out",
    Status="0xc0000072", "Account Disabled",
    1=1, Status
  )
| sort - count
| table src_ip, attack_type, status_meaning, count, unique_users, targeted_users

Password Spray Detection:

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3
| bin _time span=10m
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, count AS total_attempts,
  values(TargetUserName) AS users_targeted by src_ip, _time
| where unique_users > 10 AND total_attempts < unique_users * 3
| eval spray_confidence = if(unique_users > 25, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")

Successful Logon After Failures (Compromise Indicator):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security"
(EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) src_ip!="127.0.0.1"
| sort _time
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen,
  sum(eval(if(EventCode=4625,1,0))) AS failures,
  sum(eval(if(EventCode=4624,1,0))) AS successes
  by src_ip, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| where failures > 10 AND successes > 0
| eval time_to_success = round((last_seen - first_seen)/60, 1)
| sort - failures
Step 2: Privilege Escalation Detection

New Admin Account Created (T1136.001):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720
| join TargetUserName type=left [
    search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 TargetUserName="Administrators"
    | rename MemberName AS TargetUserName
  ]
| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| eval alert = "New account created and added to Administrators group"

Special Privileges Assigned (EventCode 4672):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4672
SubjectUserName!="SYSTEM" SubjectUserName!="LOCAL SERVICE" SubjectUserName!="NETWORK SERVICE"
| stats count, values(PrivilegeList) AS privileges by SubjectUserName, ComputerName
| where count > 0
| search privileges IN ("SeDebugPrivilege", "SeTcbPrivilege", "SeBackupPrivilege",
  "SeRestorePrivilege", "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege")

Token Manipulation Detection (T1134):

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010", "0x1038", "0x1fffff", "0x40")
| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng|CrowdStrike)")
| sort - count
Step 3: Persistence Mechanism Detection

Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):

spl
index=wineventlog (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698)
  OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
      Image="*\\schtasks.exe")
| eval task_info = coalesce(TaskContent, CommandLine)
| search task_info="*powershell*" OR task_info="*cmd*" OR task_info="*http*" OR task_info="*\\Temp\\*"
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_info

Registry Run Key Modification (T1547.001):

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=13
TargetObject IN (
  "*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
  "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
  "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\\*",
  "*\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\*"
)
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetObject, Details
| where NOT match(Image, "(explorer\.exe|msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe)")
| sort - count

WMI Event Subscription (T1546.003):

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21
| stats count by Computer, Operation, Consumer, EventNamespace
| where count > 0
Step 4: Lateral Movement Detection

Remote Service Exploitation (T1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin Shares):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3
| stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_destinations, values(ComputerName) AS targets
  by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where unique_destinations > 3
| sort - unique_destinations
| table src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_destinations, targets

PsExec Detection (T1021.002):

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
(Image="*\\psexec.exe" OR Image="*\\psexesvc.exe"
 OR ParentImage="*\\psexesvc.exe"
 OR OriginalFileName="psexec.c")
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine

RDP Lateral Movement (T1021.001):

spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS rdp_targets, values(ComputerName) AS destinations
  by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where rdp_targets > 2
| sort - rdp_targets
Step 5: Build Forensic Timeline

Create comprehensive timeline for a compromised host:

spl
(index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon) Computer="WORKSTATION-042"
earliest="2024-03-14T00:00:00" latest="2024-03-16T00:00:00"
| eval event_description = case(
    EventCode=4624, "Logon: ".TargetUserName." (Type ".Logon_Type.")",
    EventCode=4625, "Failed Logon: ".TargetUserName,
    EventCode=4688 OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:*Sysmon*" AND EventCode=1),
      "Process: ".Image." CMD: ".CommandLine,
    EventCode=4698, "Scheduled Task: ".TaskName,
    EventCode=3, "Network: ".DestinationIp.":".DestinationPort,
    EventCode=11, "File Created: ".TargetFilename,
    EventCode=13, "Registry: ".TargetObject,
    1=1, "Event ".EventCode
  )
| sort _time
| table _time, EventCode, event_description, User, src_ip
Step 6: Create Lookup Tables for Enrichment

Build reference lookups for Windows Event ID context:

spl
| inputlookup windows_eventcode_lookup.csv
| table EventCode, Description, ATT_CK_Technique, Severity

If lookup doesn't exist, create it:

csv
EventCode,Description,ATT_CK_Technique,Severity
4624,Successful Logon,T1078,Informational
4625,Failed Logon,T1110,Low
4648,Explicit Credential Logon,T1078,Medium
4672,Special Privileges Assigned,T1134,Medium
4688,New Process Created,T1059,Informational
4698,Scheduled Task Created,T1053.005,Medium
4720,User Account Created,T1136.001,High
4732,Member Added to Security Group,T1098,High
4768,Kerberos TGT Requested,T1558,Informational
4769,Kerberos Service Ticket,T1558.003,Low
4771,Kerberos Pre-Auth Failed,T1110,Low
Show full SKILL.md (213 more words)Show less

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
EventCode 4624Successful logon event — Logon_Type 2 (interactive), 3 (network), 10 (RDP), 7 (unlock)
EventCode 4625Failed logon event — Status code indicates failure reason (bad password, account locked, disabled)
Sysmon EventCode 1Process creation with full command line, parent process, and hash information
Sysmon EventCode 3Network connection initiated by a process — source/dest IP, port, and process context
Logon Type 3Network logon (SMB, WMI, PowerShell Remoting) — key indicator of lateral movement
Logon Type 10Remote interactive logon via RDP/Terminal Services

Tools & Systems

  • Splunk Enterprise: SIEM platform with SPL query engine for Windows event log analysis and correlation
  • Sysmon (System Monitor): Microsoft Sysinternals tool providing detailed process, network, and file activity logging
  • Splunk CIM: Common Information Model mapping Windows events to normalized fields for cross-source queries
  • Windows Event Forwarding (WEF): Built-in Windows mechanism for centralizing event logs to a collector server

Common Scenarios

  • Kerberoasting (T1558.003): Detect EventCode 4769 with encryption type 0x17 (RC4) for non-standard service accounts
  • DCSync (T1003.006): Detect EventCode 4662 with DS-Replication-Get-Changes from non-DC sources
  • Golden Ticket (T1558.001): Detect EventCode 4769 with abnormal ticket properties (long lifetime, non-standard encryption)
  • Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002): Detect EventCode 4624 Logon_Type 3 with NTLM authentication from unexpected sources
  • DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002): Sysmon EventCode 7 showing unsigned DLLs loaded by legitimate processes

Output Format

WINDOWS EVENT LOG ANALYSIS — HOST: WORKSTATION-042
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Period:     2024-03-14 to 2024-03-15
Events:     12,847 total (Security: 9,231 | Sysmon: 3,616)

Authentication Summary:
  Successful Logons (4624):    487 (Type 3: 312, Type 10: 45, Type 2: 130)
  Failed Logons (4625):        847 (from 192.168.1.105 — BRUTE FORCE)
  Explicit Creds (4648):       12

Suspicious Findings:
  [HIGH]   847 failed logons followed by success at 14:35 from 192.168.1.105
  [HIGH]   New user "backdoor_admin" created (4720) at 14:38
  [HIGH]   User added to Administrators group (4732) at 14:38
  [MEDIUM] schtasks.exe creating persistence task at 14:42
  [MEDIUM] PowerShell encoded command execution at 14:45

ATT&CK Mapping:
  T1110.001 — Password Guessing (847 failed logons)
  T1136.001 — Local Account Creation (backdoor_admin)
  T1053.005 — Scheduled Task (persistence)
  T1059.001 — PowerShell (encoded execution)

© mukul975, Apache-2.0. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

SKILL.md and 3 other files (scripts, references) in skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk of mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.

  • SKILL.md
  • LICENSE
  • references/api-reference.md
  • scripts/agent.py

Open the folder on GitHubat commit 54a7988

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Works with

Categories

Questions about Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk

What does Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk do?

Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to…. Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk is an agent skill from mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills. Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques.

When should I use Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk?

Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk fits situations like: SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats; build detection queries; perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.

How do I install Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .claude/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk in Codex?

Run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) into .agents/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk, .gemini/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk, .github/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk and .opencode/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk in your project.

What does Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk needs Python for the scripts in its folder. Our summary lists: Python 3.

Does Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk access the network?

SKILL.md contains no URLs. Any network use would come from the scripts or tools the agent runs. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md found no risky patterns, such as piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files or hidden Unicode. It is not a guarantee. The check reads SKILL.md only: the scripts in the folder are not scanned, so read them before running anything.

What licence does Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk use?

Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk is published under the Apache-2.0 licence (declared in SKILL.md). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk use?

About 2.8k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 11k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full. Its references folder adds about 509 tokens, read only when the agent opens those files.

What are the alternatives to Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk: Incident Response Network (LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills, 2.2k stars), Breach Forensics (mukul975/Privacy-Data-Protection-Skills, 301 stars), Authorization Bypass Detection (Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard, 6.8k stars) and Run Assert Eval (responsibleai/ASSERT, 330 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Analyzing Windows Event Logs In Splunk?

mukul975 (a GitHub user) maintains it in mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills, which has 34,116 GitHub stars. The repository holds 644 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on August 31, 2026.

Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.