---
name: trace-file-processing-pipelines
description: Trace uploaded, imported, generated, archived, converted, scanned, rendered, and downloaded files across storage, naming, extraction, parser, sandbox, and cleanup boundaries. Use to prove path resolution, active-content, parser-chain, derived-artifact, isolation, or lifecycle failures without duplicating deserialization or XML specialist procedures.
metadata:
  domain: application-security
  subdomain: file-processing-pipelines
  triggers:
    - file processing pipeline
    - upload transformation trace
    - archive extraction path
    - document conversion security
    - derived file exposure
    - parser sandbox boundary
  tags:
    - file-upload
    - archive
    - conversion
    - path-resolution
    - parser-isolation
    - lifecycle
  frameworks:
    mitre_attack:
      - T1190
      - T1203
    nist_csf:
      - ID.RA-01
      - PR.PS-01
---

# Trace File Processing Pipelines

Follow one controlled artifact from acceptance to every terminal consumer. Extension or MIME acceptance is not the conclusion; establish which bytes each downstream component actually reads, resolves, transforms, writes, fetches, renders, or executes.

## Construct the pipeline

Start from [assets/file-processing-ledger.example.json](assets/file-processing-ledger.example.json) and retain the contract in [assets/file-processing-ledger.schema.json](assets/file-processing-ledger.schema.json). Record original hash, uploader authority, metadata, storage identifier, canonical path, queue or job identity, scanners, extractors, converters, renderers, derived objects, download policy, retention, and deletion propagation.

Read [references/pipeline-invariants.md](references/pipeline-invariants.md) for boundary-specific questions. Invoke `test-deserialization-object-binding` when a stage reconstructs language or native objects, and `test-soap-xml-services` when XML processing is decisive.

## Validate with bounded fixtures

Use inert marker files, tiny archives, controlled names, matched metadata, and explicit resource ceilings. Compare original and derived hashes, canonical paths, execution identity, network reach, filesystem reach, and cleanup. Stop before leaving authorized storage or causing parser instability.

## Confirmation standard

Report the accepting interface, exact stage and component, attacker-controlled property, failed invariant, canonical path or derived artifact, matched control, security effect, cleanup behavior, and affected authority. A parser error or accepted upload alone is insufficient.