Hetzner

Hetzner — the cheap European box, made safe and reproducible

Hetzner Cloud is chosen for one reason: price/performance. A 2 vCPU / 4 GB AMD box runs about €7.99/mo, the EU Intel line dips under €4, and EU locations include 20 TB of egress. The risk is that "cheap" becomes "unhardened and unmonitored" — a root-SSH box on a public IPv4 with password auth on. Your job is to make the cheap box safe and reproducible: every server comes up from a committed cloud-init file and a Cloud Firewall ruleset, never from click-ops in the console. A box you can't recreate from a file isn't a box, it's a pet.

Decide before you create

Pick the line, then the location. Prices are post-2026-04-01 (a price adjustment took effect that date); treat exact cents as "verify in the console."

Rules:

• IPv4 costs extra (~€0.50–0.60/mo); IPv6 is free. An IPv6-only box is cheaper, but it breaks anything that can't reach IPv6: many container registries, some package mirrors, CI runners, SSH clients on IPv4-only nets. If docker pull or apt will run on the box, keep one IPv4 unless you've confirmed every upstream is dual-stack. Why: a saved €0.50/mo is not worth a broken docker pull at 2 a.m.
• Location decides your traffic budget. EU locations (Nuremberg, Falkenstein, Helsinki) include 20 TB/mo egress; overage ~€1/TB. US (Ashburn, Hillsboro) and Singapore have far lower included transfer. Why: pick US "for latency," serve a video, and the surprise bill is the traffic cap, not the instance.
• No APAC own datacenter. If your users are in Asia, this is a real latency cost — name it, don't hide it.

Full dated matrix, latency notes, and the no-SLA / no-managed-DB reality: references/plans-and-locations.md.

Provision reproducibly

Install the official CLI (latest v1.65.0, released 2026-05-21) and create a context (the token comes from the project's Security → API tokens, Read & Write):

brew install hcloud            # or: see github.com/hetznercloud/cli releases
hcloud context create my-project   # paste the Read+Write API token when prompted
hcloud server-type list        # confirm names/prices before you create

Bring the box up with cloud-init so hardening happens before first login:

hcloud server create \
  --name app-01 \
  --type cpx22 \
  --location fsn1 \
  --image debian-12 \
  --ssh-key my-laptop \
  --firewall app-edge \
  --user-data-from-file cloud-init.yaml

Use --location, not --datacenter: the datacenter attribute is deprecated and removed after 2026-07-01 for Servers and Primary IPs. Trimmed cloud-init skeleton (full annotated file in references/cloud-init.md):

#cloud-config
users:
  - name: deploy
    groups: [sudo]
    shell: /bin/bash
    sudo: ["ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL"]
    ssh_authorized_keys:
      - ssh-ed25519 AAAA... you@laptop   # your real public key, not a placeholder
disable_root: true                       # no root login at all
ssh_pwauth: false                        # no password auth, anywhere
package_update: true
packages: [ufw, fail2ban, unattended-upgrades]
runcmd:
  - sed -i 's/^#\?PermitRootLogin.*/PermitRootLogin no/' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
  - sed -i 's/^#\?PasswordAuthentication.*/PasswordAuthentication no/' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
  - ufw default deny incoming && ufw allow 22 && ufw allow 80 && ufw allow 443 && ufw --force enable
  - systemctl enable --now fail2ban
  - systemctl restart ssh

Rule: never create a box with a bare root password and "I'll harden it later." Later is a window where the box is reachable as root with password auth on, and Hetzner IPv4 space is scanned constantly. Bake it into boot.

Two firewalls, in order

The Cloud Firewall runs at the network edge — stateful, applied before the packet reaches the VM, and survives a misconfigured host. Create and apply it with or before the server:

hcloud firewall create --name app-edge
hcloud firewall add-rule app-edge --direction in --protocol tcp --port 22  --source-ips 0.0.0.0/0 --source-ips ::/0
hcloud firewall add-rule app-edge --direction in --protocol tcp --port 80  --source-ips 0.0.0.0/0 --source-ips ::/0
hcloud firewall add-rule app-edge --direction in --protocol tcp --port 443 --source-ips 0.0.0.0/0 --source-ips ::/0
hcloud firewall apply-to-resource app-edge --type server --server app-01

Inbound is default-deny — you only describe what you allow. Then the host ufw (set up in cloud-init above) is defense-in-depth: if you ever detach or fat-finger the Cloud Firewall, the box still isn't wide open. Why both: the edge firewall is your primary defense, but a single layer is a single point of failure, and the two are configured through different surfaces (API vs host).

Tighten SSH to your own IP/range once you know it:

hcloud firewall delete-rule app-edge --direction in --protocol tcp --port 22 --source-ips 0.0.0.0/0 --source-ips ::/0
hcloud firewall add-rule    app-edge --direction in --protocol tcp --port 22 --source-ips 203.0.113.4/32

SSH hardening rules

• Key-only auth. PasswordAuthentication no, PubkeyAuthentication yes. A password is brute-forceable; an ed25519 key is not.
• No root login. PermitRootLogin no + a sudo user. Root over SSH is the single most-targeted login on the internet.
• fail2ban on. Bans IPs after repeated failures — cheap insurance for the one port you must expose.
• Moving port 22 is obscurity, not security. It quiets log noise; it does not harden anything. Do it if you like clean logs, but never instead of key-only
  • a firewall.