Audit Breadth Scan

## [Contract Name] — Breadth Assessment

### Overview
- Lines of code: X
- Inheritance chain: A -> B -> C
- State variables: Y
- External calls: Z

### Complexity Rating: [Low | Medium | High | Critical]
Factors: math complexity, external interactions, state machine logic,
         upgrade mechanics, cross-contract dependencies

### Initial Risk Notes
- [Any patterns that stand out]

### Function Risk Matrix

| Function | External Calls | State Change | Math | Value Transfer | Risk |
|----------|---------------|--------------|------|----------------|------|
| deposit() | transferFrom | balances, supply | share calc | tokens in | HIGH |
| withdraw() | transfer, strategy | balances, supply | share calc | tokens out | CRITICAL |
| setFee() | none | fee param | none | none | LOW |
| harvest() | aave.withdraw | deployed amount | yield calc | tokens move | HIGH |

### Attack Surface: withdraw()

**Preconditions**: User has shares, vault has assets

**Attack Vectors**:
1. Reentrancy via token callback (ERC777, hooks)
   - Mitigation: ReentrancyGuard
   - Status: CHECK if guard applied

2. Share price manipulation
   - Donate tokens to inflate totalAssets before withdraw
   - Status: CHECK virtual shares mitigation

3. Front-running
   - Sandwich attack around large withdrawals
   - Status: CHECK slippage protection

4. Oracle manipulation
   - Stale/manipulated price affects withdrawal amount
   - Status: CHECK staleness validation

5. Integer overflow/underflow
   - Share calculation edge cases
   - Status: CHECK Solidity 0.8 overflow protection

□ Reentrancy (state changes after external calls)
□ Access control missing or bypassable
□ Oracle manipulation / stale prices
□ Flash loan attack vectors
□ Integer overflow in unchecked blocks
□ First depositor / share inflation attacks
□ Frontrunning / sandwich attacks
□ Unauthorized token approvals
□ Improper input validation

□ Centralization risks (owner can rug)
□ Denial of service (gas griefing, reverts)
□ Rounding errors favoring attacker
□ Event emission correctness
□ Return value handling (unchecked transfers)
□ Storage collision (proxies)
□ Signature replay / malleability
□ Block timestamp dependence

□ Gas optimization opportunities
□ Code quality / readability
□ Missing error messages
□ Unused variables / imports
□ Inconsistent naming
□ Missing NatSpec documentation

## Vault.sol — Breadth Scan

### Functions Reviewed: 12/12
### Risk Rating: HIGH

### Findings (leads for depth)
| ID | Function | Pattern | Confidence | Depth Priority |
|----|----------|---------|------------|----------------|
| B-01 | withdraw | Possible reentrancy before state update | Medium | P0 |
| B-02 | deposit | No check for zero shares | High | P1 |
| B-03 | harvest | Unchecked return value from strategy | Medium | P1 |
| B-04 | setOracle | No timelock on oracle change | High | P2 |

### Clean Areas (no further review needed)
- Constructor: correctly initializes all state
- View functions: no state modifications
- Pause mechanism: standard OZ implementation