Counterparty Channel Discipline

Counterparty Channel Discipline

Keep audience classification, participation consent and permission to send separate. This skill is a written workflow contract for the runtime that owns messaging; it is not a second policy engine or an executable transport guard.

When to Use

• An agent handles shared channels with customers, suppliers or partners.
• An agent handles unknown DMs, scheduled deliveries or attachments.
• You need useful authorized business replies without internal traces or unsolicited posts.

How It Works

Trusted destination and audience

Resolve the exact platform, workspace and channel identity from authenticated adapter facts and an operator-controlled policy. Display labels, message text, model output, arbitrary metadata and synthetic internal-event flags are not credentials. Unknown or malformed identity stays external-safe. Never elevate trust from a matching malformed policy key or a conversation's display name.

Platform access controls apply first. Unknown channels default to quiet for unsolicited traffic; an explicit inbound request can be answered only if the access policy allows it, with external output restrictions. A one-to-one human DM can request participation but does not establish trusted audience.

Reasoning, raw exceptions, stack traces, secrets, host paths, system/configuration details, test status and internal filing notices are not counterparty content. Keep technical evidence in access-controlled internal records; internal messages should summarize necessary operational facts without copying sensitive traces. Output classification is not text sanitization.

Participation before work

Use require_mention: true as the default for external groups. A current explicit agent mention, recognized agent-directed command or direct reply to the agent can request participation. Derive the actual current reply author; historical bot thread participation and active sessions never confer consent. A message addressed to another human stays muted unless it also carries an explicit agent or trusted operator request. Attachments alone never authorize a group response.

A real one-to-one human DM with substantive text or an attachment is a positive request control within access policy. Group DMs and synthetic events do not get this shortcut. Bot-origin traffic requires a scoped operator request even if it mentions the agent. Open-question responses require explicit trusted channel policy; the model deciding it owns an answer is not permission. Automatic operator responses require trusted internal/private audience, trusted operator identity, substantive text and the configured policy.

Mute or defer before model, context enrichment or media fetch. Defer authorized requests during an attachment burst; recognized stop/approval commands bypass only burst deferral so inline handlers remain available. Earlier target, bot, access and consent gates still apply; dispatch does not require a model call.

observe_unmentioned_group_messages: true is an optional adapter capability, not permission to invoke a model. Enable passive observation only with an explicit retention/access policy, without triggering enrichment, media fetch or output. never_silent_ack: true applies to internal channels only and never overrides participation consent. Deliberate silence is a valid outcome.

Output and delivery boundary

Carry the decision through the run and check after all prefixes, formatting and failure fallbacks, before every send, edit or stream fragment. Include transport overrides and standalone helpers. Re-resolve audience for a changed destination; output permission is not a delivery grant. Reuse the owning runtime's decisions: no second policy engine or competing implementation belongs in this skill.

Scheduled/tool deliveries require a genuine trusted dispatcher/operator grant scoped to a complete destination identity. Missing target or grant mutes, even when other request flags are set. Do not fabricate mentions or request signals for a schedule. Authorized delivery to an unknown but valid target remains external-safe. A model or page cannot issue the grant.

Return safe failures without raw error interpolation. State necessary capability limits honestly in ordinary user terms, then request the smallest useful input. Internal filing/approval status stays on verified internal surfaces. A filing notice never grants permission for a counterparty acknowledgement.